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Book Reviews

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Roger Pearson
General Editor
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Taiwan and Theater Missile Defense

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Illinois State University

In responding to perceived new threats in the post-Cold War era, the US is now collaborating with Japan to deploy a theater missile defense (TMD) system in Northeast Asia. Confronting a mounting military threat from China, Taipei has seized on Washington's program as an opportunity to acquire anti-missile capability from the US. Interpreting US and Taiwanese actions as attempts to contain China and to undermine unification efforts with Taiwan, Beijing leaders strongly object both to the deployment of TMD in Northeast Asia and to the introduction of the related technology and equipment into Taipei. While Washington will continue its plan of deploying TMD, it is taking an ambiguous position regarding Taiwan's access to missile defense technology and equipment by deferring the sale of AEGIS destroyers to Taipei. The Clinton administration's ambiguous policy represents an unbalanced approach to cross-Strait relations and could inadvertently precipitate a dangerous crisis in the Taiwan Strait.

Key Words: China, Taiwan, Theater Missile Defense (TMD), Northeast Asia, Clinton administration foreign policy, Chinese-Taiwanese relations, Chinese military threat across the Taiwan Strait.

Introduction

The annual arms acquisition meeting between Taiwan and the US has recently concluded in Washington, D.C. While US arms sales to Taiwan have always been contentious,[2] Taipei's 2000 acquisition request has attracted even more attention. Among the weapon systems being asked for this year, the request for four Arleigh

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[2] For a discussion of US arms sales policy to Taiwan, see Wei-chin Lee. lUS Arms Transfer Policy to Taiwan: from Carter to Clinton,k Journal of Contemporary China, v.9 , no.23 (2000), pp.53-75 and T.Y. Wang, lUS Arms Sales Policy towards Taiwan: A Review of Two Decades of Implementation,k in Paul H. Tai. ed. *United States, China, and Taiwan: Bridges for the New Millennium* (Carbondale, IL: Public Policy Institute, Southern Illinois University, 1999), pp.115-141.

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Burke-class destroyers equipped with the highly advanced AEGIS battle management system has proven to be the most controversial. Because the AEGIS system is one of the crucial components of the US-planned theater missile defense (TMD) system in Northeast Asia, Beijing has repeatedly issued severe warnings against the sale, fearing that the transfer of the AEGIS system would bring Taiwan under the TMD umbrella. The US Congress, with its serious concern over China's missile threats to Taiwan, has undertaken legislative action demanding that the executive branch sell the AEGIS system to meet Taiwan's defense needs. After considerable deliberation, the Clinton administration has decided to sell a batch of air-to-air and air-to-ground missiles and the Pave Paws long-range radar.[3] However, it has deferred a decision on Taipei's request for Burke-class destroyers, pending a comprehensive study of Taiwan's defense needs and its ability to absorb such equipment.[4]

The Clinton administration's ambiguous decision represents a mixture of good news and bad news for both Beijing and Taipei. While Washington's decision is certainly a disappointment to Taipei and a victory for Beijing, both sides know that the sale of TMD-related technology and equipment to Taiwan is not a dead issue. As a new US administration will take office next spring, the sale of AEGIS destroyers to the island country will most likely be revived considering the strong support that Taipei has enjoyed in Congress. Thus, Taiwan's quest for anti-missile technology and equipment will remain a major political issue for both Taipei and Washington and a serious challenge to US-Taiwan-China relations.

This study attempts to assess the strategic considerations of Beijing, Taipei and Washington regarding the sale of TMD-related technology and equipment to Taiwan. It starts with an examination of the proposed US-planned TMD program in Northeast Asia, followed by an analysis of the concerns about the program held by

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[3] The Pave Paws is an early warning radar that can be used for over-the-horizon detection of incoming ballistic missiles. Although the exact specification is still unknown, the radar will likely be used as part of Taiwan's missile defense program.

[4] The Clinton administration also deferred its decision on the sale of submarines and naval observation aircraft. See, Jane Perlez, "U.S. With an Eye on China, Settles on Weapons for Taiwan," *New York Times*, April 18, 2000, in *http://www.nytimes.com* and Ted Plafker, "Chinese Protest U.S. sale of Weapons, Radar to Taiwan," *Washington Post*, April 19, 2000, in *http://washingtonpost.com*.

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Taipei and Beijing. It then discusses US strategic considerations regarding Taiwan's possible access to TMD-related technology and equipment. The conclusion will comment on Washington's deliberately ambiguous decision to defer the sale of AEGIS destroyers to Taipei and the policy implications for China-Taiwan-US relations.

TMD and US Ballistic Missile Defense Program

The US ballistic missile defense (BMD) program underwent a fundamental change in 1989 when the Bush administration initiated a review of the program as part of a broader examination of US strategic requirements for an emerging "new world order."[5] The review suggested that the most significant threat to the US as the Cold War was ending would be from unauthorized or terrorist attacks with limited numbers of missiles rather than an attack by thousands of Soviet warheads. Furthermore, given the proliferation of ballistic missile technology, US forces would face an increasing threat from shorter-range theater missiles. To prepare for this eventuality, the review concluded that the BMD program be transformed to concentrate on developing defenses against limited attacks rather than a massive Soviet missile attack. The apparent validation of the above assessment during the Gulf War, when the US responded to Iraq's *Scud* missile attacks with Patriot defense missiles, led to the Bush administration's decision in 1991 to pursue the development of a ground-based TMD.

The emphasis on the TMD system continues during the Clinton administration. The 1993 Bottom-Up Review (BUR) assigned top priority to the TMD Program over the National Missile Defense (NMD) and the BMD Advanced Technology Development programs so that the TMD Program was to receive $12 billion over the course of five years.[6] The need to develop and deploy a TMD system to

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[5] Donald R. Baucom, "Ballistic Missile Defense: A Brief History," in Ballistic Missile Defense Organization Web-site at *http://www.acq.osd.mil/bmdolink/html/origins.html*..

[6] In responding to Congressional pressure, the Department of Defense has increased its emphasis on the NMD Program since 1996 by shifting the program from its technology readiness orientation to a deployment readiness program. Known as the "three-plus-three," this approach called for the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization to support three more years of development of the system leading to a capability to deploy a national missile defense system in three more years if the threat warranted such a deployment. See, Donald,

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defend overseas American forces, particularly in Northeast Asia, has gained much momentum during the second Clinton administration. First of all, since the 1991 Gulf War, the US government has expressed deep concern about the growing threat posed by the proliferation of ballistic missiles and related technology. The Clinton administration estimated that over 20 nations now possess *Scud*-type ballistic missile systems.[7] The Congressionally-mandated Rumsfeld Commission[8] warned that these states could pose a threat to the US and its allies "within five years of a decision to do so, and that the US might not know for several years whether or not such a decision had been made."[9] North Korea in particular has been identified as a "rogue state" in Northeast Asia, which, despite the country's failing economy, has developed its ballistic-missile program and nuclear program. The US concern about Asia's regional security was intensified when North Korea test-fired a Taepo Dong-1 (TD-1) missile over Japan on August 31, 1998. The three-stage launch vehicle provides North Korea with a missile having a range 3,000 kilometers.[10] This gives North Korea a credible ballistic missile threat against Japan, South Korea and American troops in the region. The deployment of an anti-missile defense system in Northeast Asia is now considered a high priority in US strategic consideration in the

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"Ballistic Missile Defense: A Brief History." For Congressional actions on this issue, see "the National Missile Defense Act of 1999" (106 S. 257 and 106 H.R. 4) in *http://web.lexis-nexis.com/congcomp*.

[7] "Prepared Statement of Honorable John Hamre Deputy Secretary of Defense before the Senate Armed Services Committee," October 2, 1998, in *http://web.lexis-nexis.com/congcomp*.

[8] The formal name of the Rumsfeld Commissionis called "Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States led by former Defense Secretary Ronald Rumsfeld. The Commission was originally authorized to be established by the 104th Congress to assess the ballistic missile threat to the United States as part of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 (Public Law 104-201). However, because of delays in the appointments process, the commissions charter was re-authorized in the 105th Congress in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 (Public Law 105-85). See "Report of The Activities of the Committee on National Security for the 105th Congress," House Report 105-841, January 2, 1999, in *http://web.lexis-nexis.com/congcomp*.

[9] See "Prepared Statement of Honorable Donald Rumsfeld before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,' October 6, 1998, in *http://web.lexis-nexis.com/congcomp*.

[10] Peter Landers, Susan Lawrence, and Julian Baum, "Hard Target," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, September 24, 1998, pp.20-21 and "CIA Agent Warns on Korean Missiles," *New York Times*, February 10, 2000, in *http://www.nytimes.com*.

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region.

Secondly, China's evolving military doctrine of conducting "limited war under high-technology conditions" has also heightened US interest in regional TMD deployment. Responding to the Gulf War of 1991, Chinese military planners now believe that modern warfare will be limited in scope and will involve highly sophisticated weaponry on the battlefield.[11] To meet the perceived challenges ahead, in particular the final resolution of the so-called "Taiwan question," China has undertaken substantial efforts to modernize its military during the past decade. Rather than launching an across-the-board modernization of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), Beijing is focusing on those programs that would give considerable advantage to a technologically backward country like China in a confrontation with a technologically advanced foe such as the US. Characterized as "asymmetric engagement capabilities," these programs include the development of anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), long-range land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs), and conventional short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs). Currently, China has developed or deployed two types of SRBMs: the CSS-6 (M-9) with a maximum range of 600 km and the CSS-X-7 (M-11) with a range of 300 km, and a series of ASCMs, including the C-601, C-801 and the C-802.[12] The newly acquired Russian-made Sovremenny-class destroyer armed with SUNBURN missiles specifically designed to penetrate American carriers' battle group defenses will further improve China's anti-ship capability.[13] The deployment of these weapons, along with Beijing's use of its ballistic missile forces to intimidate Taiwan in 1995 and 1996[14] and its explicit threats[15] to

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[11] For an analysis of changes in China's military doctrines, see Nan Li, "The PLA's Evolving Warfighting Doctrine, Strategy and Tactics, 1985-95," in David Shambaugh and Richard H. Yang. *China's Military in Transition* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), pp.179-199.

[12] Department of Defense, "The Security Situation in the Taiwan Strait," February 26, 1999, in *http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/twstrait._02261999.html.*

[13] "New Chinese Guided-Missile Ship Heightens Tension," *New York Times*, February 9, 2000, in *http://www.nytimes.com.*

[14] For an analysis of the 1995-96 Missile Crisis in the Taiwan Strait, see John F. Cooper. "The Origins of Conflict Across the Taiwan Strait," *Journal of Contemporary China*, v.6, no.15 (1997), pp.199-227.

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employ them to deter Washington's possible involvement in future cross-strait conflict, suggest that China is willing to use its newly developed capabilities to engage in limited warfare in the Taiwan Strait.[16] China's evolving strategic doctrine thus further increases America's perceived need of a missile defense system in Northeast Asia to protect its deployed forces.

It is within this context that the Clinton administration's decision about developing a TMD system in Northeast Asia is being made. Since it faces the same mounting military threat from Beijing, the Taipei government seized on Washington's concern as an opportunity to acquire anti-missile capability from the US.

Challenges to Taiwan's Security

Since the end of the Chinese Civil War in 1949, the Beijing government has never abandoned the idea of "unifying Taiwan with the motherland" and it has acted aggressively to further that goal. Several major battles were fought in the 1950s and 1960s, and with US assistance the Taipei government thwarted Communist military attacks on offshore islands held by Taiwan. The 1970s saw a shift of China's strategy away from a reliance on the "military liberation" of Taiwan to a wave of "peaceful initiatives" for China's unification. However, Beijing continues to regard Taiwan as a "renegade province" and has refused to recognize Taipei as an equal and legitimate negotiating partner. In attempting to coerce Taipei into accepting its unification formula known as "one country, two systems," Beijing has repeatedly warned that it would use "any means

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[15] The PLA General Xiong Guankai, a frequent spokesman on Chinese policy, reportedly made an explicit threat to the US with China's nuclear arsenal by questioning the US leaders' willingness to trade Los Angeles for Taipei. See, Ching Cheong, "Will TMD Imperil Taiwan," *the Strait Times*, February 8, 1999 and "Between China and the US: Taiwan, Even More Than Human Rights, is the Most Dangerous Issue. Here's Why," *Washington Post*, January 10, 1999. Both are in *http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe.* For a recent assessment of China's military preparations on a possible clash with Taiwan involving the United States, see Department of Defense, "Report to Congress Pursuant to the FY2000 National Defense Authorization Act," June 22, 2000, in *http://www.defenselink.mil.*

[16] See testimony of George J. Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence Agency, in *Current and Projected National Security Threats*, Hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee, February 2, 1999, in *http://web.lexis-nexis.com/congcomp.*

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it deems necessary, including military ones, to uphold its sovereignty and territorial integrity."[17]

The apex of Beijing's military pressure came after Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui's "private visit" to his alma mater, Cornell University, in June 1995. As Beijing leaders interpreted Lee's visit to the US as part of his "pragmatic diplomacy," an unacceptable bid to create "two Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan," they launched a series of military exercises and missile tests in waters close to Taiwan during the period between July 1995 and March 1996. Although China's military maneuver did not escalate into an all-out war across the Taiwan Strait, thanks in part to the Clinton administration's decision to deploy two aircraft carrier battle groups to the vicinity of Taiwan in March 1996, Beijing's "missile diplomacy" has caused serious concern in Taiwan and in Asia generally, as well as in the US. Just two months after the ending of the crisis, Washington briefed a Taiwan military team invited to the US as part of Taipei's arms-purchase mission on the Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) anti-missile system.[18]

Indeed, Beijing's missile threat to Taiwan is real and imminent. Analysts generally agree that Beijing lacks the ability to mount a successful invasion of Taiwan, as it does not have the military capabilities to gain secure control of the sea and air necessary for such an operation. Even an invasion of some of Taiwan's offshore islands would carry high risks and costs, as they are heavily fortified by Taiwanese troops. The most likely military scenario for Beijing would be a replay of the 1995-96 Missile Crisis. It could also have a higher level of intensity than the 1995-96 version and could involve direct strikes on sites in Taiwan. The missile campaign could be supplemented through information warfare by the use of computer viruses and electromagnetic pulses to knock out Taiwan's communications and transportation links. The goal of such attacks would be to disrupt the island's social and economic stability, demoralize Taiwan's citizens and to undermine their support for the

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[17] The State Council of the PRC, "The Taiwan Question and Reunification of China," *Beijing Review*, v.36, no.36 (September 6-12, 1993), pp.V-VI.

[18] Interview with a high ranking Taiwanese military official. Also see, "US Reported to invite Taiwan to Help Build Anti-missile System," *Deutsche Presse-Agentur*, August 26, 1996, in *http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe*.

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Taipei government.[19] China has already deployed 200 short-range ballistic missiles in Funjian province opposite Taiwan and is adding about 50 a year.[20] A recent report by the US Defense Intelligence Agency indicates that these offensive M-9s and M-11s could knock out most of Taiwan's military bases with little or no warning.[21] Beijing is also constructing two new bases for Russian-made S-300 surface-to-air missiles at Longtian, where several batteries of S-300s have already been deployed. Because the S-300s have a much greater range and can strike Taiwanese warplanes much farther from the coast, they will enhance China's ability to attack Taiwan, as these missiles provide protection for Chinese offensive missile forces and aircraft.[22] To cope with Beijing's missile threats, Taipei has expressed strong interest in being a partner of the US-proposed TMD system in Northeast Asia, hoping that Taiwan could be covered under the TMD umbrella once it is completed.

However, the decision to participate in the TMD project is not without controversy in Taiwan.[23] First of all, the proposed TMD program is a complicated system and its development is costly. Because the threat of ballistic missiles varies with respect to range and capability, no single system can perform the entire TMD mission. The US Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) thus has developed a "family-of-systems"[24] approach in order to successfully defeat the theater missile threat. The family-of-systems approach aims to develop both lower-tier - those systems that intercept at relatively low altitudes within the atmosphere - and upper-tier systems - those that intercept missile targets outside the atmosphere and at longer

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[19] Craig S. Smith. "China's Threat to Taiwan: Likelihood of Attack Deemed Low," *New York Times*, March 7, 2000, in *http://www.nytimes.com*.

[20] See, "Admiral Dennis C. Blair Briefs on U.S. Pacific Command," *Department of Defense News Briefing*, March 07, 2000, in *http:// http://www.defenselink.mil*.

[21] Bill Gertz, "Chinese Bases near Taiwan Sport Defense Missiles," *Washington Times*, March 28, 2000, in *http://www.washtimes.com*.

[22] Ibid.

[23] See, for instance, *1999 Hong Se Jing Jie* (*Red Alert 1999*) (Taipei: TVBS, 1999); *TMD and Taiwan's Security: What are the Strategic Choices for Taipei?* (Taipei: Vanguard Institute for Policy Studies, 1999); "ROC Still Judging TMD's Pros, Cons," *Free China Journal*, January 15, 1999, p.2 and *"TMD is a Cross-century Issue," Xin Xin Wen* (*the Journalist*), v.619, January 16, 1999, in *http://magazines.sinanet.com*.

[24] "The Family of System Concept," *BMDO Fact Sheet* AQ-99-16, in http://www.acq.osd.mil/bmdo.

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ranges. Three major components constitute the core of the BMD program: improvements to the Army's Patriot missile system known as Patriot Advanced Capability-III (PAC-III) to provide low-tier BMD architecture, the THAAD aiming to intercept attacking missiles at high altitudes, and a modification to the Navy's AEGIS air defense system to give it the capability to intercept short, medium and long-range theater ballistic missiles.[25]

The cost of developing such a complicated defense shield is staggering. For Taiwan, each AEGIS destroyer will cost $1 billion and the total cost of the shield is tentatively estimated to be $9.4 billion over 10 years.[26] The high price tag of the system has led Taiwan's former Minister of Defense to characterize the project as a "money sucking machine" (*qian keng*). He was that it would easily exhaust the country's scarce defense budget and impose an "exclusionary effect" on other important military projects.[27]

Critics also argue that the TMD system is still in its developmental stage and is estimated to be in operation by 2005 at the earliest. The specific technical demands for a system covering Taiwan may also impose additional limitations on its effectiveness because of the short distance between the island and the Chinese mainland. If Beijing were to decide to attack or intimidate Taiwan again with its ballistic missiles in the next five years or so, Taiwan may gain little or even no TMD protection. Joining the proposed anti-missile defense system, however, will certainly anger Beijing leaders and further strain cross-Strait relations, since China has repeatedly warned the Clinton administration against the transfer of TMD-related technology and equipment to Taiwan. Beijing is likely to develop even more advanced missile systems and both sides of the Taiwan Strait would be pushed into an arms race that Taipei cannot win. These concerns have led some Taiwanese analysts to argue that Taipei should not participate in this expensive and untested defense system. Others have suggested that Taiwan should develop its own

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[25] "Patriot Advanced Capability-3," *BMDO Fact Sheet* AQ-99-04, "Navy Area Ballistic Missile Defense Program," *BMDO Fact Sheet* AQ-99-02, "Navy Theater Wide Ballistic Missile Defense Program," *BMDO Fact Sheet* AQ-99-03. All are in http://www.acq.osd.mil/bmdo.

[26] *Financial Times*, October 7, 1999 in *http://www.ft.com/*.

[27] *Taiwan Today News Network*, January 11, 1999, in *http://w3.ttnn.com/can*.

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ballistic missile program instead as a deterrent against Beijing's military threats.[28]

Notwithstanding these concerns, Beijing's missile threats to the island country's security are considered credible and formidable by Taiwanese military planners and they believe that the island's defense against such threats needs to be equally so. Taiwan has already acquired the Modified Air Defense System (MADS),[29] an improved variant of the Patriot surface-to-air missile known as PAC-II, which initially was acquired for air defense against China's warplanes.[30] The current MADS missile batteries, of which the first shipment was delivered to the island in 1997[31], are few in quantity and do not have the crucial satellite links to make them effective against incoming ballistic missiles. While these anti-missile batteries are important in Taiwan's air defense, they are not enough to protect the whole island from China's missile attacks.[32] However, Beijing's strong reaction has rendered Taiwan's direct participation in the TMD program problematic. Instead, Taipei has vowed to establish its own low-tier missile defense shield known as the "Taiwan Missile Defense."[33] Using this rationale, Taipei hopes that Washington will be more willing to share TMD-related technology and provide needed equipment to the island country. The Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) stipulates that "the United States will make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be

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[28] Taiwan is reportedly developing its medium range surface-to-surface missile in order to counter China's missile threat. *Shi-jie Ri-bao* (*World Journal*), November 26, 1999, p.A1.

[29] David Hughes, "Taiwan to Acquire Patriot Derivative," *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, March 1, 1993, p.61.

[30] Interview with a high ranking Taiwanese military official.

[31] "US Patriot-based Anti-missile Defense System Arrives in Taiwan," *Deutsche Presse-Agentur*, January 15, 1997, in *http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe*.

[32] The US Department of Defense estimates that Taiwan will need at least 12 batteries of Patriot PAC-III to defend itself against China's short range ballistic missiles. However, the Taiwanese military's own estimation shows that it will need more than 80 Patriot PAC II missiles batteries to adequately defend the entire island against China's missile threats. See, "Report to Congress on Theater Missile Defense Architecture Options for the Asia-Pacific Region," in *http://taiwansecurity.org* and Julian Baum, "Defense Dilemma," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, May 28, 1998, p.33.

[33] *Shi-jie Ri-bao* (*World Journal*), January 3, 2000, p.A5. Also see interview with Taiwan's former Defense Minister Tang Fei, *Financial Times*, October 7, 1999 in *http://www.ft.com/* and "Taiwan to Build Anti-missile Shield," February 1, 2000, in *http://www.nytimes.com*.

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necessary..." (section 3 (a)).[34]

Following this strategy, in its 2000 arms acquisition list Taipei requested four Burke-class destroyers equipped with the AEGIS battle management system, in addition to the Pave Paws long-range radar and other air-to-air and air-to-ground missiles.[35] The AEGIS is designed as a total weapon system, from detection to kill. It has an advanced multi-function phased-array radar, the AN/SPY-1, which is capable of performing search, track and missile guidance functions simultaneously with a capacity of over 100 targets.[36] Using the Standard Missiles as interceptors, the AEGIS system successfully demonstrated a TMD capability in 1997.[37] Taiwanese military planners believe that AEGIS destroyers have a better battlefield survivability due to their mobility and are capable of providing an island-wide missile defense system for Taiwan.

Through the acquisition of AEGIS destroyers, Taipei also hopes that it will become a *de facto* partner in the US-proposed TMD system and can form an implicit military alliance with both the US and Japan. This would increase the military costs that China would have to bear in mounting an attack on the island. Even if Taipei would not gain TMD protection if Beijing were to launch a missile attack in the next five years, Washington is likely to come to Taiwan's aid and this would be of tremendous security assistance to the island country. Some analysts have also argued that China is going to advance its missile program no matter what decision Taipei makes regarding its participation in the TMD system. Therefore, Taiwan needs to plan how to defend itself against Beijing's ballistic missile threats rather than to ponder whether the acquisition of a defensive system would be regarded as provocative by Chinese leaders.[38] These considerations may explain why Taipei leaders of both the ruling and opposition parties favor participating in the development or acquisition of TMD-related technology and equipment even

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[34] Interview with a high ranking Taiwanese military official.

[35] Note that Taiwan is also beefing up its indigenous missile development program. The military-run Chungshan Institute of Science and Technology is adapting its *Tian Gong* (*Sky Bow*) surface-to-air missiles to serve the anti-missile purpose. See *World Journal*, February 7, 1999, p.A1.

[36] "AEGIS Combat System," *Navy Fact File* in *http://www.chinfo.navy.mil.*

[37] "Standard Missile," *Navy Fact File* in *http://www.chinfo.navy.mil.*

[38] "ROC Still Judging TMD's Pros, Cons" and *Red Alert 1999.*

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though they have also expressed reservations about the potential costs and the questionable reliability of the project.[39]

However, unlike the cases of Japan and South Korea, where the US is actively lobbying for them to participate in the system, Taiwan's development of a missile defense shield is not a decision that can be made on its own. Taipei's participation in a US-planned anti-missile system depends on Washington's evaluation of the Chinese reaction to Taiwan's inclusion and there is little Taiwan can do to change this state of affairs.

Beijing's Objections

Chinese leaders reacted very strongly to an inclusion of Taiwan in the US-proposed missile defense system and therefore to Taipei's intended acquisition of TMD-related technology and equipment from Washington. Claiming that the inclusion of the island in the anti-missile structure would be considered a hostile act, Beijing warned that the transfer of AEGIS destroyers to Taiwan would "certainly lead to serious consequences."[40]

The Beijing leaders' strong reaction primarily comes from their concern over what they perceive as a rising Taiwan independence movement on the island. During the past decade, the Taipei government under President Lee Teng-hui's leadership has resisted the call for unification under China's "one country, two systems" plan. In response to the popular demand for increasing the international recognition of Taiwan's national identity, Lee's administration has employed "pragmatic diplomacy" aimed at developing substantive ties with other countries and breaking the diplomatic isolation imposed by Beijing. Taipei has also made several attempts to join the United Nations and other international organizations. After Lee's successful "private visit" to the US in 1995, Taipei implemented the "no haste, with patience" (*jie-ji yueng-ren*) policy to restrict Taiwanese investments in China and has also aggressively pursued the

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[39] See, *World Journal*, March 28, 1999, p.A1; *World Journal*, March 1, 1999, p.A1; Barbara Opall-Rome, "Taiwan Resists Call to Embrace TMD," *Defense News*, November 30-December 6, 1998, p.4 & p.36.

[40] "Chinese Warn US Not to Arm Taiwan; Official Says Transfer of Missile Defenses Would be 'Last Straw'," *Washington Post*, March 6, 1999, in *http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe.*

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acquisition of advanced weaponry for defense. Last summer, Lee directly challenged Beijing's "one China" policy by announcing that Taipei would treat cross-Strait contacts as "special state-to-state relations." This characterization of cross-Strait relations, commonly labeled as the "two states theory," had angered Chinese leaders and they consider Taipei's policy an unacceptable attempt at secession. Beijing's anxiety over Taipei's move towards a *de jure* independence was heightened further with Chen Shui-bian's election as Taiwan's new President.[41] Regarding Chen, a pro-independence candidate, as the genuine successor to Lee, Beijing fears that Taipei's "covert independence" plot may someday triumph and lead to a permanent separation of Taiwan from "the motherland." Chinese leaders' sense of urgency has been fully expressed in a recently issued white paper in which they threatened that Taiwan could expect military attack if it indefinitely postponed negotiations on unification.[42]

From the Chinese military planners' point of view, the use of ballistic missiles probably is the most cost-effective military tactic against Taiwan, either for the purpose of intimidation or destruction.[43] As demonstrated by the 1995-96 Missile Crisis, the island country's economic and social stability was severely disrupted by Beijing's test-firing ballistic missiles. The inclusion of Taiwan in the US-deployed TMD system would certainly undermine China's only credible military threat against Taiwan, given that an invasion is militarily impossible or too costly to be carried out. The inclusion of Taiwan in the proposed missile defense system also amounts to the establishment of a new security alliance between Taipei and Washington. The termination of the Taiwan-US Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954 was one of the conditions demanded by Beijing leaders when China normalized its relationship with the US two decades ago.[44] Chinese leaders certainly could not tolerate the

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[41] *World Journal*, March 19, 2000, p.A1.

[42] The Taiwan Affairs Office and the Information Office of the State Council, "The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue." February 21, 2000, in *http://www.peopledaily.com.cn.*

[43] For an analysis of ballistic missiles as a tactical weapon, see Eugene Fox and Stanley Orman, "Motivations for Missile Defenses," *the Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies*, v.24, no.3 (Fall 1999), pp.259-273.

[44] Harry Harding, *A Fragile Relationship: The United States and China since 1972* (Washington, D.C.: the Brookings Institution, 1992).

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resumption of such a military alliance between Taiwan and the US again. They worry that the inclusion of Taiwan in the TMD will give "the pro-independence forces in Taiwan a false sense of security, which may incite them to reckless moves."[45] Beijing therefore considers the deployment of TMD in Northeast Asia as a deliberate attempt on the part of the US to undermine its efforts to unify Taiwan with the Chinese mainland.

Beijing's objections to the TMD deployment are not limited to solely the proposed inclusion of Taiwan, but also stem from broader strategic considerations. China currently has a fleet of ballistic missiles armed with conventional and nuclear warheads. The combination of this weaponry and other modernized conventional forces could enable China to exert considerable leverage over the political and military decision-making of its neighboring countries and the US in peacetime as well as in times of crisis. The deployment of TMD will nullify Beijing's recent effort to develop its capabilities of engaging in asymmetric warfare, which aims to give China significant advantages over an adversary such as the US. Although the TMD is described as merely a defensive weapon, Beijing's leaders fear that its ability to protect deployed military forces would give it an offensive character and provide the US and its allies with considerable advantages in the battlefield. As the proposed TMD system not only has the capability of theater missile defense but also possesses the potential of defending against strategic nuclear missiles, China's nuclear deterrence capability would be severely compromised against a nation covered by a TMD system. If a US-proposed TMD system were to be deployed in Northeast Asia, China would be forced to develop counter-measures in order to protect its vulnerability. Such an unwanted arms race would divert China's scarce resources which would otherwise be used for its economic modernization.[46] Using the logic of deterrence, Chinese leaders have argued that the TMD

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[45] Sha Zukang, "China policy on International Nuclear Proliferation," Remarks at Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, *Federal News Service*, January 12, 1999, in *http://web.lexis-nexis.com/congcomp*. Also see, Zhang Zhao-zhong, "China's Internal Affairs Should not be Interfered," *Jie Fang Jun Bao* (*People's Liberation Army Daily*), March 22, 1999, p.5.

[46] Sha Zukang, "China policy on International Nuclear Proliferation." Also see Yan Xuetong, "Theater Missile Defense and Northeast Asian Security," *the Nonproliferation Review* v.6, no.3 (Spring-Summer 1999), pp.65-74.

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system violates the US-Soviet 1972 Anti-ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty[47] and the Missile Technology Control Regime[48]; and they have allied themselves with Russian leaders to oppose its deployment.[49]

Chinese leaders are also uneasy about Japan's involvement in developing the proposed TMD system.[50] Because the 1997 US-Japan Defense Cooperation Guidelines require that Tokyo provide support to American military forces during wartime, there is concern in China that Japan's participation in TMD could become a pretext for involvement in any military conflict in the Taiwan Strait. Arguing that the development of a highly sophisticated TMD will certainly upgrade military and technological cooperation among those nations involved in the program, Beijing leaders oppose Tokyo's participation in the project, since it would give Japan capabilities far exceeding its "legitimate" defensive needs.[51]

To Chinese leaders, the US-proposed anti-missile system in Northeast Asia could be used by Washington and Japan not only to undermine their unification efforts with Taiwan but also to contain China. It therefore represents both interference in China's internal affairs and a threat to its national security and must be stopped if possible.

US Considerations

Over Beijing's objections, the US Congress has provided about $2 billion every year for the TMD project since 1998 and will provide

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[47] Sha Zukang, "Missile Defense Folly," *Defense News*, v.13, no.50 (1998), p.15. For a discussion on whether the deployment of a theater missile defense system violates the ABM Treaty, see Richard A. Falkenrath, "Theater Missile Defense and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty," *Survival*, v.36, no.4 (Winter 1994-95), pp.140-160; Eugene Fox and Stanley Orman, "Why International Theater Missile Defense is Still A Challenge Rather Than a Reality?" *the Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies*, v.23, no.2 (Summer 1998), pp.107-120.

[48] James Kynge, "Threat of Missile Transfer," *Financial Times*, February 26, 1999, in *http://www.ft.com/*.

[49] "Zhang Wannin Holds Talks with Russian DM," *People's Liberation Army Daily* June 11, 1999, p.A1.

[50] For an analysis of Japan's involvement of the TMD project, see Stephen A. Cambone, "The United States and Theater Missile Defense in Northeast Asia," *Survival*, v.39, no.3 (Autumn 1997), pp.66-84.

[51] Sha Zukang, "Missile Defense Folly."

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another 1.7 billion in 2001.[52] Tokyo, fearing that North Korea's test-firing of the TD-1 missile would impose a threat to Japan's national security, has also agreed to participate in the long-discussed joint research program on the anti-missile defense system.[53] These developments suggest that the deployment of the TMD system is not likely to be changed simply because of Beijing's objections.

However, the Clinton administration's position on Taiwan's participation in the TMD project is ambiguous at best. Instead of taking a clear position in response to Beijing's concern and Taipei's interest in the project, the administration's policy is that "we do not preclude the possibility of Taiwan having access to TMD."[54] While declining Taipei's request for AEGIS destroyers in 2000, Washington at the same time indicated that it was committed to "a comprehensive study of [Taiwan's] naval requirements in which one of the possible candidate systems would be the AEGIS system."[55] Apparently, the Clinton administration is not ready to rule out the possibility of Taiwan having access to TMD-related technology and equipment and is willing to leave the decision to the next administration.

Washington's policy regarding Taiwan's participation in the TMD system is the result of its efforts to balance America's interests in cooperation with Beijing on a world stage with its interest in not having Taiwan and China go to war. The US government recognizes that there are many economic, political and strategic interests involved in the Sino-US relationship. First of all, China is one of the largest markets in the world and is the 3rd largest US trading partner. As a permanent member on the UN Security Council and a member of the so-called "nuclear club," Beijing's cooperation is crucial to

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[52] "The Ballistic Missile Defense Fiscal Year 1999 Budget," *BMDO Fact Sheet* PO-99-01 and Robert Snyder, "Ballistic Missile Defense Organization Press Release: FY01 President's Budget," February 4, 2000. Both are in *http://www.acq.osd.mil/bmdo*.

[53] Kensuke Ebata, "Japan Joins USA in theater Missile Defense Research," *Jane's Defense Weekly*, September 30, 1998; Willis Witter, "Japan Makes Missile-Defense Plan high Priority; North Korea's Launch Spurs Rise in Spending," *Washington Times*, November 6, 1998; "USA-Japan Talks Advance on Sea-based Shield," *Jane's Defense Weekly*, November 18, 1998. All are in *http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe*.

[54] See testimony of Stanley Roth, Assistant Secretary of State, "Twenty Years of The Taiwan Relations Act," Hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, March 25, 1999, in *http://web.lexis-nexis.com/congcomp*.

[55] See comments by Walter Slocombe, the Undersecretary of Defense, in "A Delicate Balance," *Online NewsHour*, April 18, 2000, in *http://www.pbs.org*.

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Washington in dealing with a large variety of issues, such as the ethnic conflict in Bosnia, the launch of a punitive Gulf War against Iraq, and the proliferation of nuclear and missile technologies to Iran and North Korea, all major interests to the US. This may explain why the Clinton administration, instead of "containing" China as some have proposed,[56] has instead chosen to "engage" with Beijing, leading to the establishment of the "constructive strategic partnership" between the two countries in 1997.[57] As the "Taiwan question" has become the most sensitive issue in Sino-US relations, Washington certainly cannot treat the inclusion of Taiwan in the TMD in isolation. The proposed deployment of the TMD system in Northeast Asia has already been regarded by Beijing as the start of an undeclared policy of "containment." The Clinton administration fears that the inclusion of Taiwan in the system would only strengthen such a perception by the Chinese leaders in the strongest possible way.

The sharing of TMD-related technology and equipment is an even more sensitive issue in 2000, considering that Taiwan's newly elected president, Chen Shui-bian, has staunch pro-independence credentials. His affiliated Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) is the only major political party on the island that has adopted a plank pursuing Taiwan's *de jure* independence. Although Chen has moderated his position considerably since the election,[58] Chinese leaders have exhibited their deep mistrust and suspicion of Chen and the DPP as Taiwan's next ruling party. They insisted that the new government had to accept Beijing's "one China" principle and recognize Taiwan as a

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[56] A classic work of the "containment theory" is Charles Krauthammer, "Why We Must Contain China," *Time*, July 31, 1995, p.72. Another work of a similar line of argument is Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Munro, "China I: The Coming Conflict with America," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol.76, no.2 (March/April, 1997), pp.18-32. For an analysis of the "containment" vs. "engagement" arguments, see Denny Roy, "The 'China Threat' Issue," *Asian Survey*, Vol.36, no.8 (August, 1996), pp.758-771.

[57] The White House, "Joint U.S.-China Statement," October 29, 1997, in http://www.pub.whitehouse.gov/.

[58] See "Full Transcript of an Exclusive Interview with Taiwan's President-elect Chen Shui-bian," *Los Angels Times*, March 22, 2000, in *http://www.latimes.com* and "Taiwan's New Leadership Hints at Dropping Push for Independence," *New York Times*, March 21, 2000, in *http://www.nytimes.com*.

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part of China, or Taiwan could expect "disaster instead of peace."[59] Washington feared that the transfer of AEGIS destroyers to Taipei would be viewed by Beijing leaders as an explicit support for Taiwan independence, which would further aggravate the cross-Strait tension, destroy any hope for peaceful dialogues between Taipei and Beijing[60] and turn the Clinton administration's policy of engagement with China into enduring hostility.

The Clinton administration, however, is keenly aware of the threats that China's ballistic missiles pose to Taiwan as well as to the US. Immediately after Beijing test-fired a series of ballistic missiles in the Taiwan Strait in 1996, former CIA director James Woolsey testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee that "it will not be too long before ... the rulers in Beijing... [are] able ...to create in effect an intentional Chernobyl at a Taiwanese nuclear power plant, by hitting the power plant, again without using weapons of mass destruction."[61] The 1999 DoD report to the Congress also warned that by 2005 China "will possess the capability to attack Taiwan with air and missile strikes" and suggested that Taiwan's "success in deterring potential Chinese aggression will depend on its continued acquisition of modern arms, technology and equipment ..."[62] Most importantly, as George J. Tenet, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), has warned, "China is increasing the size and survivability of its retaliatory nuclear missile force, ..." and "is also developing and acquiring air and naval systems intended to deter the United States from involvement in a Taiwan Strait crisis and to extend China's fighting capability beyond its coastline."[63] Because

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[59] "Taiwan Warned To Accept China Terms," *New York Times*, May 9, 2000, in *http://www.nytimes.com*.

[60] See comments by Walter Slocombe in "A Delicate Balance."

[61] See the testimony of James Woolsey, Former Director of Central Intelligence Agency, in "Need For National Ballistic Defense System," Hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, September 24, 1996, in *http://web.lexis-nexis.com/congcomp/*.

[62] Department of Defense, "The Security Situation in the Taiwan Strait."

[63] The testimony of George J. Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence Agency, "Current and Projected National Security Threats," Hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee, February 2, 1999, in *http://web.lexis-nexis.com/congcomp*. For an assessment of China's missile threats to Taiwan, also see the testimony of George J. Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence Agency, "the Worldwide Threat in 2000," Hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, March 22, 2000, and the testimony of Robert Walpole, National Intelligence Officer for Strategic and Nuclear Programs, "The Ballistic Missile

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a strong defensive capability for Taiwan can force Beijing's leaders to have second thoughts on an attempt to resolve the issue of China's reunification by force, Washington is not willing to forgo the option of supplying Taiwan with TMD-related technology and equipment or even to include the island under the missile defense umbrella if it would deter a Chinese attack without the need for politically unacceptable US involvement and causalities.

In addition, the Clinton administration is also under Congressional pressure to protect Taiwan from China's military threats. In the aftermath of the 1995-96 Taiwan Strait Crisis, many members of Congress expressed serious concerns about Taiwan's security and were alarmed by the Clinton administration's rapprochement with the Beijing government. The Congress thus passed legislation in 1996 seeking to amend the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) to establish its superiority over the 1982 US-PRC Joint Communiqué which placed constraints on America's arms sales to Taiwan.[64] Although this legislation was vetoed by President Clinton on the ground that it would harm Sino-US relations,[65] two similar bills were introduced again in the House in 1997.[66] In response to President Clinton's statement of what is known as the "three noes" policy,[67] both the House and the Senate in 1998 passed concurrent

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Threat to the United States," Hearing before the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation and Federal Services, February 9, 2000. Both are in *http://web.lexis-nexis.com/congcomp*.

[64] See, "104 H.R. 1561," April 2, 1996, in *http://web.lexis-nexis.com/congcomp/*. In Section 2601 of the bill, a relevant passage states that "(a) Applicability - Section 3 of the Taiwan Relations Act (22 U.S.C. 3302) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection: (d) the provisions of subsections (a) and (b) supersede any provision of the Joint Communiqué of the United States and China of August 17, 1982."

[65] A similar bill was first passed by the US Congress and signed into law by President Clinton in 1994, but the White House interpreted the language with regard to the TRA as equivalent to the non-binding "sense of Congress." See, *New York Times*, May 1, 1994 and Benjamin Yeh, "ROC Mum on US Congress Proposal to Amend Taiwan Relations Act," *Central News Agency* (May 17, 1995), in *http://web.lexis-nexis.com /universe*. For the amendment to the TRA, see *the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995*, Public Law 103-236, in *http://web.lexis-nexis.com/congcomp*.

[66] See, "105 H.R. 301," January 14, 1997 and "105 H.R. 2386," September 3, 1997. Both are in *http://web.lexis-nexis.com/congcomp*.

[67] The White House, "Remarks by the President and the First Lady in Discussion on Shaping China for the 21st Century," Shanghai Library, Shanghai, China, June 30, 1998, in *http://www.pub.whitehouse.gov*.

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resolutions[68] expressing overwhelming support for America's long-standing security commitment to Taiwan.

To address its specific concerns on China's missile threats to Taiwan, the House of Representatives passed the *United States-Taiwan Anti-Ballistic Missile Defense Cooperation Act* (H.R. 2386) in 1997 directing the Secretary of Defense to study and report to the Congress on the establishment and operation of a TMD system capable of protecting Taiwan from ballistic missile attacks.[69] This resolution has been incorporated into the 1999 national defense authorization act (P.L. 105-261), with a requirement of developing a system capable of protecting "key regional allies of the United States" in the Asia-Pacific region, implicitly including Taiwan.[70] Further alarmed by China's massive missile build-up on sites near Taiwan, the House of Representatives in early 2000, ignoring White House warnings of a presidential veto, overwhelmingly passed *the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act* (TSEA, H.R. 1838), which aims to strengthen military ties between the US and Taiwan.[71] Although the passed House version of the TSEA eliminates the stipulation of sales of "theater missile defense equipment and related items" in its original bill[72] and as this is written its fate is still pending on a Senate vote with Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott's support,[73] the bill has demonstrated serious concern on Capitol Hill for Taiwan's

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[68] See, "105 House Concurrent Resolution 301," July 21, 1998, passed in the House by 390-1, and "105 Senate Concurrent Resolution 107," July 17, 1998, passed in the Senate by 92-0. Both are in *http://web.lexis-nexis.com/congcomp*.

[69] *US-Taiwan Anti-ballistic Missile Defense Cooperation Act* (105 H.R. 2386), October 8, 1997, in *http://web.lexis-nexis.com/congcomp/*.

[70] *Strom Thurmond National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999* (Public Law 105-261), October 17, 1998, in *http://web.lexis-nexis.com/congcomp/*.

[71] The TSEA was passed by a 341-70 vote with 140 House Democrats joining Republicans. See Juliet Eilperin and Steven Mufson, "House Votes for Stronger Military Ties to Taiwan," *Washington Post*, February 2, 2000, in *http://washingtonpost.com* and Audrey Hudson, "House Defies Clinton, Backs Arms for Taiwan," *Washington Times*, February 2, 2000, in *http://www.washtimes.com*.

[72] For a comparison of the original bill and the House passed version, see "1999 H.R. 1838," May 18, 1999 and "2000 H.R. 1838," February 1, 2000. Both are in *http://web.lexis-nexis.com/congcomp/*.

[73] Senator Trent Lott, along with Senator Frank H. Murkowski and Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison, sent a letter on March 1, 2000 to President Clinton expressing their support for the TSEA. The letter is posted at the web site of *Taiwan Research Institute*, in *http://www.taiwaninformation.org*.

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perceived vulnerability to Beijing's missile threats. It would be politically impossible for the Clinton administration to preclude the possibility of including Taiwan in the proposed anti-missile system even if it wanted to. This may explain why Clinton and his deputy national security adviser, James Steinberg, reportedly informed Beijing leaders as early as 1998 that they could not promise to block the transfer of TMD to Taiwan because of the strong Congressional support for Taipei.[74] Instead, the Clinton administration has emphasized that China's actions are a key factor in the region's and Taiwan's interest in TMD and urged Chinese leaders "to exercise restraint on missiles, to work toward confidence-building measures with Taiwan, and to press North Korea to forgo its missile ambitions."[75]

Critiques and Conclusion

Washington's policy on the development of the TMD system, and the possible introduction of related technology and equipment to Taiwan, are consistent with what Denny Roy called the "enmeshment strategy" toward China.[76] Unlike the containment position which is pessimistic about the ability of outsiders to influence China, the enmeshment strategy is based on the assumption that external forces can significantly change China along lines the outside world desires. This strategy involves hard bargaining and low-level coercion with economic incentives and disincentives to extract desirable behavior. Enmeshment is clearly demonstrated by the Clinton administration's desire for engagement with Beijing on the basis of a "constructive strategic partnership," its show of support for China's accession to the World Trade Organization[77] and its support for granting China

[74] Peter Landers, Susan Lawrence, and Julian Baum, "Hard Target," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, September 24, 1998, pp.20-21.

[75] See the testimony of Stanley Roth, Assistant Secretary of State, "Twenty Years of The Taiwan Relations Act," Hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, March 25, 1999, in *http://web.lexis-nexis.com/congcomp*.

[76] Denny Roy, "The 'China Threat' Issue."

[77] The While House, "Joint Statement by President Bill Clinton and Premier Zhu Rongji," April 10, 1999, in *http://library.whitehouse.gov*.

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permanent normal trading status,[78] while at the same time taking a hard bargaining position on a variety of issues such as bilateral trade and human rights and cooperating with Japan to develop the TMD system.[79]

As part of this enmeshment strategy, Washington has deliberately maintained an ambiguous position on the introduction of the anti-missile system to Taiwan. Without taking a clear position on the issue, the Clinton administration has hoped that such an ambiguous position could put pressure on Chinese leaders to exercise restraint in word and deed toward Taiwan. Washington believes that this strategy will not further upset the already-troubled Sino-US relationship and can avoid exacerbating cross-Strait tensions, as well as meeting Congressional challenges on the issue. This is the TMD version of "strategic ambiguity." While some have praised this policy as prudent and cautious,[80] it is important to note that its implementation requires a balanced approach.

The effectiveness of Washington's policy rests solely upon the deterrent effect that results from both the certainty and uncertainty created by the policy about future US actions.[81] The former would insure a US response (or non-response), so as to make it unappealing for other parties to trigger the US reaction, while the latter would prevent other parties from knowing how far they can go without risking a response (or non-response).[82] This ambiguity presumably forces all concerned parties to have second thoughts on possible US reaction (or non-reaction) to any provocative conduct in cross-Strait interactions and thus preserves the status quo. Washington believes that this policy would not only deter Beijing's possible use of force but would also discourage an outright bid for independence by Taiwan to which Beijing will certainly respond radically. By

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[78] See, "Full Text of Clinton's Speech on China Trade Bill," *New York Times*, March 9, 2000 and "Administration Steps Up Effort for Support of China Trade Bill," *New York Times*, May 3, 2000. Both are in *http://www.nytimes.com*.

[79] "That Elusive Chinese Spring," *Economist*, March 6, 1999, pp.27-28.

[80] See comments by Michael Oksenberg in "A Delicate Balance."

[81] For a critique of America's ambiguous policy towards Taiwan, see T.Y. Wang, "From 'Strategic Ambiguity' to 'Active Engagement': A New Approach to the Taiwan Issue," *Current Politics and Economics of the United States* v3, no.1 (1999): 1-18.

[82] Andrew J. Nathan, "What's Wrong with American Taiwan Policy," *the Washington Quarterly* (Spring 2000): 93-106.

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maintaining this dual deterrence, it is hoped that war between Beijing and Taipei can be avoided. However, the challenge of this policy is how to maintain a balance between China and Taiwan so that the tilt of the policy against one side would not open up room for risk-taking actions by the other. It requires prompt and clear action if the course of events threatens to deviate from the intended stalemate. Inaction or delayed action would certainly send the wrong signal to both parties and dangerous crises might come about as a result.

The Clinton administration's decision to defer the sale of AEGIS destroyers unfortunately fails to meet this challenge for prompt action to punish those who threaten the status quo. As noted, Beijing has been engaging in a massive build-up of its missile forces opposite Taiwan and has set up a "timetable" in the recently issued white paper warning Taiwan to engage in negotiations with China on unification or face military attacks. Chinese leaders have also continued their warlike statements since Taiwan's 2000 presidential election on March 18 and have placed pressure on President Chen to accept their version of the "one China principle."[83] As a democratically elected leader, Chen will not be able to accept Beijing's "one country, two system" unification plan, which has received almost no support on the island. Chinese leaders, after a period of waiting and testing,[84] are likely to use their ballistic missile forces to step up military maneuvers of intimidation to Taipei or perhaps even bring war to the Taiwan Strait. Given that Beijing has increased its military capability and has demonstrated its intention to disrupt the intended stalemate of Washington's ambiguous policy, the Clinton administration's decision to defer the sale of AEGIS destroyers to Taipei will only exacerbate this unintended outcome, since the decision opens up room for further risky behavior by Beijing.

Washington's decision to postpone will also weaken Taiwan's defensive capability. Although the island country's military now enjoys a qualitative advantage, many analysts believe this advantage

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[83] "China Steps up Military Drills," *New York Times*, April 25, 2000, in *http://www.nytimes.com* and "Beijing Sends Mixed Message to Taiwanese," *Washington Post*, May 30, 2000, in *http://washingtonpost.com*.

[84] Cindy Sui. "China Accepts Chen's Win But Plans to Watch Closely." *The Washington Post*, March 19, 2000, in *http://www.washingtonpost.com/*.

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is narrowing fast.[85] Further, the supply of advanced weaponry to Taipei must be planned for years in advance, as delivery, training and deployment of any major weapon system will take considerable time to be completed. Even had the sale of AEGIS destroyers been approved in the 2000 arms acquisition, it would have taken several years to have the system fully functional. As Beijing is rapidly modernizing its missile forces and enjoys almost unlimited access to the international arms market,[86] Taiwan's security will be seriously compromised a few years from now. Washington will then be forced to choose between direct involvement in cross-Strait conflicts or abandoning the island country altogether, neither of which would be considered politically acceptable to an American administration of either political party.

Some in the US have argued that TMD would only "provide some psychological security for Taiwan's 23 million citizens", because the sheer number of missiles fired by China could overwhelm any missile defense system.[87] While this argument has some validity, it fails to consider that TMD will prevent China from engaging in military intimidation by firing a few ballistic missiles at or around the island as it did in 1995, an action that could easily escalate into an all-out war across the Taiwan Strait. If Taipei were to acquire strengthened anti-missile capability, Beijing's only options become foregoing the use of ballistic missiles altogether or to launch an all-out missile attack on Taiwan, which would mean total warfare in the Taiwan Strait. The differences in the cost-benefit calculation on Beijing's part with TMD included could mean the difference between peace and war.

Strengthening Taipei's anti-missile capability can also discourage Taipei from taking radical actions of its own, since an erosion of

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[85] David Shambaugh, "A Matter of Time: Taiwan's Eroding Military Advantage," *the Washington Quarterly*, v.23, no.2, pp.119-133 and "Taiwan Seen Vulnerable to Attack," *Washington Post*, March 31, 2000, in *http://washingtonpost.com*.

[86] For instance, Beijing has purchased two destroyers from Russia and an early-warning plane from Israel. It is reported that China's new J-10 fighter is based on an Israeli prototype developed with US aid. See, "China, Russia Solidifying Military Ties," *Washington Post*, February 10, 2000, in *http://washingtonpost.com* and "Deal for Early-Warning Plane Hangs Over Jiang's Arrival in Israel," *New York Times*, April 13, 2000, in *http://www.nytimes.com*.

[87] Shambaugh, "A Matter of Time," p.127.

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Taiwan's perceived security is likely to lead Taipei to undertake desperate measures to restore the strategic balance with China. Nuclearization is a frequently- mentioned option for the island country because Taiwan is commonly regarded as a country possessing the ability to make nuclear weapons and has attempted the development of such weapons in the past. Taipei is also reportedly engaging in the development of medium-range ballistic missiles as an offensive weapon against China's missile threat.[88] While neither scenario will be helpful to the regional stability, the combination of the two would be especially destabilizing.

The Taiwan question is not going to be resolved easily and it will continue to be one of the most provocative issues in Sino-US relations in the foreseeable future. To prevent war from breaking out, Washington needs a truly balanced approach towards cross-Strait relations. Following this logic, the transfer of TMD-related technology and equipment to Taipei will provide more than mere "psychological security" for Taiwan. It will also provide disincentives for both Beijing and Taipei to take provocative action, and hence will help stabilize cross-Strait relations.

Finally, the controversy over Washington's TMD policy and the possible introduction of missile defense systems to Taiwan should also remind China that it cannot continually act in the region in a way that threatens others without expecting a response. By firing missiles to intimidate Taiwan in 1995, Beijing has inadvertently strengthened the hand of those in the US seeking to increase military cooperation with the island country. In addition, while the threat of military force can prevent Taiwan from seeking *de jure* independence, it will not promote the island country's unification with China. Polls taken in Taiwan after the 1995-96 Missile Crisis showed that Beijing's military threats had only served to deepen popular resentment towards China. Beijing needs to soften its rhetoric and "missile diplomacy" and engage in exchanges that could bridge the deep mistrust between the two sides of the Taiwan Straits.

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[88] *World Journal*, November 26, 1999, p.A2. Taiwan's former Vice-president Lien Chan also called for the development of long-range ballistic missiles. *World Journal*, December 8, 1999, p.A2.

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France and the Idea of Strategic Defense: Technology, Politics and Doctrine

Taylor Dinerman
New York

France has been extremely hostile to the idea of U.S. defense against ballistic missiles, yet France at the height of its power was sheltered behind a complex and effective multilayered defense system. The desire to see the value of its nuclear investment preserved is one of the major motivating factors behind current French policy. Yet the world is changing and perhaps French policy may change with it.

Key Words: French Strategic Policy, French Military History, Ballistic Missile Defense, Nuclear Strategy, NATO, Military Technology, European Defense Policy. Antimissile weapons, French-U.S. Relations.

Over the next few years France and the United States of America face two apparently separate but actually interrelated problems. First of all how the new European Defense Identity will relate to NATO and to the U.S.? Is it to be hostile to America, will it drag the E.U. into a cold war type confrontation with the "American Hyperpower"? Secondly, how will Europe in general, and France in particular, react to the New American consensus on missile defense? In spite of distrust and considerable anguish in liberal quarters over the fate of the much violated ABM treaty, America is moving inexorably towards equipping itself with the ability to shoot down at least some incoming missiles.

The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) launched by Ronald Reagan in 1983 produced enough knowledge so that the U.S. Government now has an excellent idea of what works and what does not. The old arguments from the arms controllers have been devalued in the face of mounting and irrefutable evidence that the USSR cheated massively on almost every Arms Control agreement they signed. Defending the American homeland against missile attack is today accepted in the U.S. as a perfectly respectable idea. Academic conventional wisdom opposing ballistic missile defense is now on the losing end of policy debate; it dominated policy in the 1970s, and

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fought a successful delaying action against Ronald Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative in the 1980s, but has lost its influence in the 1990s. Even Bill Clinton – who populated his foreign policy team with liberals and arms controllers who would fall on their swords to save the ABM treaty – has accepted that the United States should deploy missile defenses."[1]

From the French point of view Strategic Defense has an apparently mixed record. The so-called failure of the Maginot Line in 1940 was a failure of strategic operational doctrine more than anything else. Over the years, France has done rather well using balanced, multilayered systems of offense and defense. Indeed the years of France's greatest geopolitical power in the 18th century where those when it used the flexible defensive system of Fortresses and fortified towns designed by Vauban.

It was Louis XIV (1643-1715) who effectively fortified the frontiers of the kingdom. Responsible for this program, was the greatest military engineer of the age the Lord of Vauban. During years of almost ceaseless travel along the muddy roads of late seventeenth century France, Vauban built what came to be known as the *ceinture de fer*, a multilayer system of fortified town and fortresses that roughly defined the borders of France, today's "Hexagone." This comprised a line of frontier forts backed up by a support line which in turn was backed by the King's field armies, which were themselves backed up by the leftover medieval militia system of *Le Ban et-l'arriere-Ban*, giving France a level of military security unmatched by any other continental power.

Behind this protective cover France thrived as the greatest of the European nations. In spite of defeats, bankruptcy and revolution, no foreign power or powers were able to successfully invade the heart of France until in 1813, exhausted and bled dry by Napoleon and his wars (1804-1814), particularly by his failed 1812 invasion of Russia, a coalition that included Prussia, Austria, Russia and Britain, occupied Paris and restored the House of Bourbon.

Under Napoleon III (1848-1870) France regained some of its old geopolitical vigor. In 1870 against the master manipulator

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[1] Richard K. Betts, Must War Find a Way? A review Essay, *International Security* Fall 1999 P.182

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Bismarck, behind whom stood the Prussian Army and all that it represented, Napoleon found himself dragged into war. Out-organized and out-maneuvered, France's armies found themselves trapped in the fortress of Metz and trapped and annihilated at Sedan. The system of mutually supporting forts that Napoleon III had built around Paris served their purpose well and allowed the City to hold out for months against the Prussian siege, ultimately France had to sue for peace and lost Alsace and a big part of Lorraine.

In the 1890s the French military engineer Sere de Rivières supervised the building and modernization of the Fortress system both on the frontiers and at the more strategically important interior locations such as Verdun. The usefulness of this type of military architecture was seemingly proved by the way the Russians at Port Arthur were able to hold out for about a year against the better led and better motivated Japanese forces in the war of 1904-1905.

At the beginning of the 20th century the need for battlefield preparation and the need for a balance between offence and defense was accepted by all the major military powers of Europe. Yet within a few years, the French High Command had adopted the idea (popular elsewhere in Europe) that brave, inspired self-sacrificing infantry could attack and overwhelm dug in troops equipped with modern weapons. As the French Staff officer Grandmaison put it "The French Army, returning to its traditions, recognizes no law, save that of the offensive."[2]

The terrible price that France paid for that doctrine is well known. In spite of all the sacrifices of the French *poilus,* it was not until after the failure of the Nivelle offensive of early 1917, and the semi-mutinies and near disintegration that followed, that Pétain was able to put into place a doctrine more respectful of battlefield reality.

In the years between 1918 and 1926, the French Army understood the imperatives of mechanization and the needs of a balanced force, but the leadership, both civilian and military, felt they lacked the resources to do much if anything about these insights. Instead they fell back on the idea of Fortress France. Instead of

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[2] Makers of Modern Strategy Peter Parer ed. Chapter 18. Men Against Fire: the Doctrine of the offensive in 1914. Michael Howard p.520.

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building individual fortresses they developed the idea of fortified regions.[3] Eventually this concept was extended to become the Maginot line, which became, to some extent, a substitute for the multilayered defense that France needed. The second line of fortifications, and its extension along the Belgium border, were never built. This was accompanied by an overall reduction in strength from a total of 642,000 men under arms in 1924 to 550,000 in 1936.

The German offensive of May 1940 was met by a single relatively strong, but ill-organized and ill-led French field army, accompanied by a small number of British divisions. This force advanced into Belgium intending to hold the enemy to a line running through the center of that small country. It was cut off and destroyed by a coherent force, the German "sickle-cut" offensive which attacked along a line from the Ardennes to the English Channel. The Panzer divisions emerged from the Ardennes and pierced the weakly held fortifications around Sedan in a text book attack, "from the March."

The shield that should have been the Maginot line was ignored. All the field forces were in the north and the fortifications were in the south. Isolated and operating as separate entities, they failed. France's strategic defenses failed, not because of the failure of any single element but because of a failure of integration.

After 1945, like all the other major powers, France was forced to adjust its military thinking to match the new post-Hiroshima reality, The government began a small but serious effort aimed at mastering the scientific and engineering aspects of both civil and military nuclear power.

A "New Approaches" team was established to figure out how to solve the alliance's essential dilemma. In 1952 there was no way the alliance could muster the 100 divisions necessary to hold off the Soviet Army. The weakened states of Western Europe could scarcely put fifty into the field and the U.S. with it's own problems in Korea and elsewhere could not offer more than four or five. So conceptually, nuclear weapons were turned to by default. However, at this time America was not well endowed with these weapons so tactical or theater nuclear weapons were scarce and difficult to

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[3] Histoire militaire de la France, Vol. 3 de 1871 a 1940 Andre Cormier Quadrige Presses Universitaires de France p. 341.

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integrate into a strictly European war plan.

The solution that the NATO leadership chose was to integrate the NATO war plan with the U.S. plan for a major strategic attack on the USSR. NATO and SAC would aim to fight the same battle at the same time. This was difficult for both NATO and SAC to accept. In those days, "most of those in the U.S. Armed Services then looked upon NATO as another Western Hemisphere Defense Board type of sinecure."[4] Once the real nature of nuclear combat became evident, the losses that were estimated were such that "you will have five percent of the forces left after twenty or so days, and the Soviets will be down to zero." This was obviously not the solution to anything; it was certainly not a military solution. Field Marshall Montgomery rightly called this "Balderdash, utter balderdash!"'[5]

In order to try and insure that Allied Forces had at least a chance of surviving on this new kind of battlefield, the NATO planners turned to the question of "Force Posture," that is, how to configure ground units in such a way that they could survive and fight on a nuclear battlefield. This in turn created the problem of how to design a force that could be effective on both the nuclear and conventional battlefield. The U.S. Army's pentomic divisions of the late fifties had their forces split into 'Battle Groups' instead of battalions and brigades. These units could presumably survive on the atomic battlefield, but they lacked the mass and concentrated firepower to be effective in non-nuclear combat.

In the early sixties the Army reverted to a more traditional structure and decided to ignore the obvious mismatch between it's tactical nuclear doctrine and the ground forces that would have to use it. A few efforts were made by NATO to make the forces fit the plan, the drive to develop and deploy V/STOL aircraft, for example, was meant to make sure that NATO commanders would have a nuclear capable delivery system available even if all the Airfields were destroyed by a Soviet first strike. The British RAF were the only ones to follow through on this idea and the Harrier Jump jet, first deployed in 1970, was the result.

Meanwhile the U.S. began to send a wave of battlefield and

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[4] Nato Nuclear Strategy: A Look Back, Brigadier General Robert C. Richardson III USAF (ret) Strategic Review , Spring 1981 p.36.

[5] Ibid p.40.

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theater nuclear weapons to Western Europe, these included gravity bombs for fighter bombers short range rockets, like the Honest John, and very short range systems like the Davy Crocket, a nuclear-tipped rocket mounted on the back of a Jeep. As these weapons became more numerous they became a normal part of NATO units, usually controlled by Corps Headquarters which in turn would be directly under the Allied Supreme Commander (SACEUR).

This became the NATO component of what became known as Eisenhower's "New Look," the essential component of which was "the placing of a greater emphasis on the deterrent and destructive power of improved nuclear weapons, better means of delivery, and effective air defense units."[6] This evolved into the doctrine of massive retaliation which failed to satisfy America's European Allies, or America itself for that matter. President Eisenhower himself recognized the problems with this concept in a letter to Winston Churchill written shortly before the great man handed over the Prime Minister's office to Anthony Eden. He wrote that "it offers, of itself, no defense against the losses we incur through the enemy's political and military nibbling."[7]

The doctrine of Flexible Response of the MacNamara era was even more unsatisfactory to NATO in general, and to France in particular. The obsessive 'control freak' aspect of MacNamara's policy which aimed at preventing America's allies from having their own nuclear arsenals was intolerable to President De Gaulle, especially since President Kennedy agreed to provide Polaris submarine-launched missiles to Britain.

The incoherent and untrustworthy American Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy was responsible, at least in part, for the creation of the *Force de Frappe*, for France's withdrawal from the NATO unified military command, and for the development of France's own incoherent and untrustworthy nuclear policy, though the doctrinal weakness of the Americans may have been just an excuse for De Gaulle's need to rally France against *Les anglo-saxons*.

In the early days, the French nuclear strategy may have been

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[6] Mandate for Change 1953-1956 The White I louse Years, Dwight D. Eisenhower Doubleday New York 1963 p. 451.

[7] The Churchill-Eisenhower Correspondence 1953-1955 Peter G. Boyle ed. University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill 1990 p, 187.

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purely symbolic. The Algerian trauma and it's aftermath sucked up almost all the intellectual and emotional oxygen, both from the French military and from French society as a whole. Indeed De Gaulle's France of the late sixties displayed some of the stigmata of a third world "wounded civilization."

Yet, just as America later recovered from the effects of the Vietnam war, France recovered quite quickly from the Algerian war and the OAS terrorism that followed it. Mediagenic student unrest, culminating in the "events" of May '68, masked a remarkable economic and cultural revival that today French historians refer to as *Les Trente Glorieuses*, the thirty glorious years.

Militarily this was the period in which France's nuclear ambitions overwhelmed most of France's conventional military capabilities. It was only through joint international development ventures such as the Anglo-French Jaguar Fighter Bomber, or the Franco-German HOT wire guided missile, that France was able to maintain any sort of advanced conventional forces. For example right up until the mid-eighties French small arms were at least two generations behind those of the U.S., Germany, and the U.K.

French strategy, as it emerged in the late sixties, was based on the "two battle" theory. The idea being that there would be a first battle on West German soil in which the French Army might or might not fight alongside the NATO allies. The second battle would be fought on the borders of France and would involve the unleashing of *Le feu nucleaire*, with French weapons, on French orders, against targets chosen by France.

In 1968 General Charles Ailleret, The Chief of Staff of the French Armed Forces, advocated a doctrine known as *Toutes Azimuts*. The aim of this proposal was to defend France against any threat from any direction. The expression of this doctrine was to be a force of inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) which would have only one logical target, the U.S. This idea was never acted on, but it is important for American leaders to keep in mind that the top military officer of the French Republic once advocated building weapons designed specifically to incinerate America's cities.

After President De Gaulle left the scene in 1969, French doctrine became even more complex; it acquired subtleties and ambiguities until it was just as baroque and byzantine as American and NATO nuclear doctrine. The irony was that France had officially

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left the NATO command structure, in part, because of the U.S. reluctance to spell out exactly what were the exact circumstances which would call for the rise of nuclear weapons.

In 1974 France began to deploy the Pluton Tactical Nuclear missile, mounted on an AMX30 Tank Chassis. Its role was to give the French President the option of being the first to fire a nuclear weapon on German soil. This fit with the theory of *le detonateur* by which France would *by itself* inaugurate a general nuclear war between east and west. One supposes that the idea that the French President could blow up the world using other peoples weapons had a certain elegant appeal. Provocation has always been a tool of traditional French political culture, which has not been used much in pre-Clinton Anglo-Saxon politics.

It was also in 1974 that the newly elected Giscard d'Estaing is supposed to have asked some of the top experts in France to discuss nuclear weapons employment policy over lunch. During the meal he asked what tactical nuclear weapons were good for, General Gallois is supposed to have replied "Nothing!" Giscard then turned towards General Beaufre "you are going to tell me that they are essential;" at the end of the meal the French President is quoted as saying that he could just not imagine under what circumstances he would actually push the button.[8]

Still later, in 1976 President Giscard d'Estaing stated that tactical nuclear weapons were "*pas seulement une arme de dissuasion mais aussi une arme de bataille.*" He went on to say "*on ne peut fonder notre defense sur une impasse.*"[9] This was, and still is, one of the neatest statements of the core dilemma of nuclear deterrence.

In the early Mitterand years they tried to square the circle by declaring that the use of short range weapons would be a sort of "Final Warning" before France would escalate to the use of its principal weapons. A consultation mechanism was agreed to with Germany, which would, at least theoretically, give the German Chancellor a way to have a say in the use of these non-NATO weapons on German soil.

By this time, France had bought itself a miniature version of

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[8] Mémoires : 50 ans de réflection politique, Raymond Aron, Julliard Paris 1983.

[9] Geopolitique No. 52 winter 1995/1996. La Doctrine Francaise de Dissuasion, Admiral Marcel Duval, p. 12.

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the superpowers nuclear arsenal (with one important element lacking as we shall see). They had a nuclear triad consisting of the older, but excellent, Mirage IV medium range bomber, equipped with ASMP cruise missiles. A force of 18 S3 land-based IRBMs equipped with a single, one megaton thermonuclear warhead, and a flotilla of five nuclear powered ballistic missile submarines with 16 single warhead missiles on each. Their tactical nuclear forces included An-52 gravity bombs for a few squadrons of Jaguar and Mirage fighter-bombers, as well as 44 of the aforementioned Pluton missiles.

At this point ensued the great nuclear debate over the Euromissiles, when François Mitterand said "*la dissuasion c'est moi!*" thereby rendering moot, at least for a time, the whole question of nuclear doctrine. As a matter of fact Mitterand had let slip the dirty little secret of nuclear doctrine, that the use or disuse of these weapons is wholly dependant on the will or even the whim of the head of state or government of the nations that control these weapons.

So Ronald Reagan's March 1983 "Star Wars" speech not only shocked a lot of people but the ideas in it threatened the power of not only of the Soviet leadership, but of the leaders of France and Britain as well. Margaret Thatcher, whose will power was never in doubt, came eventually to respect and understand what President Reagan was trying to accomplish. In France as elsewhere the Strategic Defense Initiative was one of the most misunderstood and misreported stories of the decade. To the arms control community and to most diplomats it threatened the fundamental balance of the universe. The French were, for the most part, horrified.

One of the first reactions was to denounce the idea that "the Yankees want to extend the arms race to the heavens." Opponents would claim that the whole thing was just a fantasy, a far fetched idea that could never work. However, the feasibility was based on four facts: Moore's Law, that integrated circuits double in complexity and halve in price every 18 months. Two, roughly 80 of all aircraft shot down by missiles between 1958, when the first Sidewinder was used in combat over the Formosa Strait and 1983 when Ronald Reagan gave his speech, had been shot down by infra-red guided, heat-seeking weapons. Three, the Law of Gravity and four, even an imperfect defense devalues the opponent's offensive investment

Thus, for the French even a moderately successful SDI

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program would devalue the prestige associated with their investment in nuclear weapons. As one of President Mitterand's most important advisors wrote: "Si l'URSS réussissait à son tour à se doter d'une m'me invulnerabilité, les missiles Français et Britanniques seraient alors caducs. Et la France serait remenée, sur le plan de l'influence au niveau de l'Italie."[10] What this shows is just how important nuclear weapons are to the self-image of the French elites. On the world's stage France's influence is no more or less than that of Japan, Germany or Canada.. Like Great Britain, France is a secondary western power with more military than economic power.

The whole question of the nature of national power is the core dilemma for France as it tries to adapt its grand strategy to today's world situation. In many ways France is doing well, the economy is recovering from the long slump of the 1990s. It's technology, while exceptionally weak in some areas of information technology, is generally strong in conventional aerospace. And in spite of the kind of educational and social problems that seem to plague all of the advanced western democracies, France does a better than average job of producing excellent scientists and engineers.

However more than most of their European counterparts, the French elite believes in the old Maoist dictum "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun." However much they may be impressed by the economic success of Japan and Germany, they maintain a quiet sense of superiority over those they regard as dependant on American military power for their security. Even when deep down they know they are just as dependant as the others. It is to sustain this illusion that France is constantly pushing their fellow Europeans into creating "Euro" forces ostensibly "independent" of the U. S.

France's military independence was, as is now evident, a delusion of the worst kind. What we now know about Soviet violations of the ABM treaty leads to the inescapable conclusion that in 1983 at the moment of Ronald Reagan's SDI speech France, with all it's nuclear weapons, would have had a hard time exploding even a single warhead on a target inside the borders of the USSR.

The Soviet strategic defense forces had not only built an ABM system around Moscow, which was allowed under the ABM

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[10] Verbatim Vol.12 1981-1986 Jacques Attali, Fayard, Paris, 1993 p. 650.

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treaty, and which still covers all of European Russia. They had deployed as many as 5,000 huge SA-5 Surface to Air Missiles (SAM) which were suppose to be aimed at bombers but which were actually nuclear tipped ABM missiles. This should have been obvious to everyone when in 1986 Libya launched dozens of non nuclear SA-5s at U.S. Navy aircraft which easily avoided them.[11]

The whole of France's nuclear strategy was nullified by Soviet violations of the ABM treaty. The Soviets knew this and acted accordingly, but the question arises , did the French know? If so how do they explain their fanatical insistence that the U.S. maintain its adherence to a treaty the other side has broken repeatedly. If the French government did not know, how do they explain their refusal to believe U.S. claims, repeatedly confirmed, that the Soviets were in violation of the treaty?

Today, France is not immediately threatened by Russian missiles. Nuclear weapons are not in and of themselves the symbols of national importance they were twenty years ago. They are now part of a category of "weapons of mass destruction," what used to be referred to as NBC (Nuclear, Biological and Chemical). These are considered the weapons of terrorists, rogue states and deranged cultists, not the sort of weapons that make an advanced nation's breast swell with pride. Indians and Pakistanis danced in the streets when their respective governments set off underground nuclear explosions in May of 1998. The hysterical pride shown by many citizens of those impoverished Third World nations reveals just how far nuclear weapons have fallen as tokens of scientific and technological accomplishment.

The most advanced and prestigious form of military power available to a nation today is the kind of electronically invulnerable, digitally integrated precision strike, all weather-global land-sea-and-air power that only the American President commands. With it's own resources France cannot realistically hope to match the U.S.; even joined up with it's European partners they cannot match America's military R & D budget. Even if some of the U.S. Department of Defense's practices seem wasteful to the Europeans, with its large

[11] See "The ABM Treaty Charade: A study in Elite Illusion and Delusion, William T. Lee CSES Washington 1997.

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budgets and it's ability to call on some of the worlds best high tech industries, the U.S. will remain the world's premiere military technological power for decades to come.

How and under what circumstances Europe will share control of combined military forces that, if they are to be taken seriously, must include the U.S. is still being sorted out. What will become urgent for the European members of NATO over the next few years is whether to join in the wide ranging missile defense programs under development in the U.S. or whether to go it alone, or possibly do nothing.

The idea of a European missile defense program that would complement the U.S. one has been around at least since 1986. That year NATO's SACEUR U.S. General Bernard Rogers said in an interview, "I would hope that the European nations could get themselves organized to work towards a European Defense Initiative alongside the United States , so that when, as a result of the research, the time comes to determine whether it is mission effective or cost effective to deploy such a system, we in Western Europe will be way up on the power curve towards making that decision."[12] Others, including the late speaker of the West German Parliament Kai-Uwe von Hassel proposed various forms of cooperation with the U.S. including a 1992 proposal to complement America's GPALS (Global Protection against Limited Strikes)/ Brilliant Pebbles idea with a EPALS (European Protection Against Limited Strikes) system.

Nothing ever came of these proposals, instead the European Community, as it was the called, decided to invest in something called 'Eureka' . A research program which has apparently been folded into the larger EU scientific budget.

The results of 17 years worth of U.S. research are such that we now know that an effective multilayered ballistic missile defense system is possible. Those who argue against it are left with the silly reasoning that since we cannot stop a smuggler from bringing a small nuclear weapon into the U.S. we should allow ballistic missiles and the weapons they carry, free access to both the American people and to U.S. armed forces. The best analogy might be telling a policeman that since his armored vest does not cover his face and head he might

[12] International Defense Review 2/1986.

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as well leave it in his locker.

The U.S. has learned what works and what does not. X-ray lasers powered by thermonuclear explosions do not work, and have been entirely abandoned, likewise particle beams. Electromagnetic rail-guns are now being developed for launching space vehicles and as a possible future form of artillery. Chemical lasers are now being developed for a theater ballistic missile defense system based in a 747 jumbo jet, and a short range tactical laser is being tested as a possible solution to shooting down artillery rockets like the Kaytushas. A space-based chemical laser is now being designed and will probably be deployed in nine or ten years.

Brilliant Pebbles are by far the cheapest and most effective missile interceptors. Designed to home in on and destroy missiles that are boosting themselves into the early phase of their trajectory using the same kind of heat seeking sensors used in air-to-air missiles and other sensors. These have not been given high priority by the Clinton administration. A new GOP President would change that.

Ground based or sea based anti-missile missiles are much harder to get to work than weapons designed to shoot down ballistic missiles in their boost phase. The U.S. has been developing these kinds of systems as Theater Missile Defense systems (TMD). The THAAD and the Patriot PAC-3 have recently been tested successfully and the Navy's contributions are also moving along the development process. There can be no doubt that the technology is there. The Israeli Arrow system is going to be operational pretty soon, and it is hard to make the case that Israel deserves more and better anti-missile protection than the U.S. Both nations need high levels of protection.

Now the question is whether France and the other European states wish to have similar levels of protection as that being built for Israel and offered to the U.S.? For some European states, such as Holland, the answer is clearly yes. Others, such as Germany, are keeping their options open. France is basically hostile to the whole enterprise while working on a point defense BMD capability for the Franco-Italian Aster SAM program.

Some of the French leadership elite refuse to admit there is any validity to the whole question and suspect it is a U.S. plot to sell weapons. They also believe that missile defenses are "destabilizing." Indeed, the current French Foreign Minister Hubert Vendrine wrote

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to Madeline Albright to protest plans to develop and deploy a Theater Missile Defense (TMD) system for Japan, South Korea and Taiwan.[13] This may be a relatively cost- free way for France to earn brownie points with communist China. On the other hand, it does represent a consistent French policy of opposing most BMD programs. For them it's a balance of power policy aimed at weakening the strong, that is to say America, so as to strengthen those it sees as weak, that is to say the EU, Russia, China, the Arabs etc. This is what they mean when they say they want a multi-polar world.

Americans are sometimes told not to worry about "neo-Gaullist rationales that play on the perceived need for Europe to balance U.S. influence in world affairs."[14] If Europe is building a real capability to share the burden of defending western civilization with the U.S., then perhaps the U.S. may support the idea. Certainly some Europeans see the future Euro-forces as just that. However the creation of these forces is being accompanied by the kind of ferocious anti-American rhetoric that characterized left wing discourse about the Euro-missiles; the difference is that there was relatively little anti-U.S. sentiment in François Mitterand's France of 1983 whereas in Jacques Chirac's France, it's all the rage.

In this context the building up of a separate EU military force and the constant hostility to U.S. BMD are, taken together, a disturbing new element. If Europe wants a Euro-Army capable of striking far beyond it's borders, that is perfectly acceptable to the U.S. But combined with an insistence that the U.S. homeland remain totally exposed to incoming ballistic missiles, the idea of a separate force takes on a new and potentially hostile aspect. The objections to U.S. homeland defense (NMD) by Europeans may just be an unconsidered reflex action, as Henry Kissinger recently pointed out when he observed that "It must be kept in mind that our NATO allies have made comparable arguments about every major new American weapons program for the last 30 years."[15]

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[13] *Le Figaro,* 7/8 August 1999.

[14] *Defense News,* January 10 2000, Stanley R. Sloan: Fifty Years Later, Europe Commits to it's Promised Role.

[15] The Next President's First Obligation Henry Kissinger, The Washington Post February 9, 2000.

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Strong French anti-American feelings are not universally shared in the rest of Europe; in the U.K., the extreme right wing and extreme leftists find common ground in a dislike of the U.S., and in Germany anti-Americanism defines part of the SPD and the Green party. Indeed, sometimes one gets the impression that among German leftists it is something of a substitute for anti-Turkish racism. *Turken Raus* sounds a lot like *Amis Raus*. Anti-Americanism has never been the quasi-official doctrine of either the SPD or the CDU, and neither political party in Germany would even consider giving military shape to such sentiments. Pro-U.S. sentiment may be concentrated in the older generations, but it also exists among those who fear that without a strong U.S.-German alliance a xenophobic nationalist movement might develop along the lines of France's National Front.

Elsewhere in Europe, sentiment ranges from tolerant bemusement in Italy to outraged dignity in Greece, to mixed admiration and horror which characterizes the Scandinavians. France is so far the only EU power that even remotely foresees the possibility of a direct U.S.-EU military confrontation. Most European hostility towards American Ballistic Missile Defense may be simply a desire to keep things as they are. Maintaining strategic stability is a kind of lowest common denominator grand strategy, suitable for rich countries like Denmark or Italy with few military resources and complicated neighbors. For ambitious nations such as France to insist that America keep still in the face of a radically evolving world geostrategic environment is suspicious.

A serious U.S.-EU political clash, accompanied by a serious economic downturn and the constant low-level trade friction which always seems to exist between large-scale trading partners, might accelerate the creation of an anti-U.S. consensus inside the EU. The establishment of an anti-American European superstate seems to be the goal of certain elements of the French elite. Others are not so sure, but if such a state were to come into existence under either French or under Franco-German leadership, it could possibly have some of the characteristics of pre-1914 Imperial Germany. That is to say a rich, powerful, unsatisfied "rising" empire. Certain of today's euro-supporters have been creating a "feinbild" of America similar to the one Imperial Germany's militarists created of England in the decade leading up to 1914, under which England was seen as standing

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in the way of German greatness.[16]

Contempt for American cultural decadence is a longstanding European attitude, especially strong in France. There is certainly little reason for Americans to consider most of its entertainment exports as anything other than forms of cultural pollution; there is however no reason to believe that even if American TV shows and movies were the most highly refined and civilized in the world, Frenchmen who fear for the future of their own cultural heritage would regard them more favorably.

It might be easier to maintain the health of the alliance if the U.S. government was not constantly trying, on behalf of Hollywood, to blast open doors that the French and many other Europeans want to keep partially shut. Recognition of the legitimacy of their concerns about *l'expectation culturelle*, might make the French accept the legitimacy of American geostrategic interests.

If a U.S. administration were to put the national interests of America ahead of the economic interests of the entertainment and media conglomerates, it might be easier to reach accommodation with nations such as France, which see themselves as drowning in American-generated cultural degeneracy. Antagonizing allies over cultural issues seems counter-productive, particularly when the U.S. already has overwhelming cultural power or what's known as soft power.[17]

Cooperation with France on a Global Missile Defense system is not presently a realistic possibility; the best that the supporters of such a project can be hoped for is that France will not prevent other European countries from cooperating with the U.S. in such a project. The other Mediterranean members of NATO are in easy range of modified Scud type missiles launched by any of several unstable dictatorships to their south. Spain, for example, with its new Aegis equipped frigates might find it easy to connect to a U.S. TMD/GPALS system; both Turkey and Greece might also find it in their interests to hook into a U.S. system if only to avoid being left out. Italy might be reluctant to join such a system under the current center-left government, but eventually even the government in Rome

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[16] Germany and the Next War, F. von Bernhardi: Longmans, New York 1914 p.98.

[17] See my article Culture and Geopolitics in the Age of Oprah, Taylor Dinerman *Journal of Social Political and Economic Studies* Washington D.C. Winter 1999.

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might find it in their interests to join.

For such countries intercepting a missile or several missiles aimed at them would be easier than retaliating against impoverished nations led by dictators who might actually welcome forms of western retaliation that hits their civilians while leaving their domestic power intact. Even an ineffective attack with a poison gas equipped Scud warhead, that only killed a few Southern European goats, would have massive political and geopolitical repercussions; preventing such missiles from having a free ride is a European interest just as much as an American one. Over the next decade France will find it more and more difficult to avoid a choice between keeping their anti-U.S. posture and building a European military structure. If France maintains the current hostile stance, few if any Europeans inside or outside NATO, will want to be dragged into France's conflict with the U.S. On the other hand, if Paris were to reconcile with Washington, then a genuine European pillar of NATO could be easily established. Once France made the decision to give up its dream of "A Europe, which can Say No!" it would still be faced with intense skepticism in the U.S. Under de Gaulle, France threw away the deep friendship of the American people for France as if it were unwanted. Reconciling after such a bitter separation is going to be difficult.

The primary symbol of such a reconciliation would be a French role in a global ABM system, including a command post based in the south of France controlling the defense of southern Europe from the Caucasus to Gibraltar against ballistic missiles, using, among other things, a set of NMD type missiles based in Corsica, as well as Brilliant Pebbles and Space Based Lasers which would come under this HQs control when orbiting over the European Area of Interest. Defending Europe from ballistic missile attack, whether or not the missiles carry weapons of mass destruction, is no more inherently anti-European than defending the continent against mass tank attacks.

While officially still hostile to the current Administration's NMD program which aims to protect the U.S. and possibly Canada from a small (24 warhead) attack, there are indications that French elites are beginning to rethink their position. Recently two of the major editorialists at *Le Monde* came to the conclusion that the Americans have established a consensus and that if "Europe" (that is to say France) wants to get into the debate it must participate rather

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than ignore it.[18]

The French Senator Xavier de Villepin (Union Centriste) has announced that he believes France should for military and industrial reasons develop its own theater defense systems i.e. the Aster.[19] This was already envisaged but the Senator's public desire to see the proposal go forward indicates that inside the French government the idea of France participating in a larger, world wide defense system is not as unthinkable as it seemed a short while ago.

Ronald Reagan wanted to make nuclear weapons "impotent and obsolete." It has been quite rightly pointed out that nuclear weapons cannot be un-invented. The nuclear toothpaste is out of the tube, on the other hand we cannot un-invent muzzle loading cannons either and those weapons are certainly impotent and obsolete. Rendering nuclear-tipped missiles – as well as missiles equipped with other weapons of mass destruction or even just high explosives – useless will not stop the development of other types of weapons or methods of warfare. It will, however, reduce this particular form of terror to an anachronism.

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[18] Etats Unis: la nouvelle dissension, Alain Frachon and Daniel Vernet; *Le Monde*, July 25, 2000.

[19] Le Sénat en faveur d'une défense antimissile française: Air & Cosmos, June 30, 2000. p. 37

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Technological Leadership

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Times of danger and peril found in war often form the basis for periods of intense technological leadership and scientific development.[1] Urgency replaces complacency. Resources become available. Goals are met. New weapons are built. Technological leadership becomes paramount.

The United States faces great danger from its lack of ballistic missile defense. Complacency, widespread misunderstanding about U.S. vulnerability to ballistic missiles in the U.S., and over-reliance on arms control have placed the United States in a state of peril.[2] U.S. vulnerability to ballistic missiles is an Achilles heel.

Communist China is building three new types of long range ballistic missiles that can threaten the U.S.: the DF-31, the DF-41, and JL-2.[3] Russia has over a thousand long range ballistic missiles and is modernizing its forces with the Topol-M, or SS-27.[4] North

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[1] "There is no doubt that a period like the Cold War is a powerful stimulant for inventiveness. When national security is at stake, all workers begin to ponder better ways. I don't think greed alone is enough, and big monetary returns are very rare, anyway." Larry Soderberg, *Close Hits and Near Misses*, author's publication, 1998, p. 47.

[2] "We must have defenses against ballistic missiles; unfortunately for getting such defenses, most Americans think we already have them." Gen. Chuck Horner, "The Space Commander Speaks Out," *The Shield*, May/June 1994, p. 6. From a nationwide poll conducted on 2-3 of January 1995 by the Luntz Research Company, 58% of Americans believe the U.S. military could destroy a ballistic missile fired at the United States, 14% did not know or gave no response, and only 29% gave the correct answer that the U.S. military could not destroy a ballistic missile.

[3] Richard D. Fisher, Jr. "China Increases Its Missile Forces While Opposing U.S. Missile Defense," The Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 1268, April 7, 1999, pp. 1-7.

[4] 800 - Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (includes deployable Russian and deactivated Ukrainian strategic forces). SS-18 (RS-20): 180. SS-19 (RS-18): 160. SS-24 (Silo) (RS-22): 54. SS-24 (Rail) (RS-22): 36. SS-25 (RS-12M): 360. SS-27 (RS-12M2): 10. 368 - Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles. SS-N-18 (RSM-50): 176. SS-N-20 (RSM-52): 80. SS-N-23 (RSM-54): 112. Tamar A. Mehuron, Harriet Fast Scott, William F. Scott, and David Markov, "Russian Military Almanac," AIR FORCE Magazine, October 1999, p. 63.

Russia's military leaders have made their top priority the production and deployment of the new Topol-M intercontinental ballistic missile. *The Shield*, July/August 1999, p. 7.

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Korea can threaten the United States with its Taepo Dong missiles.[5] Iran is developing a long range ballistic missile.[6]

But the U.S. response to meet the ballistic missile threat has been for eight years under President Clinton's leadership to undercut its ballistic missile defense programs, and adopt a relatively ineffective design for a ballistic missile defense using ground based interceptors rather than space based defenses.[7]

The United States may be faced with a grave crisis when it resolves to build a ballistic missile defense. Ballistic missiles can attack the United States in minutes, but it will take years to build a defense against them.

In a time of crisis calling for the rapid deployment of a ballistic missile defense, the United States will need technological leadership.[8] The U.S. will need leadership capable of developing advanced technology weapons in a few short years rather than decades as is

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[5] The *Times*, in turn, quoted from an October 19 classified report from the Air Force National Air Intelligence Center, America's premier missile monitoring center. "According to U.S. officials who have seen the report," U.S. intelligence agencies believe North Korea's new Taepo Dong-2 could hit Alaska or Hawaii and, with a lighter payload, the western United States. And a "three-stage Taepo Dong-2 could deliver a several-hundred-kilogram payload anywhere in the United States." Ambassador Henry F. Cooper, *The Shield*, November/December, 1999, p. 1. Note: North Korea's flight test of a three-stage Taepo Dong-1 on August 31, 1998 demonstrated an ICBM.

[6] *Washington Times*, October 1, 1998. Iran is pushing ahead with a multibillion-dollar program to develop missiles capable of reaching American cities, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said this week.... *The Washington Times* reported in September 1997 about Iran's efforts, in collaboration with China and Russia, to build the Shahab-3 and Shahab-4 missile systems with ranges of up to 1,240 miles. Mr. Netanyahu said the Shahab-5 and Shahab-6 would extend that range and have the capability "to reach the Easter seaboard" of the United States. "Recent News Potpourri," *The Shield*, November/December 1998, p. 8.

[7] Such an expensive ground-based national missile defense program is likely to face stringent opposition in Congress. But even that may be part of the Clinton Administration's game plan - pretending to support a national missile defense program while setting up a flawed "Trojan Horse" program to gather support. As discussed in the 1995 "Team B" report, sea-based and space-based defenses would be far less expensive and more effective in providing the needed wide-area coverage. The Heritage Foundation's Commission on Missile Defense (chaired by Ambassador Henry F. Cooper), *Defending America: A Plan to Meet the Urgent Missile Threat*, The Heritage Foundation, March 1999, p. 46, 44.

[8] Robert Wall, "Future of Missile Defenses Lies in Advanced Technology," *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, August 16, 2000, pp. 71-73.

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now the case under current acquisition procedures.

A few examples may illustrate the situation. Nearly eight years ago, in 1993 President Clinton inherited a ballistic missile defense program that would have if funded, resulted in the deployment of Brilliant Pebbles (space based interceptor) and Navy Theater Wide in four to five years.[9] Space Based Lasers would have been deployed in roughly ten years.[10] But none of these defenses have been built. Brilliant Pebbles was cancelled because of policy.[11]

Current ballistic missile defense programs - the National Missile Defense ground based interceptor, Space Based Laser, Thaad, AirBorne Laser, and Navy Theater Wide - are not expected to be deployed until after 2004.[12] Lack of leadership induced by policy, poor management, and underfunding will have delayed U.S. missile defense programs by a decade. Technological leadership is missing.

In contrast to the decade of delay in our ballistic missile defense programs, the Polaris program of the late 1950's built and designed a ballistic missile carrying submarine, a revolutionary concept for its day, in under four years. The ballistic missile program led by Air Force General Bernard A. Schriever built four new types of ballistic

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[9] The Heritage Foundation's Commission on Missile Defense, *Op. Cit.*, p. 39.

[10] The Heritage Foundation's Commission on Missile Defense, *Op. Cit.*, p. 39.

[11] Missile Defense Study Team (chaired by Ambassador Henry F. Cooper), *Defending America: A Near- and Long-Term Plan to Deploy Missile Defenses*, The Heritage Foundation, June 1995, p. 30, p. 36. Congressman Bob Schaffer, "A Dangerous Time For America," Extension of Remarks, Congressional Record, May 12, 1999. Refer to *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, December 4, 1995, p. 110, remarks by Robert Bell, White House National Security Advisor.

[12] Most recently, Lt. Gen. Ron Kadish, Director of the Pentagon's Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) programs conceded to Congress that the navy eventually has a role to play in a fully developed NMD system to defend America. But he noted that would not happen until 2010 under the Administration's plan. Ambassador Henry F. Cooper, "Coming-Out for Sea-Based Defense," *The Shield*, March/April 2000, p. 1. The deployment readiness review (DRR) is to determine whether to deploy a national missile defense (NMD) system, and if so, whether to build it by the end of 2005 or accelerate deployment to 2003 if the threat is judged pressing. Michael A. Dornheim, "National Missile Defense Focused on June Review," *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, August 16, 1999, p. 66. Instead, USAF teamed with BMDO to fund a slower paced development program [for the Space Based Laser]. An on-orbit flight experiment now isn't planned until 2010 or later. Senate supporters of SBL continue to push the Pentagon for a quicker program. Robert Wall, "Space-Based Missile Defense Program Crystallizing," *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, August 16, 1999, p. 73.

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missiles - Thor, Atlas, Minuteman, and Titan - in less than eight years.[13]

The Manhattan project under the leadership of J. Robert Oppenheimer built the atomic bomb in three years, which today would be considered practically impossible under current U.S. policy adverse to technological "risk."[14] Under Wernher von Braun, the Apollo program built the world's largest rocket booster - the Saturn V, and landed a man on the moon in less than ten years from inception.

More recently, the DC-X reusable rocket, flown in the early 1990's as a test model for a Single Stage To Orbit (SSTO), was built, designed, and tested in 22 months.[15] Project Clementine, which mapped the moon, discovered water at the moon's poles and became the model for NASA's "faster, cheaper, better," took only 23 months.[16]

Advanced technology programs do not necessarily require long lead times for completion, but they do require motivated and

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[13] Thus from January 1955 to November 1962, just short of eight years, Schriever's organization guided the United States Air Force and the missile industry to four complete missile systems. Titan and Minuteman had a remarkable longevity, and the first three systems - Atlas, Thor, and Titan - went on to more than pay for their investment through their contributions to the space age as launch vehicles. Walter J. Boyne, *Beyond the Wild Blue: A History of the U.S. Air Force, 1947-1997*, St. Martin's Press, 1997, p. 118.

[14] The study also emphasizes that today's culture of risk aversion - a fear of taking risks and failing - is playing a significant role in undermining basic research. Stanley W. Kandebo and David A. Fulghum, "USAF, AFA at Odds Over R&D Funding," *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, January 24, 2000, pp. 26-27.

[15] During his stint in those cramped little Pentagon basement cubicles of the SSTO project office, Sponable codified the ten basic "fast track" management principles that were developed for the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization programs such as Delta 180 (14 months from proposal to launch), Delta 181 (18 months), Delta Star (13 months), LOSAT (13 months), MSTI-1 (12 months), Clementine (23 months), and DC-X (22 months).... Agree to clearly defined program objectives in advance.... Appoint a single manager under one agency or boss. . . . The program offices - those of both the contractor and the customer - should be kept small with a short "tooth to tail" ratio.... Build hardware, not paper.... Focus on key demonstrations of experimental versions and don't worry if these fail. . . . Streamline the required documentation and reviews. . . . Use the contractor, not the customer, as the integration and testing operator. . . . Develop minimum realistic funding profiles consistent with program objectives and schedules. . . Track the costs and schedule in real time, using the contractor's in-house cost tracking system. . . Finally, mutual trust is essential. G. Harry Stine, *Halfway to Anywhere*, M. Evans and Company, pp. 158-160.

[16] *Ibid.*, pp. 158-160.

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competent technological leadership and adequate resources.

Leadership

Technological leadership needs vision for developing technology. Vision improves team motivation. Motivation leads to enthusiasm. When enthusiasm combines with technical understanding, a strong program results.

Technological leadership needs technological understanding - skill in science, mathematics, engineering, manufacturing, experiment, testing, and hands on experience - to deal with technological problems, and suggest solutions. It needs people skills to build, motivate, direct, and manage a team.

Technological leaders will often be leaders in their field. J. Robert Oppenheimer who led the Manhattan project was one of the top theoretical physicists of his day. Wernher von Braun was perhaps the world's preeminent rocket scientist and engineer, and a tremendous communicator and motivator for space.[17] Their knowledge, experience, and understanding gave them respect, and enabled them to help others.

Technological leaders may also be leaders who simply understand the value of scientific research and new technology. General H. "Hap" Arnold who founded the Air Force, understood how advanced technology helped the Allies win in World War II, and promoted a program for advanced technological development for the Air Force, asking the famous scientist Theodor von Karman to help him.[18]

Hap Arnold created an Air Force that schooled itself for many decades in supporting scientific research and the development of

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[17] Ernst Stuhlinger and Frederick I. Ordway III, *Wernher von Braun Crusader for Space*, Krieger Publishing Company, 1996, pp. 93-95, pp. 109-120 [this section includes a description of his *Collier's* articles and collaboration with Walt Disney on a TV series on space travel].

[18] One could scarcely imagine two less likely friends than Hap Arnold, the tough, skillful, but not particularly technically inclined airman, and Dr. Theodor von Karman, charming, gentle, professorial, and recognized as the leading research aerodynamicist in the United States.... Yet this unlikely combination of stern aviator and convivial theoretician was to have a profoundly beneficial effect upon the Army Air Forces in World War II, and upon the history and culture of the United States Air Force. Walter J. Boyne, *Op. Cit.*, p. 15.

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advanced technology, which used numerous technological forecasts.[19] Leading scientists and engineers would make forecasts of future technology, giving guidance to research and development programs. Hap Arnold's support for advanced technology research and development led to our current Air Force equipped with stealth and precision munitions.[20]

Technology and Strategy

Military strategists have recognized the close relationship between technological leadership and defense. The "Revolution in Military Affairs" is largely a product of technological leadership - the research and development of new technology, introduction of new weapons, and development of new doctrine and military tactics to take advantage of new technology in a decisive manner.

Military strategist J. F. C. Fuller has recognized advanced technology as a key pillar to a strong defense.[21] For example, one of the main reasons for U.S. victory in the Cold War was the technological threat President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). The Soviets feared not just the obsolescence of their ballistic missile force, but the technological surge SDI would propel.[22] While

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[19] As the conversation developed, Arnold asked von Karman to come to the Pentagon to head up a group of fellow scientists in order to plan aeronautical research for as far as five decades into the future. . . . von Karman was appointed director of the AAF Long Range Development and Research Program. . . Of all Arnold's many contributions to the well-being of the future United States Air Force, this was at once the most important - and the most unlikely. Walter J. Boyne, *Op. Cit.*, p. 17.

[20] Thanks to the technology that was generated, the Air Force would be able, time after time, to pull the country's irons out of the recurrent political fires. The amazing victories of the Air Force in the Persian Gulf War were the result of a technological progression begun by von Karman and Arnold. Walter J. Boyne, *Op. Cit.*, p. 17.

[21] To Russia and Germany the supreme lessons of the war were: the increasing necessity for (1) political authority in war; (2) national discipline in war; (3) economic self-sufficiency in war; and (4) technology in war. J. F. C. Fuller, *A Military History of the Western World*, Vol. III, Da Capo Press (reprint), 1957, p. 379.

[22] The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) holds the potential of initiating a process which . . . could lead to fundamental economic and political change within the Soviet Union. . . . legitimacy for the Communist Party of the Soviet Union is based on its claim to a superior socio-political economic relationship flowing from the dialectical nationalism of Marxist-Leninist ideology. To the extent that capitalist systems have proven superior in their ability to generate innovative technology and higher living standards, the legitimacy of Party leadership has been implicitly challenged. Dmitry Mikheyev, *The Soviet Perspective on the Strategic Defense Initiative*, Pergamon-Brassey's, 1987, p. ix.

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SDI did not result in the deployment of a ballistic missile defense for reasons of policy and funding, it was successful in developing advanced technology with commercial applications.[23]

There is a strategy of developed advanced technology for defense, resulting in commercial applications as well as a technologically advanced defense.[24] But there has also been in the U.S., in part from reaction to the atomic bomb and ballistic missile programs, an opposing viewpoint to technological leadership, decrying technological advancement as part of an "arms race" that is caused by technology rather than ideology.[25]

This philosophy, put into action by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara during the 1960's, gravely affected U.S. ballistic missile defense programs. This strategy led to cuts in U.S. ballistic missile defense programs, and the adoption of "Mutual Assured Destruction" as U.S. defense strategy.[26] Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) still

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The Marxist-Leninist State died because it could not absorb or even cope with the surge of technology that followed the creation of the microchip. Lt. Gen. Daniel O. Graham, USA (Ret.), *Confessions of a Cold Warrior*, Preview Press, 1995, p. 189.

[23] 1993, 1995, 1997 *Technology Applications Report*, Ballistic Missile Defense Organization.

[24] His subtle preparations were to have enormous and lasting effect upon the character of the USAF, for it was Arnold - a visionary pragmatist rather than a scientist - who set the Air Force firmly upon the path of research and development. Walter J. Boyne, *Op. Cit.*, p. 9. One of the recurrent themes of military history is the decisive influence that technology has had on the outcome of conflicts and on circumscribing political events. Hans Mark, "Technology and the Strategic Balance," *Technology in Society*, Vol. 4 (1982), pp.15-32.

[25] At a minimum, and for its own sake, the major powers must strive to check a competition that will otherwise lead periodically to the expensive procurement, deployment, or redeployment of entirely new weapon systems. It is, after all, the continuing competition to perfect and deploy new armaments that absorbs quantities of time, energy, and resources that no static strategic environment would demand; that exacerbates U.S. and Soviet relations with unreal considerations of strategic advantage and disadvantage; that keeps political leaders in both great powers off-balance and ill-prepared for far-reaching agreements; that fixes the attention of both sides on the most threatening aspects of the opposing posture; and, especially, that provides heightened risks of a violent spasm of procurement -- one spurring to new levels the cost, distrust, and the explosive dangers of an unending competition in arms. "Containing the Arms Race," *White House Conference on International Cooperation, Wiesner Committee on Arms Control* [Jerome Wiesner], December 1, 1965, Extract.

[26] The absence today of competent U.S. strategic defenses that are operationally deployable is far more the result of a powerful systematic bias against ballistic missile defenses on the part of American administrations from 1961 through 1980 than it is the

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undermines U.S. ballistic missile defense programs. For example, President Clinton, following McNamara's philosophy, has limited U.S. ballistic missile defense programs - "National Missile Defense" - to an ABM Treaty compliant defense rather than seeking to build the most effective defense possible.

One of the challenges facing the U.S. today is the recognition that its technological leadership is diminishing as a result of nearly a decade of policies that have slowed defense research and development and acquisition of new weapons. U.S. defense policy today has instead attempted to maintain a fixed force structure essentially developed two decades ago. For example, particle beam technology and high energy lasers are still viewed as futuristic when, in fact, they should have been developed for ballistic missile defense applications years ago.[27]

While it may be said that the 1999 air campaign against Yugoslavia revealed a U.S. advantage in advanced technology compared to its European allies (implying that U.S. technological leadership is unimpaired - but this is a result of the lower funding given by the Europeans to defense research and development), it would be unwise for U.S. leadership to assume that this will continue to be the case. The U.S. has been in a decline in funding for advanced technology for over a decade, and its acquisition procedures are excessively lengthy.[28]

There is a long lead time required to build up technological

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result of the presumed nonexistence of appropriate technologies. This bias was caused by mistaken, yet fervently held, official assumptions in existence well before 1967 that held the "arms race" to be driven not by deliberate Soviet arms racing of a classic 1930s variety, but rather by a "mad momentum of technology." . . . This bias . . . cemented into the 1972 ABM Treaty. Lt. Gen. Daniel O. Graham, USA (Ret.), *High Frontier Supplemental Report*, High Frontier, 1983, p. 3.

[27] Both manned and unmanned space-based laser battle stations may be deployed in LEO [Low Earth Orbit] by 1985. . . . Neutralized hydrogen PBWs appear to be feasible as space weapons in the 1990 decade and beyond. G. Harry Stine, *Confrontation in Space*, Prentice-Hall, 1981, p. 104, p. 115.

[28] Robert C. Richardson III, "Upgrading U.S. National Security for the 21st Century," The Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies, Vol. 20, No. 4, Winter 1995, pp. 387-404.

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leadership.[29] U.S. momentum for technological leadership has slipping, and the lag factor has yet to be calculated by U.S. leadership, which has been excessively focused on maintenance of a Two Major Regional Conflict force structure rather than in investing for the future. Maintenance for Two Major Regional Conflicts has brought with it concerns for "force readiness" and an insensitivity to ballistic missile threats. "Peacekeeping missions" and the air war against Yugoslavia have also diverted attention.

The wholesale theft and technology transfers from the United States to Communist China, as related in the U.S. Congress 1999 Cox Commission Report, underscore how fragile U.S. technological leadership is. If the U.S. is to maintain technological leadership, it must develop a new generation of advanced technology.

Technological leadership must also be capable of recognizing applications of advanced technology - changes in military doctrine and tactics to take advantage of new technology. For example, it was Germany not France which understood the application of the tank (a technological development of World War I) in new military doctrine and tactics in World War II - the blitzkrieg.

In this area of doctrine, it may be remarked that U.S. leadership for ballistic missile defense technology has been unable to grasp the proper tactics or strategy for deploying hit-to-kill or laser technology for ballistic missile defense. Much of this is due to President Clinton's influence emphasizing Mutual Assured Destruction, "arms control," and the ABM Treaty. Current U.S. ballistic missile defense doctrine as reflected in ongoing programs emphasizes terminal or near-terminal defenses instead of space based missile defenses, which would provide boost phase defense and global coverage.

Experiment and Education

The development of advanced technology - new weapons -

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[29] The 30-page report says that funds available to the Air Force for basic and applied research and development have shrunk over the past decade by more than 33% (using constant Fiscal Year 2000 dollars as the basis), that neither industry, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (Darpa) nor NASA have made up the difference in funding shortfalls, that "long-term" research is now oriented toward meeting the demands of weapons to be developed in 5-10 years' time, and that "without a robust Air Force R&D program today, there will be no way to catch up 20 years from now." Stanley W. Kandebo and David A. Fulghum, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 26-27.

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requires more than computer programs and simulations. It requires fabrication and testing of hardware. It needs "hands on" engineering to bring ideas into physical reality. Bringing an idea into reality means testing and improving technology, the essence of experiment.

An emphasis on experiment and hardware brings with it a different emphasis compared to today's emphasis on computer programming and modeling. While computer programs are an important tool, technology must be practical. It must be built, tested, and improved in an experimental process. The end result must be hardware, not just software.[30]

An emphasis on experiment will bring failures. Today's U.S. "risk adverse" society brings with it the risk of losing sight of the value of experimentation, the role test failures play in developing experience and knowledge, and the progression in a learning curve that leads to program success. Orientation towards the development of advanced technology - actual hardware - will require an adjustment in U.S. attitudes toward risk and failure. The U.S. needs to understand that "high risk" programs can be successfully managed by strong technological leadership that is willing to learn from failures.

Experimental failure can be absorbed within a program with good, strong technological leadership. For example, the disastrous fire within the Apollo program that cost the lives of three astronauts was solved in-house without an outside review board.[31] And the

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[30] The real problem came with the young engineers who had recently (within the last ten years) received their engineering degrees. The young engineers were brilliant when it came to design work. They knew how to run computer analyses until the floor was covered with printouts. . . . But they'd never "bent tin." They'd never been responsible for designing something that could be built and was supposed to do something. . . . An engineering degree now consists of an extremely strong emphasis on scientific theory, mathematics, and computer technology. *And practically no hands-on lab work!* G. Harry Stine, *Halfway to Anywhere*, M. Evans and Company, pp. 98-99.

[31] Within hours after the tragic accident, Webb [NASA administrator] met with the president and asked him to let NASA, and Webb personally, remain in charge of all the many actions that would ensue: investigate the causes of the accident, determine the best course of action, recognize the errors that undoubtedly had been made, eliminate all possible future causes for similar accidents, make the necessary technical and managerial changes including personnel changes, formulate statements for publication, and try to keep time period that would be lost for the Moon project as short as possible. Ernst Stuhlinger and Frederick I. Ordway III, *Wernher von Braun Crusader for Space*, Krieger Publishing Company, 1996, p. 191.

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technological leadership of the Apollo program showed its resiliency and ability, in the face of daunting challenges, in bringing Apollo 13 safely back to earth.

Technological leadership that is top notch will not need outside review panels, boards, or commissions. Top notch technological leadership will be expert and diligent, seeking the advice of others when it has a problem it needs help with. In contrast, outside review boards and commissions unfamiliar with a program will often be unable to provide hands on advice or personal leadership.

The education associated with technological leadership must focus on practical skills as well as an understanding of the physical sciences, mathematics, engineering, and industrial processes. Practical engineering skills, innovation, and creativity need to be emphasized. While these attributes cannot be learned from a textbook, they can be valued and rewarded.

Education focused on advanced technology development will also improve our national productivity. Productivity depends on new goods and services. U.S. national productivity which has benefited greatly from advances in computer technology needs advances in other areas. American culture is heavily defined by technology.

Ramifications

An emphasis on developing technological leadership will have several effects. It will affect education programs through the university and high school levels where science, engineering, mathematics, and the mechanical arts are encouraged. It will affect military education programs by emphasizing the development of technological leadership from within the ranks, providing technical training and practical experience, and breathing new life into weapons programs and laboratories.

Technological leadership will also have an effect on the U.S. acquisition process, which takes too long and is excessively managed.[32] Recognizing the excessive length of U.S. defense

[32] I had in mind an organizational structure . . . without the time consuming, excessively bureaucratic, costly, and largely unconstructive activities that have been associated with the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB). Notable precedents worth following were also established by the Minuteman, Polaris, Safeguard, and Cruise Missile programs, which short circuited many of the standard acquisition arrangements processes of their day as they produced fundamentally new system capabilities -- and the standard acquisition process of

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acquisition processes, before accepting the position of director of the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization, Ambassador Henry F. Cooper obtained an agreement from Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney that he could introduce streamlined acquisition procedures to speed up the development and acquisition of ballistic missile defense technologies.[33]

An important consideration for technological leadership - an important ramification of a ballistic missile defense program - is the adoption of streamlined acquisition procedures designed to speed up the development and acquisition of a ballistic missile defense as Cooper insisted. Streamlined acquisition procedures will be especially important to a ballistic missile defense program because of the heavy reliance on advanced technology that a ballistic missile defense program entails.

Micro-management will not bring about technological leadership. But strong technological leadership will minimize any substantive need for micro-management. (Political interference with program management will still need to be fought.) A program for technological leadership should also provide an impetus for strengthening and improving U.S. patent laws and their enforcement, and minimizing the legal process within the patent process.[34] It is important to reward and protect the inventors, engineers, and scientists who contribute to U.S. technological leadership.

The unique emphasis on practical applications bringing with it a demand for inventors and engineers distinguishes technological leadership from purely abstract or academic accomplishment. Indeed, one of the practical results of a U.S. program for technological

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that earlier era was much less burdensome than today. Ambassador Henry F. Cooper, *End of Tour Report*, Strategic Defense Initiative Organization, January 20, 1993, p. 16.

[33] I had recommended in my March 1990 Independent Review for Secretary Cheney, before accepting the post of SDI Director, that the normal acquisition process be substantially streamlined for SDI because SDIO intends to bring into being a fundamentally new technological/ military capability as a system-of-systems that cuts across Service lines and integrates strategic and conventional mission areas – and because an acquisition cycle considerably shorter than the normal 15-years plus was very desirable. *Ibid.*, p. 16.

[34] I believe it is folly to underfund and understaff the U.S. Patent Office. I think it should be harder for legions of lawyers to challenge infringement actions. I think our patent laws and other related legislative postures should be reviewed to stimulate inventiveness. Moreover, we should be tougher in upholding our patents when they are pirated in world commerce. Larry Soderberg, *Op. Cit.*, p. 48.

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leadership in defense should be spin-offs of advanced technology into the commercial and industrial sectors. It should also provide a surge of productivity from engineers, inventors, and scientists.

Another tool that can encourage technological leadership could be the production of a series of documentaries on technological leaders such as J. Robert Oppenheimer, Gen. Bernard A. Schriever, Admiral Rickover, or the team of Jess Sponable, Pete Conrad, and Bill Gaubatz who were instrumental to the success of the DC-X rocket program.[35] Inspiration and examples from real life can count.

Environment

The development of new technology requires leadership that operates in an unfettered environment. New technology requires freedom to create and try new ideas. But bureaucrats, bureaucracy, and unnecessary rules and regulations usually stand to impede change and technology is all about change.

Technology programs will tend to work best as crash programs or skunk works operations. Connections with large organizations need to be minimized. A single person - the team leader - needs to lead the effort rather than a bureaucracy.

Technological leadership will require strong leadership from people who are willing to provide the driving force for the program, putting their heart and soul into the program, and helping others to succeed by giving generously of their talents and abilities. A well-run advanced technology program will also tend to be short-lived so that the program maintains its dynamic nature and avoids the routine.

The work environment for developing advanced technology must be fluid, able to respond to changes, solutions, and new problems. It cannot rely on rigid regulations and fixed lines of command. Personnel will need to be shifted and managed. A team leader must be able to manage the team, and may be involved in its recruitment.

This type of management cannot afford to be regulated by

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[35] I do recommend national policies and attitudes favorable to inventors. It doesn't help that the U.S. media frequently portrays inventors as eccentric, off-the-wall geeks. The foreign attitude about new ideas and inventions can be quite different. Having worked with several creative engineers from abroad and having visited foreign aerospace industries, I often recognize a more respectful attitude toward inventors than is evident here in the U.S. *Ibid.*, p. 47.

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lawsuits, complaints, annual reviews, or the very lengthy and complicated removal procedures now common to government and large corporate organizations, which focus on documentation rather than problem solving. In advanced technology programs, decisions must be made on the spot without months or years of review. A team leader must have authority to run a program.

Structure

The structure by which technological leadership can best be accomplished will be found in small, motivated, tightly knit teams - skunk works operations.[36] These teams should, of course, be manned with people possessing technological ability, talent, and experience. A small, close knit team can effectively share its experience and ability, and provide an outlet for creative or innovative solutions.

Large corporate or governmental structures will not be needed unless a project like the magnitude of the Apollo program is undertaken, in which case, a systems integration approach would be used like in our ballistic missile program of the 1950's - 1960's. One of the purposes for focusing on smaller structures is to develop talent and products - new technologies - to build new industries.

An effective structure for technological leadership should allow creativity, innovative ideas, and practical results to flourish.[37] It is

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[36] Ben Rich and Leo Janos, *Skunk Works*, Little, Brown, 1994, pp. 316-341.

[37] McLean was sensitive to the snowballing momentum of a weapons system once it entered the development process. It was dangerous, he thought, to commit a system to production before research showed that it would work. Careers of military officers became dependent on the system's acceptance and success. Money might keep pouring in even though the system failed to work. The result was often a financial quicksand and an operational nightmare. This premature commitment often jeopardized the necessary honesty of the inquiry process. such commitment, McLean thought, should come only *after* research had shown a system to work. Specification in detail was important - but only at the production stage. Underlying McLean's strategy for R&D, then, was the conviction that detailed planning was possible only after a system had been shown to be both technically feasible and responsive to the user's need. Premature planning put a straitjacket on the creative process. Essential to the ability to inquire freely, McLean thought, was to subject the weapon designer's intuitions to rapid translation into prototypes and immediate tests. Design, test, and development had to be part of a single, unified process. A "full spectrum" laboratory like China Lake was essential because the feedback from the experiment could be translated into new design ideas and more effective weapon systems. Ron Westrum, *Sidewinder*, Naval Inst. Press, 1999, pp. 168-169.

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not to maintain or develop structures, whether large corporate entities or government bureaucracies. It is to develop people - technological leadership - who can carry on a creative, technological process in a variety of structures whether in industry, private enterprise, academia and university, or military or national laboratories.

Indeed, as technological leadership is about change, it can be argued that the development of strong technological leadership will bring about changes in structures, spawning new companies, new products, new services, new demands, new industries, and new weapons.

In contrast, today's U.S. corporate environment is unsuited for technological leadership with its emphasis on corporate acquisitions and mergers, stock prices, short-term profits, and the substitution of talented and experienced personnel with younger personnel who are paid less. U.S. defense policies that emphasize force readiness rather than research and development have not helped. This reflects, in part, a decline in U.S. defense spending for research and development.

The organizational structures to quickly develop a ballistic missile defense will require change. Money by itself cannot provide the solution, although money will be required to fund programs. Technological expertise by itself cannot provide the solution, although technological expertise will form a key ingredient to any technological program such as for ballistic missile defense.

Summary

The need for the United States to deploy an effective ballistic missile defense will bring with it an intense demand for technological leadership. The U.S. must reverse spending priorities with respect to ballistic missile defense programs and research and development.[38] The U.S. must also revamp its military organizational structures to

[38] Senior U.S. Air Force officials are furious with the Washington-based Air Force Assn. for publishing a report that criticizes the service for cutting investments in science and technology.... The panel blasts the service by saying the Air Force's increased emphasis on near-term projects and a decade of cuts in defense R&D funding has shortchanged the nation's future edge in military technology.... Stanley W. Kandebo and David A. Fulghum, "USAF, AFA at Odds Over R&D Funding," *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, January 24, 2000, pp. 26-27. Paul Mann, "Dollar Trends Crisscross In Research Expenditures," *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, February 14, 2000, pp. 72-73.

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accommodate a strategy emphasizing technological leadership.[39]

The development and construction of an effective ballistic missile defense may involve the construction of miniature interceptors in space (Brilliant Pebbles), Space Based Lasers, and Neutral Particle Beams, hit-to-kill interceptors based at sea and on the ground, and a focused program for research and development. A ballistic missile defense will open doors for technological leadership, and a demand for creativity, new ideas, new products, and new industries

[39] Lt. Col. F. G. Hoffman, USMCR, "Innovation Can Be Messy," U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings*, January 1998, pp. 46-50.

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Jewish Politics in the Post-Communist World: Personality, Ideology and Conflict in the Contemporary Ukrainian Jewish Movement

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Modern Ukraine, like many other post-Communist states, is witnessing the rebirth of a strong Jewish national movement, a phenomenon not widely studied thus far. However, it is very indicative for understanding the political role of ethnic national minorities in the new East European states. This is a problem, that concerning present political situation in the region, is difficult to overestimate.

Among the questions that usually arise in this concern are social and political identification of ethnic minorities, ways and means of their representation at national public arena, as well as sources and forms of their political leadership. Ukrainian Jewry, estimated between 420 and 650 thousand people,[1] and thus the third (after the Ukrainians and Russians) largest ethnic group in Ukraine and the fifth largest Jewish community in the world, undoubtedly is one of the best objects for such discussion.

Jewish Organizations and Communal Leadership in the Contemporary Ukraine

At the moment Ukrainian Jewry is a subject of two major trends. One of them is the wave of immigration to Israel, the United States, and other countries. The other shows the attempts to recreate normal communal Jewish life also in Ukraine. The establishment and development of a Jewish institutional structure in Ukraine, including the beginning of Jewish communal structures, has taken on particular and, very often, controversial, forms.

It should be noted, that the most of the rich communal, cultural, and national-political tradition of local Jewry has been lost due to dissolution of Jewish social, cultural, educational, and political structures under the Soviet regime, and the destruction of Ukrainian

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Jewry in the Holocaust. One should add to that a strong administrative, political, and societal anti-Semitism of the post-war years.[2] Jewish life, consequently, developed beyond the traditional forms of Jewish self-organization.

That was one of the reasons for the fact that the trends of political activities in the course of growing ethnic movements and national cultural revival of ethnic minorities, promoted by *perestroika* in Jewish case encouraged emigration more than the rebuilding of local Jewish structures. However, it simultaneously brought to life numerous Jewish organizations of different sorts and forms, which number considerably grow after the bake-down of the Soviet Union. Those organizations that played a major role in Jewish politics at the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s are still playing an important role in the Jewish community of Ukraine.

According to official data, in Ukraine there were more then 100 Jewish organizations in 1992, about 150 in 1993, over 200 by the summer of 1994, and, according to official data, 365 in 1996 and 474 in 1998.[3] The most important ones are "umbrella" organizations such as the Association of Jewish Organizations and Communities of Ukraine (AJOCU), the Ukrainian Jewish Council (UJC), and the Association of Jewish Religious Communities of Ukraine (AJRCU), which were established at the beginning of the 1990s. Others, like the All-Ukrainian Jewish Congress and the Ukrainian Foundation for Jewish Culture, as well as two "super-umbrella" structures - United Jewish Community and Jewish Confederation of Ukraine - appeared recently.

Ukrainian Jewish organizations and other Jewish communal institutions became a bases for advancement of Jewish communal elite. Among them one can identify:

1."Movements politicians," or "communal polity": local Jewish political elites of different origins, including those from underground Jewish national and human rights movements of the pre-*perestroika* period ("idealists"); representatives of the Jewish periphery in the former Communist bureaucratic "political aristocracy"; and finally, representatives of the new generation of the Jewish elite of the *perestroika* and post-*perestroika* periods ("pragmatists").

2."Bureaucratic politicians," or "communal bureaucracy": officials of

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welfare, charity, cultural, educational, informational and other "professional" institutions, predominantly sponsored by the local activities of foreign and international Jewish organizations.

3."Religious politicians," or "communal theocracy": rabbis and leaders of Jewish religious movements and congregations, and finally,

4. "Business politicians" or "communal plutocracy": a new elite of the Jewish movement including representatives of influential groups of Jewish businessmen, both local and foreign.

Besides that, the appearance of umbrella-type centers of political organization points to a combination of all levels and types of political groups, with a focus on many different aspects of Jewish life in contemporary Ukraine that are the subject of controversy. Among these aspects are the means and patterns of construction of Jewish communal institutions; the infrastructure, character, and content of Jewish education; problems of charity and welfare activities; forms and priorities of Jewish national and cultural redemption in Ukraine. Others include the approach to *aliya* and Israel as well as to the Diaspora Jewish communities; lobbying and representation of Jewish interests; rights for restitution of Jewish properties confiscated by the Communist regime, as well as distribution of aid from world Jewry; and relations with other national movements, especially the Ukrainian.

The realization of ideological, cultural, social, and other differences in the Jewish public square has had a predominantly elitist character. These differences are reflected through periodical clashes between segments of the community's ruling strata that are connected with certain interest groups (local, international, political, corporate, etc.) in the local Jewish movement. Thus, the Jewish political elite captures the primary role in both articulation and in realization of these conflicts at the national as well as the local level.

This political elite, in spite of their diverse backgrounds, enjoys a number of similar features. Among them is, for example, the motivation for their participation in Jewish politics. Experts who have tried to examine these motivations differ in their approach. According to Chief Rabbi of Kiev and Ukraine Ya'akov Dov Bleich, the major factors for involvement in political life are "money and power."[4]

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Michael Frenkel, editor-in-chief of Kiev's Jewish newspaper, *Hadashot,* and one of the leaders of the local Jewish community, claims that the Jewish movement attracts people with an interest in Jewish national revival in Ukraine as well as emigration, and to advance their economic interests and personal ambitions.[5]

It could be argued that in political life, Jewish leaders and activists are guided by a sophisticated combination of pragmatic and idealistic motivations for their activities. Among them are "socio-centric" motives, such as the struggle for spiritual and political rights of Jewish communities, or groups of interests which are in organic symbiosis with "egocentric-instrumental" ones, such as money, relations, privileges, etc., as well as for "egocentric-autonomous" (power, prestige, and respect) reasons. At any time, one or another dimension could prevail, reflecting the interests of specific groups or leaders.

In any case, it is clear that the sphere of "major Jewish politics" in Ukraine is reserved for the political elite. The proportion of the Jewish population which is actually involved in the Jewish movement, besides *aliya* to Israel, is not significant (estimates are from 2-3 percent to 10-15 percent, depending on locality).[6] This situation should also be seen in the context of the influence of Jewish communal and political institutions which are, to a large extent, authoritarian and bureaucratic. All this points to the special importance of the personal factor in the Jewish movement of post-Soviet Ukraine. The fact is that different social, political, economic, and other interests are often personalized by this or that political leader and their groups. Consequently, Jewish politicians who are leaders on the national level and in nationwide Jewish "umbrella" organizations play such an important role in the re-establishment of Jewish institutions in Ukraine.

A "Soviet Patriot" - Ilya Levitas

The Ukrainian Jewish Council (UJC) was officially established at the First Convention of Ukrainian Jews in October 1992 in Kiev. The principle of representation at the convention (one delegate per 2,000 Jews in each city) reflected the basic constitutional idea of this umbrella structure: to represent the Jewish population rather than the Jewish organizations.[7] The UJC originated in the All-Ukrainian Society of Jewish Culture, which was sanctioned by the Ukrainian

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authorities.

The emergence of this organization is connected with the name of Ilya Levitas, a teacher from one of the Kiev schools. Levitas was among the first who, with the support of Boris Oleinik, an influential leader of the Ukrainian national and liberal-oriented Communist elite and a well-known Ukrainian writer, organized the Kiev Society of Jewish Culture in 1988.That society was an example for the creation of similar organizations in other cities of Ukraine which, in 1989, united into the [Ukrainian] Republican Society of Jewish Culture (SJC).

Since the creation of the SJC, Levitas and his supporters articulated their pro-government loyalty and their nonacceptance of any form of "Jewish nationalism." The approach of his followers regarding *aliya* followed accordingly. In the course of meetings with high-ranking representatives of the Communist Party of Ukraine held in January and February 1990 (during the time of *perestroika),* the leaders of the Kiev and Ukrainian branches of the USSR Society of Jewish Culture declared their "great disappointment that Jewish emigration to Israel and other Western countries had significantly increased in 1989." They explained that emigration was exclusively due to non-ideological reasons — "instability...in Ukraine, difficult living conditions, the life and dignity [of the Jewish people] was being threatened by extremist organizations." At the same time they condemned Jewish emigration as an "unpatriotic step, especially in this difficult period of *perestroika,*" because emigration "decreases the economic and intellectual potential of the country."[8]

The Societies of Jewish Culture in Ukraine, created according to the Kiev SJC pattern at the beginning of the 1990s, tried to play the role of secular Jewish communities, especially in eastern Ukraine. However, the SJC did not succeed because they failed to bring Jewish public associations, movements, and organizations, that were fast appearing on the Ukrainian scene, into their sphere of influence.

The breakup of the USSR and the proclamation of Ukrainian independence was a serious challenge to the leaders of the Society of Jewish Culture, which had become almost an anachronism by that time. Ilya Levitas and his colleagues, showing their political flexibility, and supported by the post-Communist majority of the "new" Ukrainian establishment, were able to transform their organization into a national one called the Ukrainian Jewish Council (UJC). This

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council came onto the political stage as the national reincarnation of the Republican Society of Jewish Culture, which was almost non-existent by that time. Representatives of the SJC comprised two-thirds of the delegates to the October 1992 founding convention of the Ukrainian Jewish Council, which approved Ilya Levitas as its chairman.

Local SJC branches went through a similar transformation, reconstituting themselves as municipal and provincial Jewish councils. The result was the creation of a vertically subordinated bureaucratic structure, which simultaneously was controlled by central and local Ukrainian authorities.

The UJC is, by statement and de facto, a pro-government organization whose political position is a continuation of the *Evsektsiya's* socialist Jewish tradition of the 1920s. Ilya Levitas and his followers do not see the Ukrainian Jewish Council as an independent public organization. Ideally, they want to become a sort of quasi-government structure, "a Jewish ministry," which would represent the "Ukrainian Jewish population" before the government, and represent the government before the Jews.[9]

As Levitas declared shortly after Ukrainian independence, "we want the [Ukrainian] state to take care of the problems of revival and development of our culture, and our cultural institutions should became government ones."[10] For example, the UJC newspaper *Evreiskie Vesty* (Jewish News), which is the only Jewish newspaper in the ex-USSR that is totally financed by the government,[11] is a platform for propagandizing the ideas of Jewry as an integral part of the Ukrainian people and of a deeply rooted Ukrainian-Jewish brotherhood, as well as prioritizing Jewish cultural revival (in its "Yiddish" model) over national revival.

This position was clearly articulated by Levitas at the Second All-Ukrainian Congress of Jewish Educators in January 1997, in which his presentation had elaborate praise for "the people's Yiddish culture" and, at the same time, was visibly anti-Zionist.[12]

In addition, Ukrainian leaders used Levitas, as a way to influence the Jewish community of Ukraine. However, the fact that the UJC relied so heavily upon those Ukrainian government institutions responsible for financing the UJC and local Jewish Council activities did not mean material profits for politicians in the Levitas camp. The economic crisis in the country, lack of public financing, and the

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Ukrainian government's failure to budget for even key branches of the economic and social sphere made Jewish interests even more marginal. At the same time, the Ukrainian establishment's support gives the UJC considerable political influence. According to some observers, this gives UJC leaders accessibility to the higher echelons of power, helping them to outmaneuver their political opponents.[13]

The ideological and political position of the UJC, as well as its structure, are quite suited to the authoritarian bureaucratic style of Levitas's leadership. People who are acquainted with him argue that Levitas's behavior and ways of treating people resemble those of the third secretary of the district party committee. His presence is felt in all aspects of Ukrainian Jewish life, and every Jewish meeting or festivity is influenced by him. Levitas demands absolute personal and political loyalty from his followers.

The political fate of Arkady Monastyrsky, a former key associate of Levitas from the beginnings of the UJC, provides a good example of this. In 1997, Monastyrsky took his first independent step on the Jewish political stage when, with the help of V. Feldman, an important Kharkov Jewish businessman, Monastyrsky established the Jewish Culture Fund. This organization was based on the same ideological principles as the UJC but was not under its auspices. In response, Levitas immediately removed Monastyrsky from the position of UJC deputy chairman. Levitas also used his influence in higher Ukrainian circles to make Monastirsky *persona non grata.*[14]

The Levitas leadership style also influences how political opponents are dealt with. His connections within conservative circles of the Ukrainian ruling elite contributed to the conflict around Jewish Agency activities in Ukraine in 1993. Ukrainian officials claimed that Jewish Agency activities were "damaging the intellectual and cultural potential of Ukraine."[15] Levitas represents a specific type of Jewish politician/Soviet patriot who, at some stage, as J. Petrovsky puts it, "managed to convince Ukrainian Jews that he meant business."[16] By 1996 about 200 Jewish organizations had declared their affiliation with Levitas's UJC.[17]

To a large extent, Ilya Levitas and his organizations are a symbol of the contradictory character of post-Communist Jewish politics. The appearance of any kind of Jewish organizations like the SJC or Jewish Councils, regardless of the aims of their leaders, following 60 years of total absence of organized Jewish life, play an important and

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positive role, and undoubtedly "activated Jewish identity" in Ukraine.[18]

Dissident: Joseph Zissels

At the moment, the UJC is on the periphery of the Ukrainian Jewish movement while a more independent national political union, the Association of Jewish Organizations and Communities of Ukraine (AJOCU), has been at the forefront since the mid-1990s. Its founder and head is Joseph Zissels, "a dynamic leader with a good image" (according to M. Frenkel), who represents another type of modern Jewish politician-dissident.

Joseph Zissels was born in the city of Chernovtsy in western Ukraine and graduated from the Department of Physics and Mathematics of the local university. In the following years his formal engineering career was combined with active participation in the underground human rights movement and the distribution of *samizdat* literature. Zissels was among the few activists of the Jewish movement who simultaneously took part in the *Gel'sins'ska spilka* (Helsinki Union), a Ukrainian underground human rights organization with a national liberal orientation. In the 1980s Zissels was arrested twice by the KGB for his participation in the struggle for Ukrainian independence and for the national rights of the Jewish people. He spent seven years in political prison camps where he became close to activists in the Ukrainian national movement.

After being released at the end of 1987, during the Gorbachev reforms, Zissels immediately joined in creating the infrastructure for an independent Jewish movement. He became co-chairman of the Organization Committee of the Va'ad (council of representatives) of Jewish organizations of the USSR. The principles proclaimed at the first legal conference of this organization, held in Riga in May 1989, became the political credo of Zissels and his followers. These principles included: independence of the Jewish community; the service (i.e., non-administrative) character of their activities; equal attention to *aliya* and the creation of institutions of Jewish national-cultural autonomy in the diaspora.[19] All these ideas became the core of the statement of the Association of Jewish Organizations and Communities of Ukraine (AJOCU), which was launched on 14 January 1991. The AJOCU was the first mass-supported Jewish

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organization in Ukraine in more than sixty years.

A large role in the formal institutionalization of this organization was played by Ukrainian dissidents, colleagues of Zissels from the Ukrainian liberal democratic movement. Many of them received important appointments in the first government of an independent Ukraine, proclaimed on 1 December 1991. It should be noted that these former dissidents and national-democrats were only minor government partners in the former Communist bureaucracy that had slightly reoriented itself along Ukrainian nationalist lines. Nevertheless, even though their participation in key political decision-making was quite limited,[20] they actively lobbied for the registration of AJOCU by the Ukrainian Ministry of Justice and overcame opposition by the post-Communist majority in the government.

The ideology of AJOCU leaders is based on an understanding of the non-governmental status of the organization, and on the adoption of the principles of self-sufficiency, self-determination, and independence for the Ukrainian Jewish community. According to J. Pertovsky, Zissels "was among the first people to combat the idea that local [Eastern European — V.K.] Jews were either poor representatives of a collapsing community who need Western financial support to revive the community or nouveaux riche who do not care at all what is going on in their own community and pretend to be Western businessmen."[21]

The AJOCU infrastructure does not recognize a centralized system with subordinate branches. Rather, it was created as an umbrella organization with equality and independence for all participating Jewish organizations. Article 1 of the AJOCU statute states that "Public organizations and communities that join the Association are acting on the basis of their own statutes....They do not have the right to interfere in the Association's activities, while the Association has no right to interfere with their activities."[22] Zissels and his supporters insisted that the AJOCU would be open and simultaneously provide a legal basis for any Jewish initiative in Ukraine, be it political, academic, religious, cultural, educational, or organizational.[23]

In 1993, according to Zissels, the Association of Jewish Organizations and Communities of Ukraine united 129 Jewish organizations in 62 Ukrainian cities, including 11 municipal

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communities, 20 religious communities, 12 Zionist organizations, 15 educational organizations, 4 newspapers, and 68 cultural organizations.[24] In 1995, the AJOCU was already an umbrella for 205 Jewish organizations from 80 towns, including 16 municipal communities, 47 religious communities, 17 Zionist and youth organizations, 22 educational facilities, 4 newspapers, and 85 cultural organizations, as well as 5 associated organizations.[25]

AJOCU leaders made an attempt to find internal financial resources. An important part of its funding was provided by the AJOCU-owned Ezra company, which dealt with the transfer of currency belonging to emigrants leaving for Israel, as well as with arranging Israeli visas and invitations, arranging business trips and international contacts and other services.[26] As a result, sometimes AJOCU expenses were compatible with the budget of the Association's projects, with the inclusion of world Jewish financial support. According to some reports, the annual budget of AJOCU in 1993 was US$250,000, which at that time was a very respectable amount.[27] As it turned out later, this period of relative financial stability did not last long. At the same time, the Association's own resources made it possible to take a more independent position towards local and foreign governments, semi-governments, NGOs, and international organizations, and to undertake 38 long-term organizational, social, and educational programs.

Unlike the Ukrainian Jewish Congress, AJOCU leaders saw and still see Jewish territorial (municipal) communities as the major source of their political support. For that reason, projects stimulating the creation of such communities are a priority for the association. Thus, the "AJOCU Program to Help in the Construction of Jewish Communities in Ukraine," issued at the end of 1993, presented an approach that "Jewish life in Ukraine is possible when Jews are united and integrated in a community. Hence, the association takes the initiative of establishing Jewish communities in those cities where such communities do not yet exist."

According to a document signed by Zissels and the program coordinator, Igor Kuperberg, in 1996, the AJOCU planned to create Jewish communities in 40 cities in the country, as well as to establish a center in Kiev for research and information on community building. For this they expected to raise and allocate 420 million karbovanets (more than US $80,000).

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Other AJOCU activities included the creation of professional organizations such as the Jewish Pedagogical Center, the Association of Jewish Studies, the Kiev Institute for Jewish Studies, the Magen Avot welfare and charitable fund, the repatriation consulting center, and others. These institutions organize their activities independently, including relations with other Jewish organizations in Ukraine and abroad, the creation of their own infrastructure in the provinces, and fundraising. At the same time, they coordinate their activities with the board of the Coordinating Committee (Va'ad) of the AJOCU.

The above-mentioned document saw the AJOCU as a model for the organization of national-communal life of Ukrainian Jewry in general.[28] This, as well as the practical activities of politicians from Zissels group, demonstrated their obvious demands for primary roles in the Ukrainian Jewish movement, which brought them into conflict with Ukrainian Jewish Council leaders. This conflict, which reflected their different ideological positions, and with each group supported by different factions of the Ukrainian ruling strata, was also a struggle for the monopolization of functions of public administration in the emerging Jewish community of the republic.

Another important point of conflict between leading forces in Ukrainian Jewish politics in recent years were the conflicts of interest between local and foreign Jewish organizations. Addressing the annual meeting of the American Jewish Committee, Zissels clearly defined these conflicts. The period of euphoria of the late 1980s with regard to the relations of Ukrainian Jewry with foreign Jewish organizations had changed in the 1990s to a feeling of mutual disappointment, which resulted in a cooling of relations. Ukrainian Jews resented what they saw as the "paternalistic attitude of various Jewish and Israeli institutions." Zissels said that there was an obvious need to restructure their cooperation with foreign partners on the basis of "mutual respect and understanding, and equality in relations." The key point of Zissel's address was the following declaration:

> We cannot pass on our work with local Jews to somebody else. We have to learn everything that Jews in the Western communities already know: how to pray, how to teach children, how to bring up children, and how to build professional communal institutions. We should never tell people to go to the Jewish Agency or the Joint just

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> because we are not doing a particular thing. If we talk this way it means that we are not Jewish leaders, that we were chosen for nothing, and that we are not able to do anything for the community which gave us authority to act on their behalf.[29]

Explaining his position in an interview in *Hadashot*, Zissels noted that Ukrainian Jews are able to define their own needs "without any orders from abroad."[30] At the same time, representatives of foreign Jewish organizations working in Ukraine claim that local Jewish leaders are "short-sighted, non-professional, egotistical, and assimilated.[31]

It is not surprising that Zissels has expressed his uneasiness with the fact that foreign Jewish organizations such as the Jewish Agency, the JDC, Habad, and others have established their infrastructures in Ukraine. According to him, the cornerstone of relations between local and foreign Jewish organizations should be based on the principle that the "Jewish life of a city must come from within the community and not from outside it."[32] Zissels says that "the Joint can deal with Jewish welfare issues in Ukraine by itself...and the Jewish Agency and Lishkat ha-Kesher [the Liaison Bureau][33] do not need anybody's help in taking care of Jewish education or *aliya* problems....But it would not be right if local Jewish organizations did not oversee these activities, although we would undoubtedly be grateful to foreign and international organizations for their kind help in these very important issues."[34]

Joseph Zissels said also that direct financing by foreign donors of Jewish schools in Ukraine should be stopped. The money should first be transferred to the respective Jewish communities which, in turn, would finance Jewish schools in their towns. The current system of funding "separates Jewish schools from the communal organizations."[35] It is evident that centralizing resources would considerably strengthen community organizations and, by association, strengthen the AJOCU itself.

On the other hand, AJOCU leaders have frequently suggested decentralizing world Jewry's assistance to Ukrainian Jews. For example, they insist on the establishment of direct relations between specific Jewish communities in the West and in Ukraine.[36] It is clear that such a practice would erode the controlling and distribution functions of local branches of leading international Jewish structures,

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and consequently decrease their influence in Ukraine.

Social, cultural, and political interests are highly personalized in both the Jewish movement and in post-Soviet politics in general.[37] Conflicts between Jewish organizations also frequently take on a personal form. A good example of this kind of conflict was the huge political scandal around financial malpractice by some of the Israeli companies handling the transfer of new immigrants' finances to Israeli banks. Both the Israeli and Ukrainian media accused Zissels and the AJOCU of being responsible for hundreds of people losing everything.[38] Zissels, speaking on behalf of the AJOCU, blamed the media for "diverting public attention from the real criminals in the affair."[39] Even though it is unlikely that AJOCU leaders were the criminals, the scandal was effectively used by political rivals of the AJOCU to discredit its leaders, both in Kiev and the provinces, as well as damaging a number of its programs, such as the *aliya* consultation centers and welfare projects.[40]

However, the prestige of Zissels and his organization in both Jewish and non-Jewish political circles, and his relations with leaders of Israeli and Western Jewish communities, was such that it did not mean the end of the AJOCU. On the contrary, the Association and its leaders became initiators of creation of "superumbrellar" Jewish Confederation of Ukraine, which is now the leading Jewish organization of that country.

Thus, the political carrier of Zissels is different from the political destiny of many of his former colleagues from the Jewish underground. Many of the latter did not make it in the arena of practical politics dealing with the creation of normal Jewish communal institutions and fighting for control over them. At the same time, the political destiny of Zissels was, to a large extent, typical of his generation of "politician-idealists" from the *perestroika* and post-*perestroika* periods. For many of them, and the organizations they created, it was difficult to adapt to the end of the "romantic period" of the Jewish movement. Thus, since the middle of the 1990s, there has been a spiritual vacuum in Jewish organizational politics.

Rabbi: Ya'akov-Dov Bleich

A relatively new phenomenon in Jewish politics in Ukraine is the growth of the political importance of Jewish religious leaders (rabbis).

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During the 1990s, in many Ukrainian cities (such as Odessa, Kiev, Dnepropetrovsk, Kharkov, Kherson and others), rabbis began to take on Jewish communal leadership roles, pushing aside representatives of both the "post-Communist" and the "new" Jewish elite. The growth of political influence of Jewish spiritual leaders was the result of a number of circumstances.

First of all, many Ukrainian Jews see rabbis as independent and authoritative, above the "dirty politics" of the local Jewish community heads with their conflicting ideological orientations. In this case, the fact that many of the rabbis come from abroad is seen in a positive way, for they serve as a balance between local interest groups. Also, Joseph Zissels assumes that the presence and activities of a rabbi creates a more balanced situation in the community, both financially and morally. The rabbi is closer to the community than many representatives of international and Israeli organizations, and thus is able to compete with them even with more limited resources.[41]

Second, there is growing interest among Ukrainian Jews in Judaism. Ours and other sociological samples show a positive reference to Judaism as more of a cultural factor than a religious identity.[42]

Third, there is the institutional factor. In 1992 there were only 14 active synagogues in Ukraine. At that time their public and communal role was not considered to be "very significant."[43] In 1995 there were 50 synagogues active in all regions of Ukraine [44] and their role, in spite of earlier pessimistic opinions, is growing constantly. The synagogue in Ukraine has become an important center of information, social aid, and personal contacts. The necessary public infrastructure for synagogue activities is also provided by quickly growing Jewish religious communities which, according to official data, numbered more than 70 by March 1996, as well as a network of yeshivas, Jewish day and Sunday schools, kindergartens, and other educational and charitable institutions.

Fourth, the rabbinical elite have direct access to the resources and experience of the Jewish diaspora. Curiously enough, these expatriate rabbis, in many cases, are more careful and correct in their activities than their local secular counterparts.

Finally, the personal factor was also of great value. The advancement of rabbis in the Jewish movement was largely the result of the activities and personality of the Chief Rabbi of Ukraine,

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Ya'akov (Yankel) Dov Bleich. He represents a new category among Jewish politicians in Ukraine, a category which could be called a rabbi-politician — a Jewish politician alongside the Soviet patriot and the dissidents.

The political success of Rabbi Bleich, a New York-born representative of the Karlin-Stolin Hasidic movement, who came to Ukraine in 1991 at the age of 26, is the result of his personal qualities. Fluent in English, Hebrew and Yiddish, Rabbi Bleich was talented enough to learn Ukrainian and Russian. Among the strongest features of his character is Rabbi Bleich's ability to identify and recruit qualified and reliable assistants, such as administrative directors and people in charge of programs, loyal to him. Rabbi Bleich demonstrated an important ability for a politician to estimate and make use of a changing political situation. As Johanan Petrovsky writes about him:

> Rabbi Bleich knows that he is in Rome and tries to do as the Romans do. Not in the sense of religious practice but how to treat people... and he does everything possible in order to complete the task. He is canny enough to understand that the attitude of the authorities towards Jews depends on personal contacts....And he can speak to Kravchuk and nowadays advises Kuchma in good Ukrainian. ...People eagerly come to visit him, and he is invited to give talks on TV....Rabbi Bleich, because of his sociability and tolerance, has become an attractive figure for a large group of religious people in Kiev.*45*

As a result, shortly after his arrival in Kiev, Rabbi Bleich become Chief Rabbi of Kiev and Ukraine, and in 1994 was unanimously elected chairman of the Jewish community of Kiev. In addition to the creation of two religious schools for boys and girls in Kiev (now with about 550 students), Rabbi Bleich increased the communal organizations' activities in many areas by creating a bakery, butcher shop, soup kitchen, yeshiva, etc. He also organizes summer camps and participates in various interorganizational bodies. Rabbi Bleich's greatest political success was in becoming the leading ideologist for most of Kiev and Ukrainian Jewry. People see Rabbi Bleich as a natural mediator between the different Jewish organizations: secular and religious, foreign and local, pro-government and independent.

Rabbi Bleich's political strength is also a result of his being chairman

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of the Association of Jewish Religious Communities of Ukraine (AJRCU), as well as his key position in the management of such institutions as the Coordination Committee of Jewish Education in Ukraine, the Magen Avot national Jewish charitable fund, and others. His charismatic role symbolizes the growing influence of spiritual leaders as the new Jewish political elite, sometimes at the expense of the marginalization of other ruling groups in the Jewish community of Ukraine. A similar role outside Kiev is played by Rabbi Shmuel Kamenensky in Dnyepropetrovsk, Rabbi Moskovich in Kharkov, Rabbi Avrum Wolf in Kherson (recently transferred to Odessa), Rabbi Shalom Gotleib in Nikolayev, Rabbi Pinchas Vishedsky in Donetsk, as well as Rabbi Shlomo Wilhelm of Zhitomir. At the moment, as Betsy Gidwitz correctly puts it,

Community rabbis serve as representatives of the local Jewish population to local and regional power sources, defenders of the Jewish people and the State of Israel, congregational leaders, day school presidents, welfare service supervisors, fund raisers, coordinators with international organizations..., host to foreign visitors, and mediators in various disputes among the Jewish people."[46]

The political advancement of spiritual leaders and the series of "coups" that they made in the major Jewish communities of Ukraine since the mid-1990s has brought about a new distribution of political power in the Jewish movement of Ukraine. Rabbinical involvement in Jewish politics has its advantages and disadvantages. As in other instances of political conflict, here too the clashes were often based on personality.

In Kiev in 1990-1991 there was a controversy between Rabbi Bleich, at the time relatively unknown, and Rabbi Berl Karasik, head of the local Habad community, who also had his eye on the national Jewish leadership. While being a famous Habad scholar and a brilliant teacher, Rabbi Karasik was a weak administrator compared to Rabbi Bleich. This was seen, for example, in the selection of community officials, as well as in a few corruption cases in which his closest assistants were involved.[47] In addition, Habad was unsuccessful in its attempt to get back the famous Brodsky synagogue building, resulting in a decline in the political image of the Habad center in Kiev among some observers.[48]

These and other factors have weakened the position of Rabbi Karasik, who is still the head of the Kiev Habad community. At the same time, the influence of Rabbi Bleich and his followers increased. This was not just a simple conflict between the Lubavitch and Karlin-Stolin factions of Hasidism, since their ideological differences are known only

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to a small number of Jews. Rather, it is the strength of Rabbi Bleich next to the seeming weakness of Rabbi Karasik which is influencing the political scene. Rabbi Karasik, as well as other opponents of Rabbi Bleich, in spite of being highly qualified as scholars and teachers, were unable to beat Rabbi Bleich's successful combination of spiritual-ideological and administrative methods. As a result, by the end of 1993, most religious communities, whatever their affiliation, supported Rabbi Bleich who, as noted, was elected as chairman of the Association of Jewish Religious Communities of Ukraine.

This occurred despite the visible strengthening of the political positions of Habad leaders in general, especially in large eastern Ukrainian Jewish communities. In a few large communities Habad leaders created "empires" — as was done by Rabbi Kamenetsky in Dnepropetrovsk. These organizations normally included an impressive system of communal services, such as cash subsidies and food assistance, public dining rooms for poor people, kosher restaurants, medical centers, social and cultural centers, information and legal aid offices, as well as schools, training centers, kindergartens, and child care services.

Personality differences have also affected relations between the different streams of Judaism. Among the more than 70 Jewish religious communities and associations, the majority are associated with the Orthodox wing mainly represented by Habad and other Hasidic movements. In some places, mainly in western Ukraine, Conservative Judaism exercises some influence, and the Reform movement, although not very strong, is growing and is represented by 16 small communities in Kiev and other cities of central Ukraine.

The ideological and philosophical conflicts between Orthodox groups (Hasidic or Religious Zionist), or between them and Conservative and Reform groups, is of little importance to local Jews. More often these conflicts are understood as an integral part of local Jewish politics. Clashes between the rabbinic elite and other ruling groups of the Ukrainian Jewish community became a visible phenomenon in Ukraine in the second half of the 1990s.[49]

The end of the 1990s saw growing conflict between the new Ukrainian umbrella organizations, the Bleich- and Zissels-led Jewish Confederation of Ukraine, and the United Jewish Community of Ukraine chaired by Vadim Rabinovich, as well as a subdued conflict between Bleich's AJRCU and Habad's Or Avner and the Federation of Jewish Communities of the CIS — their political wing. However, the Chief Rabbinate headed by Rabbi Bleich has played a stabilizing role in the intercommunal discord.

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Thus, the activities of rabbis have become an important factor in Jewish political life in Ukraine, leading to the resolution of a number of intra- and interfactional conflicts within the Jewish communities in that country. All these conflicts have a purely political character and have almost nothing to do with the antagonism between the religious and secular camps of the Jewish movement. From this point of view, the advancement of rabbis to dominant roles in the Ukrainian Jewish community seems to be a purely political phenomenon and has a lot to do with the ethnic and national, rather than the religious, redemption of Ukrainian Jewry.

Millionaire: Vadim Rabinovich

The fall of 1994 and the start of 1995 are unanimously regarded as the final termination of the "romantic period" in the history of the Jewish movement in post-*perestroika* Ukraine. On the one hand, the government's inability and disinterest in providing material support to Jewish organizations became evident by that time. On the other hand, there was an obvious crisis in relations between Ukrainian and foreign Jewish organizations. A decrease of interest in local Jewish organizations resulted after a shift from the non-profit-oriented enthusiasm at the initial stage of the local Jewish movement to the unavoidable professionalization and consequent bureaucratization of its activities by the mid-1990s. The establishment by international Jewish organizations of their own infrastructures in Ukraine, as well as the impact of massive inflation which increased the costs of projects and decreased their effectiveness,[50] were also responsible. As a result, complaints of a constant lack of funds and calls for a search for "internal resources" became major topics of Ukrainian Jewish politicians in both the pro-government and independent camps. This situation promoted the political advancement of Jewish businessmen.

The appearance of this group on the Jewish political stage is a recent phenomenon. Until 1996, the majority of the approximately 3,000 successful Ukrainian Jewish businessmen (including 30 Jews who are among the 100 largest Ukrainian entrepreneurs) "do not participate in Jewish life personally and do not support it financially."[51] The reasons for this were related to the social, economic, and political situation in Ukraine.

Similar to other CIS countries, private business in Ukraine exists under conditions of a highly monopolized, quasi-market economy that is still highly affected by the state bureaucracy. Consequently, local

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businessmen (whether Jewish or not) have to seek the protection of government officials and politicians of different ranks. These relations, as a rule, are part of an extended mechanism of informal associations within the elite of Ukraine. The patrons (politicians and bureaucrats) provide their clients (businessmen) with access to public resources and, in exchange, they receive financial favors from the businessmen.

These favors cost Ukrainian Jewish businessmen at least US $20,000,000 annually, which goes toward funding a number of underbudgeted state social institutions.[52] At the same time, support of Jewish organizations and institutions by Jewish businessmen was very modest. In 1993, Michael Frenkel, editor-in-chief of *Hadashot,* regretfully stressed the fact that "big Jewish businessmen were more likely to give money for an expensive event promoting city authorities than to contribute to Jewish charity."[53] Only a few entrepreneurs occasionally supported Jewish communities with small amounts of money, food, construction materials, and manpower.

In late 1995 and early 1996, a new trend was detected when Jewish businessmen began to take a greater interest in Jewish life. Some of them even became Jewish communal leaders, while opening their personal accounts to some communal programs. A breakthrough occurred in April 1997 at the First (Constitutional) Convention of the All-Ukrainian Jewish Congress which was initiated by Vadim Rabinovich, one of the most important Ukrainian businessmen and a multimillionaire, who became the president of the new organization.

Vadim Rabinovich was born in Kharkov, Ukraine, in 1952. During the Soviet period he was involved in illegal economic activities and, as a result, spent a few years in prison. Released at the end of the *perestroika* period, he immediately became involved in business activities, becoming very successful at using the new options provided by the semi-capitalistic economy of post-Soviet Ukraine. Today, Rabinovich is among the ten wealthiest and most important Jewish businessmen in the former Soviet Union. He owns eighteen large companies dealing with investment, banking, trade, industry, insurance, advertising, and mass media.

The basis for his personal wealth (estimated at between tens and hundreds of millions of dollars) was created by profits from importing Russian oil and gas to Ukraine at the beginning of the 1990s. Rabinovich was then the Ukrainian representative of Concern Nordex, "a multi-billion dollar international corporation controlled by Grigory Luchansky."[54] In the mid-1990s, Rabinovich was also the official Ukrainian representative of the Esty Lauder company which invested in local mass media and other business areas.

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Like many Eastern European Jewish businessmen, Rabinovich has Israeli citizenship. His family lives in a prestigious suburb of Netanya, a city that in the 1990s became one of the most popular places of settlement for wealthy Russian Jews of the last wave of *aliya* to Israel. Many of them sponsor municipal and communal projects in the city. Rabinovich is known to have donated $500,000 for the construction of a new synagogue in Netanya, as well as money for a golden menorah in Jerusalem.

Similar to other Ukrainian businessmen of his caliber, Rabinovich has many personal political connections within the highest echelons of the Ukrainian power elite. For example, he is known to have been very close to Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma. Rabinovich is believed to have been one of the major donors to Kuchma's presidential re-election campaign. At the same time, he is believed to have donated large amounts of money to the election fund of former Prime Minister Lazarenko — Kuchma's unsuccessful rival in the presidential race. Until recently, Rabinovich did not respond to requests for help from any of the groups within the Jewish movement. For example, an attempt by Joseph Zissels to draw Rabinovich into constructing a united Jewish community of Ukraine through the creation of a national Ukrainian Jewish organization was almost totally unsuccessful.[55] Unexpectedly, a few month later Rabinovich took an interest in the creation of the Ukrainian Jewish Congress, an idea which originated in the Kiev Center of the *Tseirei Habad*, headed by Rabbi Asman, who was supported by some other Habad rabbis in Ukraine.

This surprising turn of events may have been stimulated by a *New York Times* article (4 April 1997) about the business, political, and personal connections of Rabinovich including speculation about his connections to the mafia. This caused a scandal which could have seriously damaged Rabinovich's image and interests in the United States, Israel, and, even more importantly to him, in Ukraine. Thus, Rabinovich had to act to insure his personal and political security.[56] In fact, Rabinovich could have easily arranged membership for himself in the Supreme Rada (parliament) of Ukraine in order to gain certain rights and immunity. However, if Rabinovich did this he would have to give up his Israeli citizenship, something he was not ready to do.

Another way to protect himself was to become head of the Jewish community in Ukraine. The creation of a country-wide Jewish organization in Ukraine, similar to the Russian Jewish Congress (RJC) established in 1996, presented a respectable and effective solution to his problems.[57] Thus, the invitation from the Habad leaders came just in

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time.

The establishment of the All-Ukrainian Jewish Congress (AUJC) was a result of that alliance. Besides Rabinovich himself, who became the President of the Congress, major Ukrainian Jewish businessmen such as M. Gravetz, E. Zwyagelsky, A. Mayberg, V. Pinchuk, G. Surkes, and A. Tabachnik have joined the AUJC governing body. As in the case of the Russian Jewish Congress, whose "moving force became [Jewish] bankers...,while the initiative and ideological birth...came from the rabbis,"[58] Jewish businessmen and rabbis of Ukraine were united by mutual political interests.

Rabbinical leaders were interested in using the connections of their new partners with the Ukrainian political establishment in order to gain access to centers of political influence, and they were equally interested in the financial resources of the politician-businessmen. The latter, due to the political dynamics of 1996-1997, sought to strengthen their formal political status and authority, in addition to their role in the informal organizations. Thus, they needed the Jewish communal infrastructure for formal institutionalization of their new organization, to gain international legitimacy, recognition, and contacts. Those contacts increased the importance and influence of politicians in the Rabinovich camp in the eyes of the Ukrainian elite.[59]

Reasons of personal and political security were also of considerable importance for Rabinovich and the large entrepreneurs who entered the AUJC leadership. This meant gaining maximum defense within the conditions of the usual "post-Soviet capitalist" practices of non-economic methods of business competition, which included bureaucratic terror and physical liquidation of rivals. It was clear that any such attack on a Ukrainian Jewish community leader would be investigated and punished much more severely than an attack on the average big businessman, which was already common.

Finally, being head of the third largest Jewish community in Europe would give an economic advantage to Rabinovich and his colleagues, as well as develop international and local business connections. More importantly, their status as official leaders of Ukrainian Jewry made it possible for them to demand an active role in the restitution of Jewish property which had been confiscated by the authorities after the establishment of the Communist regime in Ukraine in the 1920s. According to preliminary estimates of the Association of Jewish Organizations and Communities of Ukraine (AJOCU), Jewish property in Ukraine includes minimum 2,000 buildings and plots of land [60] worth hundreds of millions of dollars. Thus, public organizations have become

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more commercial in nature and reap political dividends as a result.

In addition to bringing methods from the business world to Jewish politics, Rabinovich has shown himself to be a master of political games, while at the same time he has effectively used conflicts of interest between factions within the AUJC. For example, the Congress initiators, Rabbi Asman (who, in fact, pushed aside Rabbi Karasik from the position of Habad leader of Kiev) and his associates, unlike their counterparts in Russia, were unable to preserve their monopoly influence in the AUJC management.

It is interesting to note that a number of representatives of the rabbinical elite, including some Habad leaders in eastern Ukraine, responded rather coolly to the initiatives of the Kiev center and Rabbi Asman's group. Also Chief Rabbi Bleich, after a brief period of cooperation with the AUJC leadership and its president, Vadim Rabinovich, responded negatively to Rabinovich's leadership ambitions, as well as to his participation in the restitution of Jewish properties.[61] Even though Congress President Rabinovich did do a lot for Kiev Habad (his role was crucial in influencing the authorities' decision to give the Brodsky Synagogue to the Habad community), other Jewish politicians such as Zissels and his team became even more influential. Zissels' group was more dominant at the Second AUJC Convention, while Rabbi Asman and his group played a secondary role.[62] For instance, evidence of Zissels' impact was evident in statements and constitutional documents that were adopted by the convention (Zissels was the chairman of the Editorial Committee of the convention). Thus, the convention's materials contained attacks on the monopoly of foreign Jewish organizations in Jewish communal institutions.[63]

Rabinovich accepted the concept of the Congress infrastructure that was developed by Zissels.[64] According to this plan, the Congress becomes the real center of Ukrainian Jewish community management, which fit Rabinovich's interests. Therefore, alongside a large number of democratically elected institutions (e.g., the Convention, the Executive Committee, the Council of Regions), the real power within the Congress was reserved for the Board of Trustees which, according to the AUJC constitution, "as a rule, consists of...persons who financially support Congress activities," while the order of Congress activities was decided by the president.[65] A similar model was suggested for regional branches of the AUJC. All that makes the Congress a sort of "commercial enterprise" of specific Jewish businessmen.

It would be a simplification to consider the "Rabinovich phenomenon" only in terms of his personal interests and ambitions. To

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some extent Rabinovich was in the right place at the right time during the crisis within the Jewish community. The Ukrainian Jewish community is comparable to leading Western Jewish communities in terms of educational level, social and professional organization, degree of urbanization, modernity and social mobility, as well as in the development of institutional infrastructure. However, in contrast to the West, by the mid-1990s, Ukrainian Jewry had become almost totally dependent on outside economic and organizational resources.

At this time, local Jewish businessmen were beginning to invest their money in the community. In addition, the organizational and financial crisis of the Jewish movement promoted a restructuring of local conflicts, including a visible decrease in ideological controversies. As a result, the AUJC was able to include leaders and groups from many different orientations, some voluntary and some not, within its umbrella organization. In other words, the creation of this national organization became possible due to considerable changes in the political climate in the Ukrainian Jewish community.

However, Jewish politician-businessmen use the Jewish Congress structure as a tool to establish personal power in the local Jewish movement, and not for socio-centric or ethno-patriotic reasons. Thus, an influential group of politicians aggressively imposed their own rules of the game on the movement. For example, a few months after the AUJC's second convention, the leaders, guided by the principle that those who do not have money should have no voice, began dismissing real or potential opponents from the main spheres of Jewish politics.[66] This process provoked an unavoidable crisis in the AUJC which resulted in the breaking away of the AJOCU and AJRCU, as well as some other organizations. As Betsy Gidwitz writes, "The scope of All-Ukrainian Jewish Congress operations has been circumscribed by the refusal of Habad rabbis within Ukraine to affiliate with it. Thus, Rabinovich is denied the support of leading Jewish organizations....Rabinovich's dictatorial and mercurial leadership style further limits his effectiveness."[67]

As a result, AUJC status was reduced as an all-Ukrainian "umbrella" Jewish organization, becoming, as some observers saw it, "just the 301st Jewish organization of the republic." Many influential businessmen such as Surkis, Maiberg, Shulman, and Pinchuk left the AUJC's Executive Committee. In addition, Rabinovich's influence decreased due to his personal conflict with Vladimir Gorbulin, the Secretary of the Ukrainian National Security Council, which greatly damaged Rabinovich's relations with Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma. Thus, Rabinovich desperately

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tried to present himself as the only real Ukrainian Jewish leader.[68] A declaration to all members of the Congress signed by Rabinovich in November 1998 suggested to all Jewish organizations that "by January 1, 1999 they submit statements declaring that they are members of only one Ukrainian umbrella organization — the All-Ukrainian Jewish Congress." Rabinovich promised that those organizations which do so "will be subsidized annually with US$900-9,000."[69]

Local Jewish organizations which supported this initiative were proclaimed as provincial Jewish communities or AUJC branches. A meeting held in Kiev on 21-22 January 1999 of AUJC leaders together with representatives of these communities, as well as with those of all-Ukrainian Jewish organizations such as Maccabi, the Ukrainian Jewish Foundation, and Hillel, declared the creation of the Coordination Council of the Ukrainian Jewish Community, with Rabinovich as its chairman. He immediately proclaimed this new organization as "the sole representative of Ukrainian Jewry at the international level."[70]

Rabinovich was strongly condemned by many Ukrainian Jewish politicians[71] and provoked AJOCU, UJC, and AJRCU leaders to end their relations with the AUJC and to declare on 23 February 1999 their wish to create a new united Jewish organization.[72] The creation of two new rival umbrella organizations, the Rabinovich-led Congress of the United Jewish Community of Ukraine, and the Jewish Confederation of Ukraine — formed by the Association of Jewish Religious Organizations, the Ukrainian Jewish Council, and the Association of Jewish Organizations and Communities — was formalized at the inaugural conventions of these organizations held in April 1999.[73]

Thus, by the end of 1998, besides the Zissels-led AJOCU, influential religious circles also became the center of the anti-AUJC camp. The attempts of Rabinovich-led politicians to gain international legitimacy also appeared to be ineffective. Thus, Rabinovich has been ostracized by many Western countries including the United States, as well as Jewish groups which refuse to recognize him as the leader of Ukraine's Jewish community. In August 1998, Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu refused to attend a dinner in Jerusalem for the Aish Hatorah Yeshiva to which Rabinovich had also been invited, forcing the school to cancel his invitation.[74] In spite of massive pressure, the AUJC was not permitted to enter the European Jewish Congress, although the AJOCU and UJC are among that organization's members.[75]

Thus, the initial appearance of Jewish businessmen in Jewish politics could hardly be regarded as totally successful. Nevertheless, one can also see the evolution of people like Vadim Rabinovich as Jewish public

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leaders. According to some observers, ethno-patriotic motivations are taking a more important place in the political and personal priorities of the new generation of politician-businessmen.[76] Which of the trends will prevail in the future is still an open question.

Conclusion

It could be concluded that the real picture of Jewish politics in Ukraine is still very complicated. In includes both peculiar Jewish Ukrainian feature, and elements, that similar with correspondent spheres of Jewish political life in other countries. Furthermore, some aspects of Jewish politics in Ukraine are meeting some features, that sometimes are considered to be general for Jewish political tradition as a whole This also concerns the traditional types of Jewish political leadership. For example, the traditional Jewish political idea of "three domains" of Jewish public life, that include prophetic, civil (bureaucratic) and spiritual (priesthood) elite (81) is somehow presented in the both Ukrainian and in general East European Jewish movement.

This movement in pre- and early *Perestroika* period, held in the situation of total bending of independent Jewish national activities, had a definitely "prophetic" character. National leaders of that time, which were "prisoners of Zion" and activists of Aliya and human rights movement demonstrated an ideological ("prophetic") model of public leadership.

The group of Jewish politicians which was dominant on the next step of the Jewish movement in the USSR and successor states (1987-1994), were recruited from different sources and was represented mainly by "communal bureaucracy", i.e., leaders and activists of different local and foreign Jewish structures. Their authority as a group, as one can assume, was based on the models of public administration rather then anything else.

The third period of the Ukrainian Jewish movement, started in the middle of 1990s, presents the increasing political role of modern "priesthood", i.e., rabbinical leaders. This group of Jewish political elite was trying to exercise a spiritual-political form of power, based on the combination of public leadership and public administration models.

Finally, the businessmen joining of the Jewish politics seems to

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became a new important factor, providing possibility of political integration of Ukrainian Jewish ruling elites and organisational strengthening of Ukrainian Jewish movement.

In general, elements of Ukrainian Jewish politics, based on the relations of contradictions and cooperation of its leading subjects are just in the process of their formation, and political future of Ukrainian Jewish community remains ambivalent. That is why, the prospects of development of Ukrainian Jewish movement will deal with the realization of one of the following options:

1. the establishment of strong, independent and influential community of the "American stile";

2. the victory of a "paternalist trend", meaning the creation of Jewish institutions and groups of Jewish leaders, that will be relatively independent from local authorities (especially, if present economic situation of Ukraine will not improve), but totally dependent from Israeli and/or Western Jewish organizations;

3. finally, the creation of a "pocket" Jewish movement, having relatively weak national institutions, that will be independent from the international Jewish structures, but controlled by the Ukrainian authorities.

It is evident, that results of struggle in the Jewish movement will be crucial for the Ukrainian Jewish community both in the near and in the distant future.

Footnotes

1. In the course of the last population census that was conducted in Ukraine in early 1989 there were 487,307 people that regarded themselves as Jewish. However, a great wave of Jewish emigration from Ukraine started in 1989 as well as a trend of coming back to Jewish identity of many of those, who in Soviet times, preferred to hide it because of political reasons, considerably change this picture. Since the exact data is unavailable, the Ukrainian Jewish population figures presented in this article, is a result of estimations. The first figure (420,000) is estimated by experts of Ukrainian Jewish Vaad on the bases of the reports of Ukrainian Jewish communal services. (See "Reports of Ukrainian Jewish VA'AD activities in the field of welfare and communal service,

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1991-1997", p. 1) The later (650,000) was presented in Mark Kupovetsky in his *Ethnic Demography of Ukrainian Jews in the 1990s, and Projections of School Age Populations (7-16 year-olds) for 1997 and 2002.* (The demographic research, commissioned and funded by the Joseph Lookstein Center for Jewish Education in the Diaspora, Bar-Ilan University) Fall 1996-Summer 1997, p. 26 It should be noted, that both figures cover so called "enlarged Jewish population", i.e., those who have right to immigrate to Israel according to Israeli Law of Return, meaning Jews and members of their families in the second and third generations

2. See: Yehoshua Gilboa, *The Black Years of Soviet Jewry* (Boston: Little Brown, 1972); Vladimir Khanin, *Jewish Life in Ukraine after the Second World War: Documents on Jewish Identity and Emancipation, 1944-1987* (London: Frank Cass, 1999).
3. The statistical data is quoted from archival materials of the executive body of the Jewish Confederation of Ukraine (JCU) .
4. Personal interview, Zaporozhye and Kiev, September 1995.
5. Personal interview, Kiev, September 1994.
6. These estimates were made by various experts including heads of Jewish educational institutions in Ukraine, local Jewish Agency representatives, as well as activists in Jewish communities, organizations, and other groups representing Jewish leadership in a number of cities in eastern and central Ukraine. (A series of personal interviews, 1993-1997). Kiev sociologist N. Churilov, who studied the Jewish population of Kiev at the beginning of the 1990s, got results that were very close to ours. See N. Churilov, *Nekotorye problemy evreev v Ukraine: sostoyanie i perspectivy* [Some Problems of Jews in Ukraine: Situation and Prospects] (unpublished paper, n.p., n.d.), p. 2. Similar results were also arrived at by Moscow researchers V. Chervyakov and V. Shapiro, who took a census of the Jewish population in the three biggest cities in Russia; V. Chervyakov, Z. Gitelman, V. Shapiro, "Religion and Ethnicity: Judaism in the Ethnic Consciousness of Contemporary Russian Jews," *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, vol. 20, no. 2 (April 1997):286.
7. "Interview with Ilya Levitas, Chairman of Ukrainian Jewish Council," JCPA Materials on Revival of Organized Jewish Life in Ukraine, File 8, Doc. 6, p. 27. See also Ilya Levitas, "Vozrozhdeniye? Da, vozrozhdeniye" [Revival? Yes, Revival!], *Evreiskiye Vesty* (Kiev), no. 5 (May 1992).
8. TsDAGOU, F. 1, Op. 32, D. 2770, Ll. 58-59.
9. "Abstracts of Address of Ilya Levitas, Chairman of the Council of Ethnic Societies of Ukraine and the Ukrainian Society of Jewish Culture to All-Ukrainian Inter-ethnic Congress, Odessa, December 1991," *Evreiskiye Vesty,* no. 6 (December 1991), p. 2.
10. Ilya Levitas, "K evreiskome renessansy" [To the Jewish Renaissance],

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Evreiskiye Vesty, no. 1 (1992), p. 1.

11. The newspaper has been published since 1991 as a supplement to the official gazette of the Supreme Soviet (parliament) of Ukraine, *Golos Ukrainy* [The Voice of Ukraine]. See M. Feldman, "Jewish Press of Ukraine," *Jewish History and Culture in Ukraine* (Kiev: KJYS, 1995), p. 186.
12. Personal observation of the author, January 1997.
13. For example, this opinion was expressed by L. Finberg (personal interview, December 1996), and S. Yushkovsky (Tel Aviv, November 1997).
14. Interview with S. Yushkovsky, Secretary of the World Union of Yiddish Language (interview was conducted in Tel Aviv, November 1997).
15. According to some sources in the government, the primary reason for the conflict was the JAFI program "Na'ale 16," aiming to bring local Jewish youth to Israel for high school and college studies (confidential interviews, Kiev, August and September 1994).
16. Johanan Petrovsky, "Hope Dies Last: Ukrainian Jews and Ukrainian Independence, 1991-1995" (unpublished paper), p. 10.
17. "Ukrainian Jewish Council. Ukrainian Society of Jewish Culture. The List of Jewish Organizations of Ukraine as of 1 August 1996"
18. This was also the opinion of M. Frenkel, the editor of the Kiev Jewish newspaper *Hadashot* (personal interview, Kiev, September 1994).
19. Personal interview with J. Zissels, Kiev, January 1997.
20. Mykola Ryabchuk, *Politychna vlada i politychna elita* [Political Power and Political Elite], in *Politologiya postcommunizmu* [Political Studies in Post-Communism] (Kiev: Politychna Dumka, 1995), p. 155 (Ukrainian).
21. J. Petrovsky, "Hope Dies Last," p. 11.
22. Association of Jewish Organizations and Communities of Ukraine, the Statute, 24 May 1991/15 March 1993 (Ukrainian).
23. Personal interview with J. Zissels, Kiev, August 1993; Jerusalem, December 1994; Kiev, February 1995.
24. Copies of this and other documents of the AJOCU used in this article were kindly presented to the author by the AJOCU Central Office in Kiev, Ukraine.
25. "Report of Activities of the Ukrainian Jewish Va'ad in 1995," p. 1 (Russian).
26. Personal interview with J. Zissels, Kiev, August 1993.
27. J. Petrovsky, "Hope Dies Last," p. 12.
28. Joseph Zissels, "The Creation of the United Jewish Community of Ukraine / Jewish Congress of Ukraine — Communal Structure of a New Type" (Kiev, 1996) (Russian).
29. Joseph Zissels, *The Jews of Ukraine and the Jewish Community in the*

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29. Joseph Zissels, *The Jews of Ukraine and the Jewish Community in the West*. Report to the annual conference of the American Jewish Committee (n.p., n.d.), p. 3.
30. *Hadashot,* February 1994, pp. 1-2.
31. This was also the opinion of an official in one of the influential Israeli organizations working at that time in one of the southern Ukrainian cities (personal interview, September 1994).
32. Joseph Zissels, *Jews of Ukraine and the Jewish Community in the West,* pp. 2-3.
33. Lishkat ha-Kesher was created in 1952 as a branch of the Israeli Prime Minister's Office in order to keep contact with Eastern European Jewry. At the moment the Bureau (known as *Lishka* or *Nativ*) governs a large system of Israel cultural centers in post-Soviet states including Ukraine. These centers, in addition to other functions, compete with *ulpanim* (Hebrew language schools) of the Jewish Agency, as well as sponsor local Jewish Sunday schools via the "Mechina" program. Lishkat ha-Kesher also has four Jewish day schools with a strong Zionist orientation, known as Batei Sefer Ma'avar, or the Tsofiya schools.
34. That position was presented by Joseph Zissels in his address to participants of the International Conference on Jewish Civilization and Jewish Thought in Ukraine, held in Kiev, 25 August 1995. See also Vladimir Khanin, *Ha-hinukh ha-yehudi*..., pp. 97-100.
35. The author is grateful to Mr. J. Zissels and Rabbi Dr. Pinchas Hayman (then Director of the Lookstein Center for Jewish Education in the Diaspora, Bar-Ilan University) for their kind permission to quote here a part of their discussion in Kiev, September 1995.
36. See Joseph Zissels, *Jews of Ukraine and the Jewish Community in the West*, p. 4.
37. According to M. Frenkel, "the struggle involves more a personal than an institutional aspect" (personal interview, Kiev, August 1993).
38. See, for example, issues of *Vesty* (Tel Aviv) from June until August 1995 and 24 September 1998; *Ha'aretz* (Tel Aviv), 6 March 1997; and *Jerusalem Post*, 29 May 1996
39. The document is quoted from the copy officially distributed by the AJOCU executive body.
40. The information was presented by L. Finberg (personal interview, Jerusalem, 30 July 1997), as well as from a confidential interview (Jerusalem, November 1987). See also *Report of Ukrainian Va'ad Activities in 1991-1995*, pp. 3-4.
41. Joseph Zissels, *Jewish Community of Ukraine: Situation and Prospects*, p. 9.
42. Vladimir Khanin, "Social Consciousness and the Problem of Jewish

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Identity of Ukrainian Jewry," *Contemporary Jewry,* vol. 19 (1998); Vladimir Khanin, "A Rabbinical Revolution? Religion, Power and Politics in the Contemporary Ukrainian Jewish Movement," *Jewish Political Studies Review*, vol. 10, nos. 1-2 (1998); see also V. Chervyakov, Z. Gitelman, and V. Shapiro, "Religion and Ethnicity: Judaism in Ethnic Consciousness of Contemporary Russian Jews," *Ethnic and Racial Studies,* vol. 20, no. 2 (April 1997).

43. That was the opinion of many Jewish activists participating in the Conference on Jewish Civilization and Jewish Thought in Ukraine, Kiev, August 1993.
44. The data was provided by the Chief Rabbinate of Ukraine.
45. Petrovsky, "Hope Dies Last," p. 10.
46. Betsy Gidwitz, "Travel to Jewish Population Centers in Ukraine, March and April 1997," p. 60.
47. Petrovsky, "Hope Dies Last," p. 4.
48. The synagogue, built in 1903 from a donation of the Brodsky family (famous Kiev sugar businessmen and philanthropists), is one of the largest and most beautiful synagogues in Ukraine. The synagogue was closed and confiscated by the authorities at the end of the 1920s. After World War II the synagogue housed the city's puppet theater. After Ukrainian independence, the question arose of giving back this building, together with other Jewish properties. Saliy, then mayor of Kiev, who was against the restitution of former Jewish properties in Kiev, used the inflexible position of Habad Administrative Director Dubinsky. As a compromise it was suggested that Habad co-rent the building together with the theater. (I owe this information to M. Frenkel, the editor of *Hadashot*, who took part in these meetings with Saliy.)
49. See Vladimir Khanin, "A Rabbinical Revolution?," pp. 11-13.
50. See Joint Distribution Committee, FSU Budget, 30 September 1997.
51. J. Zissels, "The Creation of the United Jewish Community of Ukraine/Jewish Congress of Ukraine — Communal Structure of a New Type," p. 2 (Russian).
52. J. Zissels, "Jewish Community of Ukraine: Situation and Prospects," p. 12.
53. Personal interview, Kiev, August 1993. M. Frenkel was referring to two Jewish businessmen who "bought" the Kiev subway for a day so that everyone traveled that day for free.
54. Tom Sawitski, "Sinned Against or Sinning," *Jerusalem Report*, 28 December 1995. In 1993, the company organized a $250 million Ukrainian-Russian-Germanbarter deal (oil-food-equipment). As a result of this, Luchansky "is known and respected in Ukraine as the man who saved the country from freezing that winter."

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55.Personal interview with J. Zissels, Jerusalem, January 1998.

56.A huge political scandal around acting Prime Minister of Ukraine Efim Zvyagelsky in 1994 proves that Rabinovich had cause to worry. Zvyagelsky, a Jew, was falsely accused of corruption. This case included an impressive anti-Semitic campaign in the Ukrainian nationalistic and so-called liberal media. See V. Mindlin, "The Zvyagelsky Case," *Eghuperts* (Almanac of Fiction and Investigative Journalism of the Kiev Judaic Institute), no. 3 (Kiev: Sphera, 1997).

57.According to certain information, it was a recommendation of RJC president V. Gusinsky, one of the biggest Russian businessmen and a business partner of Rabinovich, which influenced Rabinovich's decision. However, Gusinsky withdrew his support after learning about Rabinovich's criminal record and the U.S. State Department's withdrawal of his American visa.

58.*Meshdunarodnaya evreyskaya gazeta* [International Jewish Newspaper], Moscow, no. 2 (161), January 1996, p. 2.

59.Thus, it is known that Rabinivich was actively "promoting" Ukrainian democracy in the United States while trying to use his new connections in Jewish and non-Jewish business and political circles to lobby for the Jackson-Vanik amendment. See the *New York Times*, 26 August 1997, p. 16.

60.See *Va'ad of Ukraine, Program of Restitution*, AJOCU Reports, May 1991, p.1 (Russian; unpublished).

61.L. Finberg made this estimation of Rabbi Bleich in the course of a personal interview (Jerusalem, August, 1997).

62.Observation of many delegates to the Convention (personal interviews with the delegates, Kiev and Jerusalem, 1997).

63."Address to International Public Organizations," Materials of the Second Convention of the All-Ukrainian Jewish Congress, Kiev, 17-18 December 1997 (Ukrainian). It is notable that representatives of JDC-sponsored charity funds and of the Tsofiya schools that are sponsored by the Israeli Education Ministry did not attend the convention.

64.This becomes evident when comparing materials produced by leaders of the AJOCU in 1996 (see *The Creation of the Unified Jewish Community of Ukraine*, Kiev, 1996) with *The Constitutional Principles of the All-Ukrainian Jewish Congress*, adopted by the Convention (*VEK*, 1998, no. 2, pp. 3-5) (Ukrainian).

65."Changes and Additions to the AUJC Constitution," Materials of the Second Convention of the All-Ukrainian Jewish Congress, p. 3.

66.Confidential interviews with activists in the Ukrainian Jewish movement, July 1998.

67.See Betsy Gidwitz, "Visits to Jewish Communities in Ukraine and

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Moldova, April 1-30, 1998" (unpublished paper), June 1998, p. 4.

68.See "Vadim Rabinovich: 'Let's Say the Truth to Each Other'," *VEK-Vestnik Evreiskogo Kongressa* [The Jewish Congress Herald], no. 1 (31), 26 January 1999.

69.All-Ukrainian Jewish Congress, doc. no. 205/160, 16 November 1998.

70.See *VEK*, no. 2 (32), 27 January — 3 February 1999.

71.Many Ukrainian Jewish public figures expressed this opinion in January-May 1999. See also *Segodnya* (Kiev), 4 March 1999; *Golos* (Tel Aviv), no. 253, 7-13 March 1999, p. 68.

72.*Vesty* (Tel Aviv), 25 February 1999, p. 5; *Den* (Kiev), March 1999.

73.According to Rabbi Bleich, "there were a lot of people who participated in both congresses." See reports of Katya Gorchinskaya about both events in *Kyiv Post*, 8 April and 15 April 1999

74.See Elli Wohlgelernter, "Rival Ukrainian Jewish Groups End Conferences," *Jerusalem Post*, 15 April 1999.

75.Betsy Gidwitz, "Visits to Jewish Communities in Ukraine and Moldova, April 1-30, 1998," p. 5. As it was observed, representatives of the Conference of European Rabbis, World Jewish Congress, and European Jewish Congress attended the inaugural convention of the Jewish Confederation of Ukraine, but obviously ignored the inaugural meeting of the Rabinovich-led Congress of the United Jewish Community of Ukraine.

76.It was also my personal impression from meetings with Vadim Rabinovich and other Jewish politician-businessmen in Kiev and other Ukrainian cities in February 1998.

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Third World Corruption: A Brief Survey of the Issues

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The author examines the problem of corruption which is widespread in most Third World countries, and finds that although it facilitates effective action in some cases it generally imposes a severe restriction on economic development which is particularly harmful when political leaders transfer the financial resources they have stolen to other countries rather than investing them in commercial or industrial enterprises within their own country. The theft of funds and resources provided by international donors is a common form of corruption, and private enterprise and efficiency at all levels is customarily vitiated by corruption at any level. While poverty is commonly blamed for corruption, any successful efforts to combat the economic effects of this debilitating disease require not only a determined and sustained anti-corruption campaign and the cooperation of donor nations and international organizations.

Key Words: Third World, Nigeria, Pakistan, Zaire, Transparency International, corruption

The problem of corruption within or across nations is not a recent phenomenon, nor is it exclusively a Third-World concern. The English historian Edward Gibbon called "corruption the most infallible symptom of constitutional liberty." Further, "James Madison and the Founding Fathers took for granted the corruption of government by business, and business by government" (McDougal, 1). The Berlin-based Transparency International annual develops a global "Corruption Perception Index," and in 1998, based on a scale of zero to 10 (zero being highly "corrupt" and 10 being highly "clean"), Cameroon was ranked the most corrupt, but USA tied with Austria for 17th place, Denmark being the "cleanest" (*Washington Times*, 9/23/98). Thus, depending upon definitions and interpretations,

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corruption plagues almost every nation, though there is variation in degree and intensity. Further, while it may prevail in any sector of the economy, public-sector corruption, especially in the Third-World nations, has received considerable attention in recent years; there is a plethora of recent literature (see bibliography).

Corrupt public officials, from low-level bureaucrats to national leaders, can have negative economic, social and political effects on a country's process of modernization and development. It is a major problem in countries where due to weak institutions and enforcement, often accountability is low but where national development needs and aspirations are intense and resource scarcity is acute. There are many different forms of corruption, as well as several different groups who may engage in corrupt behavior.

Third-world corruption has been receiving close scrutiny at various public and private forums, with calls for rapid ameliorative steps, for the resultant negative effects serve as a huge drain on national/international efforts to promote development. There are already grassroots campaigns, from Nigeria to Thailand, gaining strength in fighting corruption. The developing countries, in conjunction with developed countries, international agencies and various non-governmental organizations, are increasingly focusing on this corrosive issue.

When President Mobutu Sese-Seko of Zaire left office in 1996, he had a vast personal fortune virtually stolen from the nation that he had ruled for about 30 years. It was reported that he diverted between $50 million and $70 million a year from the Bank of Zaire to personal accounts in Europe; estimates of his personal fortune run over $6 billion (Wedeman, 463). These types of stories are not uncommon in various nations of Africa, Latin America and Asia.

The former prime-minister of Pakistan, Mohammed Nawaz, overthrown by a military coup in October 1999 and already sentenced to life imprisonment on charges of hijacking of a commercial airliner that carried his military chief and 200 other passengers, has recently been indicted on charges of mass corruption (*Infotimes*,

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Pakistanjournal@egroups.com, 6/2/00).[2] The famous President Peron of Argentina was said to have accumulated $700 million in foreign banks by the end of his rule (Theobald, 77). For poorer countries, such "capital flights" often represent a significant percentage of their national outputs, and in the face of acute resource scarcities, such pilferage becomes extremely detrimental to national development and modernization goals. But that is not the only type of corruption that pervades these countries; "demanders" and "suppliers" of corruption services are numerous and the services have considerable variety. Corruption exists at many levels; often the civil service employees engage in briberies and favors, and this type of corruption is often most common and hard to detect. Corruption can exist in both the public and private sectors, within each and between the two, in forms of bribery, fraud, embezzlement and extortion.

As well, corruption is often viewed as merely a symptom of larger social, political and economic causes in these countries. Underdevelopment itself can be a major cause of corruption; at the same time effects of corruption can further impede socio-economic transformation. While this chronic problem is being much debated and solutions are being sought, thus far the results appear negligible and new approaches are being proposed (see Klitgaard, 2000). A recent survey of senior officials from over 60 developing countries "ranked public sector corruption as the most severe impediment to development and growth in these countries" (Gray-Kauffman, 1998: 7). While most people agree that corruption is a major problem and its costs are enormous, there are those who feel that any remedial steps must precede clear identification of the fundamental circumstances that breed corruption.

Given this brief background, our purpose in this brief survey-paper is three-fold. First, we will describe the general meaning and nature of corruption in the Third-World context. Second, we will briefly explain the causes and effects of corruption. This will be followed, third, by a discussion of some of the solutions that have

[2] His predecessor, Ms. Benazir Bhutto (and her husband) had been earlier indicted on similar charges; she now lives in exile in Europe and her spouse is under house-arrest in Pakistan. Back in 1996, the Transparency International ranked Pakistan's corruption level as No.2 among the countries ranked, Nigeria being the worst; at the time the sordid joke often heard in Pakistan was that the country probably "bribed" someone to be ranked No.2.

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been much talked about in recent years.

II. Defining Corruption in a Third-World Context

Depending upon a society's heritage of moral-ethical, socio-cultural and legal traditions, the definition of corruption can vary across nations at a given point in time or in a given nation over a period of time. In developing countries, corruption can often be identified merely as the illegal use of public office for private gain. Though this is also true for developed countries, it does not tell the whole story. Even reference to "corrupt" public officials/bureaucrats and private businesses does not seem comprehensive enough. One dictionary definition of corruption is "the perversion or destruction of integrity in the discharge of public duties by bribery or favor; the use or existence of corruption practices...." (cited in Theobold, 2). However, limiting it to one or the other sector can also be restrictive, for often there are linkages. One author provides a definition that seems to be the most comprehensive in this context. He defines corruption as the "abuse of public roles or resources or the use of illegitimate forms of political influence by public or private parties" (Johnston, 62).

Though the difficulty of defining corruption is evident, there are certain common characteristics to such attempts. It usually has to do with public officials being bribed or somehow accepting money or other favors for private gain. Corruption involves people in rent-seeking (and often vote-seeking) activities, trying to influence the system to their advantage. It is usually an illegal activity, and those who are involved are fully aware of this. However, it is also necessary to take private sector corruption into account. Almost no level of government or of society is immune from such behavior.

One interesting formulation to describe corruption is suggested by Robert Klitgaard; that is, C = M + D - A. This means that corruption (C) is a function of monopoly (M) plus discretion (D), less accountability (A) (Klitgaard, 1998: 4). What this implies is that when an individual or an organization has monopoly or controlling power over some event or action, along with discretion as to how that event or action takes place or is resolved; and, further, if accountability for the event/action and any consequences is low or lacking, then there are fertile grounds for corruption. This description assumes that for the participants any moral-ethical

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concerns become secondary; economic gain or acquisition of political power or control become primary, especially if the risks are minimal. Perhaps a bit simplified, but such an explanation adequately describes most situations (see bibliography for further details). It must be recognized, however, that a single, uniform and universal definition of corruption is quite difficult, if not impossible.[3]

III. Causes of Corruption

Before the solutions for fighting Third-World corruption can be discussed, it is important to identify some of the reasons Third-World corruption is so rampant. The causes and reasons are many; yes, people engage in corrupt behavior for personal gain; people bribe to gain favored treatment. However, there are several cultural, social and especially economic reasons why people often choose to engage in corrupt behavior.

Many Third-World nations have relatively recently gained independence from the former colonial powers of Europe. This is especially true of many African countries. Often the transition to an independent nation has not been a smooth one. There have frequently been political coups, violent overthrows and other unstable forces, representing the background for the evolution of public-sector institutions. It is no surprise that many of these regimes turned out to be corrupt. These governments soon faced pressures to meet demands from their citizens for jobs, roads, schools, etc.; yet the lack of well-developed public administration and related institutions, such as the habit of mass political participation that could ensure some accountability, inhibited their ability to provide the social-economic infrastructure for nation-building. Often *ad hoc* structures, without proper legitimacy, tended to be hastily developed, giving rise to political instability in later years. Further, public employees at all levels tended to be poorly trained or lacking altogether. Such conditions make the possibilities of corruption very easy and widespread.

Economic conditions in many developing countries are often ripe for corruption. If poverty, low levels of living and unemployment are

[3] For similar definition descriptions, see Theobold, esp. Ch.1, "What is Corruption?"; also see some early literature on the subject by Nye and Andeski.

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the only life-styles people perennially encounter, any means of making life better – including corruption – are worthy of taking risks. If we consider the low-level civil service workers and citizens who engage in rent-seeking behavior to influence them, we can observe a casual cost-benefit approach on the part of the practitioners. The wages of civil service employees are low in developing countries, often well below those for the average private-sector employee. The employees barely can survive on these wages, so the expected benefits of accepting bribes are attractive. When civil service wages are very low, officials may try to supplement their pay with illegal payoffs; evidence reveals, in general, that corruption tends to be relatively low where the ratio of civil-service wages to private-sector manufacturing wages is high (*Bulletin*, 3). Under such circumstances, losing a job that pays very little in the first place is not a very strong deterrent to acting illegally or unethically. Those who engage in briberies often do so for two reasons: to obtain government benefits (e.g., welfare, housing, medical) and to avoid costs (e.g., criminal charges, licensing fees). Obviously for anyone engaged in such self-seeking behavior, the benefits of corruption are high, especially if they are readily available and the risks are minimal – and even if risks are present, participants may anticipate overcoming them by further corrupt behavior. Thus, rampant corruption, individual or collective, tends to feed upon itself; indeed, it becomes systemic (see Klitgaard, 2000, for his interesting classification of first stage, second stage, and "systemic" corruption).

There is, however, a key mixture that is present in most developing countries that differentiates them from most developed countries. The risk of detection is very low, the punishment if caught is minimal and those who are charged with enforcing the laws are often themselves corrupt and/or incompetent. Often it is specially hard to detect bribery because if both parties in a bribery situation are benefitting, there is no reason for either to come forward with disclosures. The fact that people find very little risk in getting caught and punished is a key reason why corruption has been able to grow as it has. When the risks are small, the benefits easily outweigh the

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possible costs (see Alam for details).[4]

Such reasoning is also true for the national leaders and other high officials who simply rob from the public exchequer, or take "cuts" from national/international business transactions, or pilfer from foreign aid coming into the country; the potential for such self-enrichment is almost limitless. National leaders sometimes are dictators in a one-party system. There are no democratic means for the citizens to simply vote them out of office. They can use the money to pay off those who may be inclined to expose them; corruption breeds further corruption. There is little or no accountability for their actions. The legal institutions that can perform watchdog duties are particularly lacking and inefficient, or if existing, they may be often controlled or manipulated by those in power. When people at the top are perceived to be dishonest and corrupt, those in various levels of the hierarchy feel encouraged to be corrupt as well. Moreover, when commitment by the government is lukewarm and enforcement is weak, complacent attitudes about corruption trickle down to the rest of society; corrupt behavior simply becomes the norm – even unrecognizable as such. Thus, a set of circumstances and practices evolves such that everyone talks about corruption, yet, reluctantly or not, everyone is inclined to become a participant; corruption becomes systemic.

One key factor that often encourages corruption is the mass of government rules and regulations that often exist in developing countries; too many rules and regulations persuade people to engage in illegal efforts to obviate them. One scholar believes that there is a strong correlation between economic underdevelopment and administrative underdevelopment (incompetency or corruption); and the later gives rise to corruption which impedes development (Theobald, 84). Ironically, most of the developing countries have administrative structures that are often too large for the country.

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[4] The current military regime in Pakistan appears to be quite determined to eradicate mass corruption in that country. Among other things, it has established a National Accountability Bureau with the purpose of "recovery of plundered wealth with individuals, barring a very few, and restore the same to the national exchequer." However, the Bureau Chief cautions that while-collar corruption is difficult to detect and investigate, for "We have neither a culture nor skill to conduct an investigation into such offenses" (reported in *Dawn*, daily newspaper, June 10, 2000).

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They are unable to meet all the demands of the citizens, which leads to a lack of legitimacy. Civil servants are poorly trained and have a low work morale often due to their low wages or job insecurity. The more regulations the government sets up, the more opportunities there are for bribes and rent-seeking behavior. For instance, if the government puts heavy restrictions on imports, import licenses becomes very valuable. So importers would have more reason to engage in bribery and graft. In the same way, if protection of domestic industries from international competition is prevalent, this may generate rents that local entrepreneurs are willing to pay (Mauro, 85). There is common knowledge that governments that restrict competition will increase rents, thereby creating further incentives and opportunities for bribes and other corrupt behavior.[5]

Finally, there are some socio-cultural reasons why corruption is as rampant as it is in developing countries. If it is such a problem, why aren't people becoming so fed up with it and reporting it? The fact is that often the norms and traditions of a society mirror the types of behavior that some within the society and outsiders may perceive as corrupt. In many societies, allegiance to a clan, a kinship or a family, is of utmost importance. These loyalties can take precedence over public duties, even for high public officials, and even at the expense of common good. So, hiring family members or giving them preferential treatment is considered normal, sometimes even obligatory. Gift exchange is a norm in many business transactions. Much like American congressmen bringing home the "pork" for their constituencies, public officials in developing countries also have their loyalties. Public officials are also more likely to do favors for friends and relatives in societies where relationships are more personalized. This type of patronage may be especially true in countries populated with several ethnic groups. Mauro finds that ethnolinguistic fractionalization is directly correlated with corruption (Mauro, 87). Further, one scholar argues that the questionable business practices of "robber barons" in U.S. history represent what he calls "creative corruption," in the sense that those practices generated many long-term beneficial results for U.S. economic growth and prosperity

[5] See a recent IMF study by Vitorio Tanzi on the role of excessive government regulations that tend to encourage corruption.

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(McDougall, 3).

In sum, the level of political and economic development and how it interacts with the cultural tradition may determine the level of corruption. Obviously, there are many factors in determining the causes of corruption: low wages, low accountability, underdevelopment, the legitimacy of the institutions, the relative ease of market transition, weak or deficient commitment to anti-corruption policies by the authorities, and certain socio-cultural norms of behavior. All of these factors together can contribute to the prevalence and perpetuation of corruption in Third World environments.

IV. Economic Effects of Corruption

The effects of corruption on the economy of a nation are numerous and often rather damaging. Further, the effects on the legitimacy of political institutions in terms of policy formulation and enforcement, and on the broader development/modernization process make the need for expeditious solutions rather critical.

Corruption undermines a state's legitimacy. When corruption undermines the basic "rules of the game," i.e. the judicial system, property rights, rule of law, and even moral-ethical rules of conduct, etc., it tends seriously to impede socio-economic transformation. It has been argued that illegitimate institutions cause corruption, but corruption also contributes to a lack of legitimacy. People perceive the government as being for sale to the highest bidder, which is a further threat to the government's authority. The monetary benefits of corruption are perceived to be very high. This perception places a premium on being in power, attracting only the most corrupt to office. Corruption is associated with an almost pathological political style, and this standard of mistrust can spread to all other areas of society. This type of "radical" self-interest philosophy "intensifies social inequalities, encourages social fragmentation and internecine conflict, and propels a corrupt society into an unremitting cycle of institutional anarchy and violence" (Theobold, 130).

Relatedly, there is the much debated question as to whether corruption, by "lubricating" the wheels of bureaucracy, may actual speed up the administrative processes, obviate the inertia of various rules and regulation, and thereby improve "system" efficiency and benefit the society by, among other things, accelerating economic

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growth. However, on balance the evidence seems to negate any such positive effects. There is more pervasive evidence that corruption tends to be negatively related to both economic efficiency and growth. Further, both public officials and those who offer bribes conspire to defraud the ordinary citizens, to undermine fair trade, to waste resources, to frustrate development and often to increase human suffering (see Theobold, especially Ch.5, "Is Corruption a Problem?). These ideas will be further amplified in the succeeding section.

One Machiavellian argument, condoned by some and endorsed by others, is that bribery creates auction-like conditions where the most efficient producers will get the contract or favor – i.e., corruption serves as a tonic, not a toxin (see Goldstein, for example, for further discussion). The argument is that bribes represent "speed" or "grease" money that, by "lubricating the wheels of bureaucracy," overcomes bureaucratic "redtape" and thus accelerates administrative efficiency. Firms and individuals that engage in rent-seeking can avoid regulations and legalities. Although such arguments seem sensible in terms of strict economic calculus, there are several pragmatic considerations that point to their weaknesses.

This argument assumes that the auction-like conditions will result in contracts going to the most efficient producers/suppliers. However, it is just as likely that the contracts will go to those with the most "grease," rather than those who are efficient. If the bribery arrangements are satisfactory to the parties involved, efficiency is likely to be quite secondary; it may not be the contractor who can build the best roads, for example. Thus, projects are not always likely to be handled by those who are likely to be most efficient. In the end, resources are often squandered through bribery among the wealthy and well-connected who are unconcerned with the country's well-being.

Another false assumption is that "speed" money necessarily does speed up the bureaucratic machinery. It may in fact cause more delays when officials are trying to generate additional bribes. Enterprises that report a high incidence of bribery actually spend a greater amount of time negotiating the ways of overcoming rules, and obtain licenses for such things as import-restricted items (Gray-Kauffman, 1998: 8). Also, the "speed" money view does not take into account the possibility that some otherwise-efficient businesses may have a moral aversion to bribery and corruption.

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Further, the argument does not recognize that contracts acquired through corruption are not enforceable in court. It discounts the idea that officials, even if bribed, may not deliver on their promises. It does not take into account that bribery actually raises the transaction costs. These arguments seriously weaken the "tonic" notion of corruption. On the other hand, one can readily identify various negative effects of corruption on a developing economy.

One of the key ingredients for accelerating economic growth anywhere is capital accumulation (both private and public); and corruption can not only reduce capital formation but also alter its character so that it becomes detrimental to national development. Foreign countries will be unlikely to invest in "risky" countries. As well, money involved in corruption domestically will unlikely be reinvested into the market. Corruption is almost like an inevitable tax on doing business, and this can further diminish incentives to invest.

One of the wastes associated with corruption is the fact that the proceeds are usually channeled into inefficient or unproductive activities. Poorly-constructed buildings, bridges, dams, etc. in various Third World countries are often attributed to governments giving privileges to those with the most money, not the most efficient for the tasks. Politicians, especially those in command, and other high officials take public resources and instead of investing in needed infrastructure, they are known to use them for private consumption. For instance, they buy fancy cars, jets and vacations and neglect the productive activities needed to encourage growth; recently, the former prime minister of Pakistan has been charged with tax evasion in connection with the purchase of a private helicopter worth more than $1 million (*InfoTimes@rcn.com*, 6/2/00). Or more often than not, "corrupt" money simply "flies" abroad, instead of being spent on domestic productive/consumption activities.

Andrew Wedeman explored the differential effects of corruption in some selected countries. Specifically focusing on Zaire and South Korea, he found negative growth effects on Zaire's economy, but generally positive consequences in South Korea. In Zaire, President Mobutu literally robbed the country of needed capital, and then invested the money for his own private gain, mostly in Swiss bank accounts. Corruption in this country led to complete economic collapse. South Korea also had a high incidence of corruption.

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However, a number of corrupt presidents in South Korea merely scraped off a percentage of the capital of the country, but still allowed capital formation in the nation's private sector. He concludes that while the leaders of South Korea profited from their investments, they – unlike Zaire – also helped fuel economic growth in the country (Wedeman, 1997: 469). However, he concludes that South Korea is the exception rather than the rule; usually most corrupt activities only lead to a loss in growth efforts.

There is other empirical evidence that corroborates the preceding arguments. Paulo Mauro explored the subject in a major study published in 1995. Based on a cross-sectional study of developing countries, he found that an improvement (i.e., reduced corruption) of one standard deviation in the corruption index is associated with an increase in investment rate of more than 4% (i.e., investment as percentage of GDP) (Mauro 91). Though it is difficult to curb corruption, this is a significant result. However, Mauro also found that when looking at a group of "honest" and "corrupt" countries, the results were not always similar. High corruption rates could lead to high, medium or low growth rates. There are simply too many factors that can contribute to growth. More studies are needed to confirm the concept that all forms of corruption invariably have negative effects on growth, although the present evidence leans heavily toward the positive economic effects of reduced corruption, as distinct from the purely moral-ethical arguments against corruption.

A recent study by the World Bank provides some further insights on the issue. Briefly, here are some findings based on a survey of 60 developing and industrialized countries onm the economic impact of corruption: (1) high and unpredictable corruption tends to hurt capital formation; countries with highly predictable corruption practices have higher investment rates; overall, however, corruption hurts economic performance, regardless of predictability; and (2) corruption tends to be higher where the expected "payoffs" are believed to be higher than expected "costs" (i.e., the probability of being caught, nature of punishment, etc.) (*Bulletin*, 3-4).

Another negative economic effect of corruption is that it tends to stifle talent and entrepreneurship. The highly educated and talented people in a country may engage in rent-seeking activities rather than productive work if the pay is perceived as better. If they

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can "earn" more as, say, a corrupt customs official, why should they open up a business? Corrupt administrations are a serious cost for business interests. As well, if people need many permits and licenses and it is necessary to bribe to get them, this can discourage innovation as well.

Finally, one of the worst effects that corruption can have on a developing society is that it further worsens the problems of poverty; further, it "redistributes wealth and power to the undeserving" (Klitgaard, 2000, 2). In a system where money talks, the rich will get richer and the cries of the poor will continue to be ignored. When bribes are necessary for things as simple as peasants' need for fertilizer or irrigation water, it is the poorest who will bear the heaviest burden. To wit, a "study of an irrigation district in India indicated that 20 to 30 percent of the funds the government provided were wasted in corruption and malfeasance;" further, irrigation experts in Pakistan discovered "that illegal water outlets were purchased from the state, imposing severe costs on downstream farmers" (quoted in Rose-Ackerman, 32). When rent-seeking activities can be used for private gain, basic needs of the masses such as food, clothing and shelter will be the last priority for public officials. Corruption involves the redistribution of assets from the relatively poor to the relatively wealthy, which exacerbates poverty, with longer-run negative distribution consequences. This is even seen when international or developed-country agencies come to a Third-World nation to extend aid for development projects. Graham Hancock in his book *Lords of Poverty* argues that international aid is not the same as international help. Most people never receive or make contact with the aid when corrupt officials are stealing it. So, even aid leads to corruption, with little or no benefits to the most vulnerable members of society. Corruption makes aid to the neediest countries virtually useless.

In sum, there are many negative political, social and economic effects of corruption on a developing society. Though there are some that argue that corruption can have some positive effects, it is difficult to ignore the evidence that most of the effects are in fact negative. Having provided some evidence to that effect, the focus may now be shifted to discussing some of the ways of dealing with Third-World corruption.

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V. Combating Corruption

In seeking solutions, it is necessary to address the causes. It must be remembered that corruption cannot be regarded as merely a problem in itself; it is a symptom of greater social, economic, and political forces. Solutions must seek to remedy the fundamental sources that breed corruption. For example, given that there is a demand-supply phenomenon with respect to bribes, solutions must focus on the causal forces. They must framed in terms of faulty institutions, low accountability, heavy regulations and other domestic problems.

The first thing that developing countries need to do is to embark on political reforms that will help foster an anti-corruption environment. Anti-corruption laws must be adopted on a widespread scale and they must be strictly enforced. There must be awareness on the part of the general public and the public officials that none is above the law and there are mechanisms in place that require accountability for actions and policies pursued by the officials.

It is important not only for data on corruption to be gathered, but for it to be published as well and this information must be publicly disseminated and available to all for the asking. Developing countries must adopt laws comparable to the US Freedom of Information Act. In many countries, criticizing a government official is an illegal act. This allows such officials to continue corrupt behavior without accountability. These types of laws need to be reversed. A free press is essential to combating these crimes, and the press must be able to publicize information about corrupt officials if the crackdown is to be successful. Although it is unreasonable to think that all countries will become democracies, the citizens must have some power as voters and users of public services.

Perhaps grassroots people-oriented anti-corruption organizations may be encouraged which will serve not only as monitoring agencies but also dissemination outlets; and such entities may undertake continuous and sustained anti-corruption campaigns. Most of all, campaigns need to be sustained and permanent. Too often, quick attempts at combating corruption lead to failure. Reforms may be slow in working, but in order to combat corruption, entire institutions must be reformed. The people, the government, the international community all need to be persistemt in encouraging strategies that will be successful not just in the short-term but in the long run as

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well.

One of the key reasons that corruption is so rampant is that accountability is low; however, "ensuring accountability is probably the most difficult issue" (Pope-Vogl, 8). It must be remembered that often the risks of being caught are low and that the punishment if caught is usually insignificant. As deterrent, the costs of engaging in corrupt behavior must be seen as extremely high. An effective solution in the early stages is first to punish some prominent corrupt officials. This will start breaking the culture of corruption by showing others that they, too, may be prosecuted. The legal and judicial systems also need to be revamped. Prosecutors, judges and police must be competent, honest, and autonomous of the state. The penalties for being caught must be very costly. Formal punishments like jail and payment of fines must be imminent if caught. But, informal punishments can also be effective in deterring possible offenders. Blackballing, negative publicity and a loss of respect in society can be very strong disincentives, especially in societies where personal relationships are valued. Anticorruption watchdog institutions must also be strengthened. These include private investigators, the press, accountants, and securities regulators. Citizen watchdog groups are also important, and must be free from the political process. Along with increasing the risks of corruption, countries need to increase the rewards for honesty. Incentives to reward honesty and efficient service need to be in place. Citizens who expose corrupt officials need to be protected from informal punishments.

The civil service and the administrative machinery are also institutions that must be changed. Many theorists argue that if low-level civil servants are accepting bribes out of necessity, then it is important to increase their pay. Knowing that they do not have to supplement their wages with bribes in theory should encourage more honest people to apply. But there is also concern that increasing wages, may foster further corruption because it makes these positions more desirable. However, if this is a solution that is accompanied by other institutional reforms, this result is unlikely. Also, there is a finding that there does appear to be less corruption in countries where public servants are paid relatively well compared to other workers (*Economist,* 1997: 60). These civil servants also need to be better trained to do their jobs more efficiently, so bribe money is not

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necessary to get things done.

Given the rather wide-ranging presence of governments in Third World countries, a well-argued solution, which was especially common in the global "Reaganomics" of the 1980s, to the problem of combating rampant corruption is to reduce the role of the state in favor of liberalization/ privatization. The proponents of this neo-classical free-market solution argue that state intervention often leads to "state failures" and that economic liberalization is the key answer. They feel that developing countries are underdeveloped because excessive state presence breeds corruption and inefficiency – thus, less government and increasing privatization must be pursued. However, some recent evidence suggests that this approach, while not without merit, is a bit simplistic; there is growing evidence that attempts to privatize and "capitalize" the economy have led to even more corruption. Privatization in Russia, India and Mexico has cost billions of dollars in bailouts and has contributed to inflation and halted growth (Celarier, 531). These countries encountered pressure from multinationals to privatize, but the pressure came "long before they had the independent regulatory, legal or judicial framework in place to effectively stop corruption" (Celarier, 531). The countries had a long history of corrupt governments, so if corruption had been the norm in the socialist state, it was certain to remain and even grow in the "privatized" environment. In Russia, for example, the former communist leaders benefitted greatly during the transition, which further worsened conditions for the average citizen.

The international community must also do its part to reduce corruption if a successful campaign is to be launched. There must be international support for domestic reforms, since many bribes come from the developed countries. Multinational corporations need to promote and enforce anti-bribery legislation abroad. International financial institutions such as The World Bank and the IMF must do their part to crack down on corruption. They can make loans conditional on domestic reforms with goals of reducing corruption. The World Trade Organization can also help by cracking down on bribes from MNCs and developed countries (see Pope-Vogl for further discussion; also see Pieth).

A serious change in the way that foreign aid is distributed to developing countries is also necessary. The presence of too many middlemen makes skimming off the top much too easy. Consideration

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needs to be given to a more effective approach to distributing aid so that it actually helps the development process. Aid needs to be provided especially to improved public administration mechanisms. Robert Klitgaard even suggests holding a contest to see which country could develop the best national strategies to reduce corruption, the prize being additional aid for a certain number of years to help them with development (Klitgaard, 1998: 6). Strategies that reward honest behavior will increase the benefits of acting legally and further increase the costs of corruption.

Conclusion

Corruption is a symptom of the many other problems that developing countries face. However, it is easy to recognize most of these problems. Underdevelopment, inefficient institutions, and many other factors exacerbate the problem of corruption. And the existence of corruption itself furthers these development problems. Solutions aimed at dealing with development issues, such as poverty, population control, unemployment and better education are very important in themselves. However, by focusing on development issues, corruption may be contained as well. The economic incentives for engaging in corruption must be changed. Above all, there needs to be more accountability, and greater rewards for honesty. Some of these reforms require broad institutional changes, which can be difficult and costly. However, they will serve many purposes; combating corruption is just one of them. The international community must recognize the seriousness of this problem. There are many strong ideas out there about how countries need to revamp their systems and engage in a strong anticorruption campaign. The international public groups, the NGOs and the international business community must play their part in helping to support these measures.

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BOOK REVIEWS

Joyride to Infinity:
A Scientific Study of the Doomsday Literature
R. A. McConnell
Scott-Townsend Publishers, ISBN 1-878465-35-X

It is the main title, and not the subtitle, that best characterizes this book. In effect, *Joyride to Infinity* is an intellectual feast, encapsulating the thought of R. A. McConnell, now in his mid-eighties, who has for more than half a century been alive mentally to a broad spectrum of issues and ideas. The book is at once readable, stimulating, provocative, rewarding – and given to exploring themes that many readers may perhaps consider extreme but will nevertheless find quite interesting.

McConnell is a physicist who between 1947 and 1982 devoted his research almost entirely to psychic phenomena, first at the University of Pittsburgh and then at Duke University. From the totality of the evidence he reviewed, including many cases of "spontaneous psi," he is convinced that psychic phenomena do occur, and that there is accordingly a spiritual reality of immense importance separate from the physical, despite the fact that scientifically conducted experiments in the laboratory find the subject-matter frustratingly elusive. We might imagine that many readers may be deflected by his discussion of these things in the first part of the book, but what held this reviewer's attention was the fact that I have long been curious to know just what has come out of the decades of psychic research at Duke University. Readers who share that curiosity will want to read that first part, and perhaps most particularly McConnell's more systematic books on the subject, such as *Parapsychology in the Context of Science*.

Three-fourths of the book, however, deal with a variety of other subjects that have occupied McConnell's attention in the most recent years of his career. A key sentence that explains his choice of subjects is his statement that "the evasion of reality on every conceivable subject by all of us is the key to the human condition." This leads him to focus on what he sees as threats to civilization, including the disintegration of Western Civilization that was triggered

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by the two World Wars. (At the same time, it illustrates the eclectic nature of the book that he includes quite an insightful essay about Affirmative Action that he submitted to a court in 1972, and a number of perspicacious comments about university life.) Most of the volume, however, is devoted to critical reviews of books he considers important about the environmental crisis that he sees as impending because of over-population, the controversy over genetics and intelligence, multiculturalism and immigration, and (as we would expect) parapsychology. He provides a synopsis of many of the books, as well as his own commentary.

The reviews provide an intriguing bibliography, and will more than likely lead readers to seek out some of those books for their own reading. One of these, for example, is Lyons, Moore and Smith's recent (1995) *Is the End Nigh?*, to which McConnell devotes 18 pages. Those authors have much in common with McConnell in their concern over population growth, the environment, immigration, globalization, growing income and wealth polarization, the weakness of economic and free trade theory, and even the international migration of disease. Many of the books McConnell reviews relate to one or more of these subjects.

Joyride to Infinity is a book that "thinks large." Intellectually, that's a virtue, if we value stimulation. When one of the books he reviews gets into such possibilities for "the extinction of mankind" as "radiation damage by a supernova explosion, [or] disruption of the solar system by the visit of a cold massive intruder from outer space," one wonders, however, whether the speculations are not getting too far removed from the sorts of things people have reason to worry about. There is, indeed, much to be concerned about; and the great weight of McConnell's discussion deals with these things.

Dwight D. Murphey

Chinese Intelligence Operations
Nicholas Eftimiades
Newcomb Publishers 1998, Arlington, VA, 174 pages, Paperback

This provocative little book is still the "only show in town" in regard to Chinese Intelligence operations. Nick Eftimiades explains

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how the People's Republic of China operates their intelligence organizations, what their goals are, and how they differ in some respects from their Russian tutors – the KGB and GRU. He mentions a national characteristic of the Chinese – they have a great deal of trouble keeping secrets. There are also so many of them.

The Soviet agents were always, and to a great extent, still are a problem to the nations of the West, but the Chinese are a much bigger problem, reaching gigantic proportions where U.S. counterintelligence efforts to contain spying are concerned. Just consider the number of Chinese overseas – who number some 40-60 million people alone. Add to that the 40,000 Chinese graduate students studying in the United States at any given time. Which of these students is a spy? Which of these students will decide not to spy if asked? This is a problem for both the American and Chinese authorities. Appendix 2 of this book renders a translation of a PRC document on the handling of these students while they are here in the United States.

In the other direction, many Americans go to the PRC to study. They are invited to lecture and they bring papers to present and laptops loaded with information. These lectures are arranged to stimulate the Americans to talk about sensitive and perhaps classified data during their visits. The Americans are closely cultivated while in the PRC. The PRC in turn sends 10,000 people each year to the U.S. to mine information at American gatherings of interest to them.

Not all of the PRC intelligence operations are directed against the United States. Great efforts are made against Australia, Taiwan, Japan and other Asian states. Domestically, the PRC follows the practices of most communist states with "block captains" to report on any foreigners in their area, as does Castro's Cuba for instance.

The PRC personnel are quite pushy, as the recent case in Washington involving the renting of a building overlooking the Pentagon indicates. They indicate instant anger and disgust if their requests are not filled immediately.

This is a handbook written by a professional intelligence officer with a great depth of experience and as such it can benefit the informed as well as those who want to learn what all the fuss is about.

Fred Smith

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American Academia and the Survival of Marxist Ideas
Dario Fernandez-Morera
Praeger Publishers, 1996

This is a scholarly book that offers a valuable critique of several of the central tenets of Marxist thought, and especially of the denial of the realities of Marxist practice that has been common among those who have continued to cling to Marxism since the demise of the Soviet Union. As such, it is a worthy addition to the literature on Marxism.

Fernandez-Morera, an associate professor of comparative literature and Hispanic studies at Northwestern University, also deals most particularly with what he considers to be at the heart of Marxist theory: its epistemology, in which all concepts are seen relativistically as arising out of class conflict. The book offers many examples of this sort of thinking, which has come to be manifested so pervasively within deconstructionism, Critical Theory, multiculturalism (where it is applied to ethnicity rather than to class), and much feminist writing. Fernandez-Morera's critique of this relativism is from a classical liberal, Austrian School of Economics perspective, with many references to the ideas of such thinkers as Mises, Hayek, Bastiat and Menger. He doesn't refer to the *Methodenstreit*, but his critique could be considered a continuation, in effect, of the great argument over methodology that raged in the late nineteenth century between the Austrian School and the German Historical School.

This reviewer does have important reservations about the book, although they don't negate the strengths I have just mentioned:

1. It seems a shame that Fernandez-Morera didn't make the book an occasion to explore the many subtleties that bear on the subject of "relativism." The subject deserves to be carried into much greater depth than past discussions have taken it, since there is so much to say about when relativism is appropriate and when it is not.

There is a propensity among the successive generations of the Austrian School simply to repeat the same "truisms" without further extension or elaboration. Since other bodies of thought have during the past century taken on considerable nuance, even though they are not nearly as sound as the Austrian School is on most things, the result is that the ideas come across as over-simplifications. The School's ideas were accordingly easily brushed aside during the

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decades that free market thinking was very much a minority intellectual position; and now that support for a global market economy is ascendant, the over-simplifications take on an even more damaging role, locking classical liberalism into a circular ideology that no longer allows itself to look afresh at the imperatives of a free society.

2. Fernandez-Morera focuses on certain Marxist arguments, but makes no attempt to grapple with other concepts that are equally central to Marxism, such as its "theory of exploitation" (today continued as "victimization") and the "labor theory of value." An author isn't obliged to explore more than he chooses to discuss, but readers will want to note the limits.

3. The title suggests that this is a book about today's academic Marxism. It is not, however, the place to look for a detailed review of the contemporary scene in either American or European university life. It tells us nothing, for example, about what one will confront at a meeting, say, of the Midwest Sociological Society or of the Modern Language Association. Fernandez-Morera's discussion isn't empirical about today's academic Marxism, but is based on ratiocination about certain important Marxist perspectives. The book is valuable for what it is, but not for what its title suggests.

Dwight D. Murphey

The Black Book of Communism: Crimes, Terror, Repression
Stephane Courtois, Nicolas Werth, Jean-Louis Panne, Andrzej Paczkowski, Karel Bartosek, Jean-Louis Margolin
Trans. by Jonathan Murphy and Mark Kramer
Harvard University Press 1999

If someone were to ask "What are the ten most important books to have on your bookshelf?," a strong argument could be made that this book must be included on the list – high praise, indeed. It merits so preeminent a position for a number of reasons.

One, of course, is that the twentieth century can hardly be understood without a detailed realization of the brutalities of Communism in all its manifestations, worldwide. Those enormities rank among the central facts of the century and yet are little known.

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Such a background is needed, too, if world opinion is ever to move away from the double standard that has long considered Nazism an unmitigated evil but that has granted considerable leniency, often even indulgence or preference, to Marxism-Leninism. Many of the events of the past century, large and small, are understood only in the most warped fashion because of that moral, ideological skewing.

There is also a less abstract, more humanly personal, reason: that the 85 to 100 million victims as estimated in this book cry out to scholars to be noticed. These are victims whose lives have vanished in much the same way as one "unperson" after another was airbrushed out of old Bolshevik photographs. There are even now few dramas, documentaries, museums, "survivors' testimonies," war crimes trials, or other acknowledgments that these tens of millions were once living, breathing human beings. When their lives ended, they fell off into a memory hole; and even the most elementary respect for human life requires that they not stay there permanently.

The Black Book of Communism states its purpose as being "to paint a true picture of all the criminal aspects of the Communist world, from individual assassinations to mass murder." It devotes more than 200 of its 856 pages to the Soviet Union, about which it gives an indispensable history; but there is in turn a detailed chronicling of events in Spain, Poland, Central and Southeastern Europe, China, North Korea, Laos, Cambodia, Latin America, Africa and Afghanistan. It centers on the atrocities and does not aspire to be a complete history of the Communist regimes or movements in those places (for example, its account of the Civil War in Russia after the Bolshevik coup omits any mention of Trotsky's role commanding battlefields from his train or of the intervention of foreign troops).

Such a book is of value only if it is the work of credible scholars. That requirement is well-satisfied here. The authors are primarily French historians and specialists in Communism, although Andrzej Paczkowski is Polish and Karel Bartosek a Czech. They are all connected with the Centre d'Etude d'Histoire et de Sociologie du Communisme and its review *Communisme*. We are told in the Foreword that "these researchers are former Communists or close fellow-travelers" (which itself has pluses and minuses, but will certainly add to their credibility among those who share the general assumption that intellect and objective scholarship come only from

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the Left). There is much internal evidence in the book of its objectivity, such as when it cites the varying estimates of the Soviet deportation of Poles without attempting to insist on one at the exclusion of the others.

The work is informed by the information now available through the archives that have been made public in the formerly-Communist world. The records of the Gulag administration are now open, as are the Czech archives and those of the Stasi in the former East Germany. There will be more research to do in the future, since several important archives remain closed, such as the Russian Presidential archive, the Soviet foreign intelligence archive, and the Chinese and Vietnamese archives. Many of the documents are still classified about the repression of the Poles, and very little has been revealed about North Korea or about the vast death camps in western China.

This reviewer experienced two phases in his reading of the *Black Book*. The first 500 pages held him spellbound, despite their horrific subject-matter; but then the continual accounts of executions, purges, politically-induced famines, tortures and rapes necessarily became wearisome, and he began to see the book more as an invaluable resource than as something to be devoured from front to back in a continuous reading. To say this is not to criticize the book, which had serious work to do, but is rather a commentary on the grisly subject matter.

We might hope that the study of Communism's atrocities will not become set in cement, where certain totals become articles of faith. Consistently with the soundest intellectual tradition, there will be room for long-continued scholarship, necessarily with revised estimates. At present, there are wide variations in the estimates made. For example, the totals for those starved to death as a matter of state policy during Mao's Great Leap Forward (1959-1961) run from as "low" as 20 million to as high as 43 million; and the estimates of those killed during China's Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) vary from a "mere" 400,000 to as many as three million. Estimates of the number of deaths under Pol Pot in Cambodia are from 750,000 to 3.8 million. More exact detail is known about the Soviet Union, and we are told that there were from 10,000 to 15,000 summary executions in simply the two months of September and October, 1918, and that during the 14 months of the Great Terror in 1937 and 1938, 1.8

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million people were arrested, with 690,000 killed. I cite these figures only as illustration, since the *Black Book* contains countless others.

The worldwide scope of this study is relevant to some important intellectual issues, and undermines some of the sophistries about Communism:

There are those, for example, who have argued that Communism was not a coherent entity, and that the word is just a term of convenience to lump together a number of disparate movements. The fact, however, that terror-for-terror's-sake as a tool of social manipulation has been central to virtually all Communist regimes is too much a coincidence to be ignored. In addition to generalized terror, certain features have been recurrent: one-party systems, the centralization of economic planning, accelerated industrialization, the collectivization of agriculture, and anti-religious militancy. These things arose out of shared ideology and the ongoing efforts of the Comintern, the Cominform, the Soviet Union, Red China, Castro's Cuba, and others.

Some adherents to *Realpolitik* such as de Gaulle have argued that Communist movements were really just disguised nationalism. This, too, is a reductionism, since it brushes aside too lightly the common features. If Communism were simply nationalism, why would the USSR have trained the MPLA's cadres in Angola; or Castro have provided guerrilla schools for them, as well as tens of thousands of his own soldiers? Why would the Sendero Luminoso ("Shining Path") in Peru have sought to emulate Stalin, the Chinese Gang of Four, and Cambodia's Pol Pot?

In addition, the *Black Book* continues the process of refuting the premise, prominently advanced by Khrushchev, that Communism in Soviet Russia started out benignly, but turned vicious with Stalin. Lenin, we are reminded, put into place all of the apparatus of the terror-state. It helps to read Lenin's 1918 telegram in which he ordered the hanging of 100 kulaks: "I mean hang publicly, so that people see it... Do all this so that for miles around people see it, understand it, tremble."

The authors don't comment on it, but one fact that is mentioned alters the impression I had long held of Bukharin. I had thought that he was one Bolshevik, at least, who wanted Communism "with a human face." A few years ago, an academic colleague of mine, an American "academic Marxist," relished Bukharin for precisely this

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reason. It hardly comports with this when we are told that "Bukharin, after the execution of his old Party comrades Zinoviev and Kamenev, publicly declared: 'I am so happy that they have been shot like dogs.'"

There is much to be learned from the *Black Book*'s many details. It is interesting, for example, how many aspects of later Leftist revolutionary activity echoed early Communist experience. We remember the American New Left's call "not to trust anybody over thirty." There is resonance, then, when we are told that Nechaev, the blood-thirsty of forerunner of Lenin, "proposed the extermination of all Russians over twenty-five years old." We know, too, that China had "Red Guards" during the Cultural Revolution. It adds light to know that groups of armed workers in Russia in 1917 were also called "Red Guards." I had thought that the personality-denying process of public criticism, self-accusation, confession and mass cruelty were somewhat distinctively Chinese; but in fact these same ingredients appear as part of "reeducation" in Communist Romania.

Dadaistic ridiculousness was a successful comic technique of the American New Left, especially with Jerry Rubin and Abbie Hoffman. The Left has employed Dadaism many times, but I hadn't known of its use in Romania: "Some of the reeducators played the part of choirboys; others masqueraded as priests. Turcanu's liturgy was extremely pornographic... The Virgin Mary was called 'the Great Whore,' and Jesus 'the cunt who died on the cross.' One seminarian undergoing reeducation and playing the role of a priest had to undress completely and was then wrapped in a robe stained with excrement. Around his neck was hung a phallus made of bread and soap...." Rubin and Hoffman weren't original geniuses of street theater, just leftists in a long-established mold.

To mention just some of what the book tells us runs the risk of trivializing the vastness of its account. It is a bit like focussing on a shrub or a canyon or two while driving past the enormous mesas of Utah or New Mexico. The many details are themselves full of significance, each deserving much more elaboration in separate works, but the chronicle as a whole is just as indispensable.

Dwight D. Murphey

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The Vanished Kingdom:
Travels Through the History of Prussia
James Charles Roy
Westview Books, 1999

There may, for all I know, be an entire literary genre that could be described as "traveling histories." This book is, however, this reviewer's first experience with it, and I found it delightful. James Charles Roy has travelled from place to place in what was once Prussia, often camping out in the countryside, and telling of the ghostlike bleakness there today after 55 years of socialist suffocation and cultural obliteration. His observations and interviews of old timers pass seamlessly into a recounting of the history of the particular place, a process through which he is able to tell coherently the various historical episodes in Prussian history. Midway through the book, it struck me that the transitions from present to past had hardly seemed like transitions at all, causing me to go back to look at how he had achieved the synthesis. The answer is that there are no transitions – just an easy flow into history-telling.

Roy's other books on European history have been Book-of-the-Month Club and History Book Club selections. With *The Vanished Kingdom*, he has chosen as his subject one of the more pivotal areas in Europe, which makes it an important book for most readers, who will have had only a passing awareness of Prussia's long history. It is surprising, and somewhat amusing, to learn that the Teutonic Knights began as the monkish 'Order of St. Mary's Hospital' taking care of injured Crusaders in Jerusalem. From being just a minor appendage to the Crusades, they became the dominant power in north-central Europe, conducting incessant warfare with the neighboring (and also fiercely warlike) peoples. They reached the height of their power in the fourteenth century, but collapsed shortly after their disaster in the (first) Battle of Tannenberg in 1410.

Perhaps their most significant residual was the rise of the Junker class. The Junkers were small landowners, chronically poor, who had been given land in exchange for military service over a two century period and who continued as military men to provide themselves a needed source of income. The Junkers were reminiscent of the Old Romans of Cato the Elder's day: austere, disciplined, aristocratically contemptuous of the common man. The fact that they detested

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central authority meant that, contrary to the stereotype, they later weren't given to supporting Bismarck or Hitler.

The Thirty Years' War (1618-1648) was one of "indescribable butchery," but out of it arose the unification of Brandenburg and East Prussia under a Hohenzollern in 1618. It was under the Hohenzollerns that Prussia rose to the position of a major European power, particularly under the Great Elector, Frederick William, who reigned for 48 years starting in 1640. The army was central to the Hohenzollern dynasty. Frederick the Great, who assumed the throne in 1740, created a united Prussia after his victory in the Seven Years' War against Austrian, French and Russian armies.

Little more than half a century later, Prussia was again embroiled in war. Napoleon won the battles of Jena and Auerstaedt in 1806, occupying Berlin. The tide turned, however, during the rest of the nineteenth century, as Germany passed through "a period of liberation, reform, consolidation, [and] industrial growth." Prussia took the lead in the eventual consolidation of Germany's 26 states and cities into a united Germany under Bismarck. After Bismarck's defeat of Napoleon III in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870, the new German empire was established in the Hall of Mirrors at Versailles Palace in early 1871.

Roy continues the history on through to the present, but that history is less in need of being recounted here, since most readers will be familiar with it. Many people do not realize, however, that at the end of World War II Poland was moved westward, with much of eastern Germany becoming a part of Poland and, at the same time, eastern Poland becoming part of the Soviet Union. The result is that, as Roy tells us, "Prussia today does not exist." Its territory was divided "among Poles, Russians, [and] Lithuanians."

Nevertheless, Prussia was for centuries the very heart of the German psyche. "The idea of Prussia," one of Roy's interviewees told him, consisted of "our notion of purpose, service, steadfastness, and duty to both our race and our land. Also, to the idea of permanence." Roy grapples with the question of whether the separation of Prussia from Germany will become a major source of conflict in the future, despite the acquiescence of present-day Germans, but of course can't provide a long-term answer.

Dwight D. Murphey

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The Menace of Multiculturalism:
Trojan Horse in America
Schmidt, Alvin J.
Praeger Publishers, Westport, CT. (1997) ISBN 0-275-95598-2.

The word multiculturalism is commonly used with two opposing meanings. On the one hand, there are those who would like to strengthen what is known as Western or European culture by including the best ideas from all other cultures so that it might become a universal model for human behavior. These might be called "cultural inclusionists." On the other hand, there are those who want to destroy Western society by reducing it to chaos so that they can rebuild it according to the same naive egalitarian dream that motivated Pol Pot of Cambodia. These insist that all existing cultures are equal in value except for European culture, which is bad.

Schmidt's book is about the second kind of multiculturalism, and that is the meaning your reviewer will adopt when using the word. Schmidt acknowledges the first kind of multiculturalism by calling it "multicultural education," of which he heartily approves.

The strength of the book lies in the fact that it can be read with interest by readers at any level of intelligence if it matched by an appropriate level of sophistication.

Schmidt is a sociologist and is perhaps not aware that most natural scientists, if they have an opinion, believe that: (1) Homosexuality has a genetic basis. (2) The fully established 15-point average 10 difference between U.S. blacks and whites is largely genetic. (3) The population/environment problem is the foremost challenge of our time, outweighing all others by far. (4) With millions dying of starvation and disease elsewhere in the world, and with our country facing an uncertain future, abortion is not a transcendent evil but must be weighed against its realistic alternatives both at home and abroad.

Chapter 1: Schmidt defines multiculturalism as follows (p. 3):

> Multiculturalism is a leftist political ideology that sees all cultures, their mores and institutions, as essentially equal. No culture is considered superior or inferior to any other; it is merely different. Criticism of other cultures, especially non-Western/minority cultures,

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is labeled "insensitive" and "bigoted."

Chapter 2: "False, Deceptive Portraits." In this chapter Schmidt discusses the use and misuse of the word culture by multiculturalists. He analyses slogans that are used by multiculturalists to give the appearance of being cultural inclusionists.

Chapter 3: "Multiculturalism's Leftist (Marxist) Concepts." This chapter presents the ideal behind multiculturalism, namely, total equality for all people and all cultures, and the slogans and ideology derived from that ideal. He warns vaguely about the claim that "knowledge and truth are socially constructed" but does not delve into "postmodernism" and its materialist roots.

Chapter 4: "All Cultures Are Not Equal." Schmidt examines a number of cultures and shows that the multiculturalist's claim that all cultures are equal is too absurd even to postulate. His emphasis is on moral differences. Among his more colorful examples are the "giraffe women" who had their necks enormously elongated beginning at age five by adding brass rings until they are carrying perhaps 20 pounds of brass on atrophied neck muscles. If a woman committed adultery, the rings were removed, the head fell over, and the sinner suffocated.

Chapter 5: "The Facts Be Damned: Omissions, Distortions, and Noble Lies." In discussing slavery in the U.S., history textbooks fail to mention that slavery was already widespread among American Indian as well as African tribes. Nor is there any mention of the fact that slavery lasted much longer in Africa and Asia than in the British Empire and the U.S. Today, slavery still exists in the Sudan.

A 1993 "multicultural" textbook describes the Aztec and Mayan civilizations "as impressive as those found anywhere in the world." but makes no mention of their ritual slaughter nor of their very limited cultural attainments. When discussing American Indians, no mention is made that many of the tribes were bloodthirsty and some practiced cannabilism. Multiculturalists have foisted upon the American public the notion that American Indians were ecologically minded. Schmidt sets the record straight.

Multiculturalism ignores the flaws in modern cultures except those of Western providence. A sixth-grade, 1995 text on the Eastern Hemisphere devotes eight pages to Islam but makes no mention that in traditional Islamic society women are veiled and barred from public life. Textbooks describing Latin American life ignore the

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Hispanic practice of Machismo in which the male is admired for his extra-marital sexual relationships which the wife must tolerate without complaint. All other cultures are romanticized in recent textbooks except those of the West, which are belittled as imperialist, oppressive, and devoid of merit.

Under "Feelgood history for minorities and women" Schmidt provides many examples of distortions of U.S. history that have appeared in American history books since the 1960s, lessening the achievements of whites and exaggerating the contributions of minorities. These come under the heading of "noble lies."

Speaking as a former Canadian who visits Canada once a year, Schmidt says: "American School children deserve to be told the truth about what multiculturalism is doing to Canada; instead they are taught distortions and falsehoods." (p.56) Schmidt provides an historical review of the French-English cultural strife in Canada.

In a similar vein, he deplores the fact that the sad state of affairs in Yugoslavia is never presented in the popular press as a failed experiment in multiculturalism. To do so would not be politically correct.

Chapter 6: "Diversity: A One-Way Street down Leftist Lane." This chapter is devoted primarily to three aspects of diversity: (1) Racial segregation and favoritism on university and college campuses. (2) The promotion of homosexual objectives. (3) The displacement of the great literary works of Western civilization by intellectually inconsequential books chosen to further multicultural or "politically correct" objectives.

. Schmidt characterizes campus multiculturalism as "a pretense, a sham, a fraud." University administrators throughout the country have acceded to the demands of black students for segregated housing and other segregated facilities and for Afrocentric academic departments taught by black professors only. In western U.S. the segregation has been extended to Hispanics.

Since there are hundreds of African cultures, the more gullible and less competent black students merely replace their European names with African names, adopt some African clothing style, and imitate some African rituals, all in the childish belief that they are returning to their African culture. This gets them no respect from nonblacks. Meanwhile, they are taught to believe fanciful tales of Black African achievements in science, the arts, and politics.

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Schmidt reports several illustrative incidents, including: Vassar College in 1991 had a separate graduating ceremony for blacks. The University of Pennsylvania has a separate yearbook for blacks. But when the Sons of Italy offered California State University scholarships for needy students of Italian descent, they were refused with the explanation that the University would not accept racially or ethnically directed scholarships unless they were intended for African Americans, American Indians, or Hispanics. When Linda Chavez, an Hispanic American who believes that Hispanic immigrants should learn English, had an Arizona State University speaking engagement cancelled, the explanation was: "the Minority Coalition has requested that we cancel this engagement and bring in other speakers whose views are more in line with their politics." (p.67)

On many U.S. campuses, homosexuals, dissatisfied with tolerance, are successfully demanding social approval for their sexual practices. On such campuses, any overt student expression of disapproval of homosexuality is punished by the administration.

Schmidt provides a detailed medical explanation of the fact that the human rectum is not made for penile intercourse (p.74), pointing out the serious medical consequences of such intercourse, including the spread of AIDS. Schmidt provides statistics with journal references on the prevalence of deviant sexual practices by homosexuals as well as on the psychopathological practice of sado-masochism. The public has been led to believe that these practices are exceptional. If these surprising numbers are correct, they are of profound sociological importance and should be made known to the general public.

Chapter 7: "Political Correctness: Multiculturalism's Police." Schmidt defines the term Political Correctness in terms of its history and use. The promotional aims behind political correctness are succinctly stated as (1) to impose multiculturalist values that relativize all knowledge and standards of truth except the multiculturalist's own, and (2) to dismantle the Euro-American culture. Lists are provided of politically incorrect terms and their PC equivalents. PC activities, laws, and campus regulations are given, along with numerous examples of ridiculous harassment of persons who were deemed not politically correct.

Chapter 8: "From Melting Pot to Boiling Pot." begins with a history of cultural assimilation in the U.S.A. Schmidt distinguishes

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between cultural assimilation, which is necessary for the survival of a society, and racial amalgamation, which is not. He sees Multiculturalism as constituting a two-prong attack on European civilization: Afrocentrism for the Negro and bilingualism for Hispanic immigrants.

What has been subsidized by the government as bilingual education is rapidly becoming bilingual citizenship with official dealings in two languages. This chapter gives a detailed history of bilingualism in Canada: and then treats at length bilingualism in the U.S. Schmidt reveals which organizations are promoting bilingualism, what they have done and are doing, and their plans for the future. The effect of bilingualism is to doom immigrant children to menial jobs while creating a political and managerial elite among those who handle both languages well.

Chapter 9: "Multiculturalism's Threat to the Family." From a different set of premises, one might largely agree with what Schmidt has to say in this chapter. For the preservation of benign cultures and, with them, civilization, the family would appear to be an essential element. The key to understanding multiculturalism's opposition to the family is stated on page 136: "For a mother to acquire an identity from having borne and raised children is an unpardonable sin; for in this way she perpetuates the Eurocentric, patriarchal culture."

Despite their claim that all cultures are equal, multiculturalists' opposition to trans-racial adoption is well known. Schmidt reports (p.134) that transracial adoptions are opposed by The National Association of Black Social Workers, the North American Council on Adoptable Children, and the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People. One purpose of such opposition, according to Schmidt, is to preserve the distinction between black and white in order to promote black political power and the claim to preferential treatment as "victims."

Schmidt continues with chapter citing the suppression of traditional Western symbols in the path of multiculturalis, but his concluding chapter (Chapter 12) entitled "America's Fight for Its Soul" sadly offers nothing for an understanding of multiculturalism but merely conveys a feeling for the state of mind of the author's own Judaeo-Christian convictions.

R. A. McConnell

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Joyride to Infinity

Robert A. McConnell Ph.D.

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The author is both an engineer and a scientist. As an engineer, his competence was proved as a radar development group leader in World War II. As a scientist with a Ph.D. in physics he is a Research Professor Emeritus of Biological Science, a Life Senior Member of the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, a Fellow of the American Psychological Society, and a Fellow of the American Association for the Advancement of Science.

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